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Corporate governance has emerged as a decisive business issue. Less 
corporate governance research is undertaken in civil law countries like 
Germany. In this thesis, the role of institutional investors in Germany is studied 
with the aim of providing an answer to the following research question: What 
role do independent institutional investors play in the corporate governance of 
listed German companies? This study follows an inductive qualitative research 
approach. The research model is based on six variables - board oversight, 
board nomination, identifying weaknesses, making recommendations, 
introducing changes in corporate strategy and exercising institutional power - to 
determine the role of institutional investors and to provide answers. 
Overall, the results show that the participants of the research study experience 
the role and responsibilities of institutional investors in the German two-tier 
corporate governance system as weak to medium across all six variables. The 
handling of recommendations from institutional investors to companies is not 
structured or executed in a systematic way by the study participants. The 
results indicate that the interviewees are convinced that institutional investors 
could be valuable partners in strengthening and improving corporate 
governance. They can playa role in corporate governance and can add value 
because they have a good understanding about the strategy and business 
model of the companies, expertise in research & analysis as well as a good 
sector expertise. However, the type of institutional investor matters in corporate 
governance. The strongest players are private equity and hedge funds. The 
weakest players are endowments and insurances. The most common company 
situations when institutional investors prompt change are underperformance, 
special company situations/crisis, corporate finance issues and management 
remuneration. The majority of the study participants expect a higher 
shareholder engagement in the future. Most of them have a positive point of 
view about the future role of institutional investors in corporate governance. 
III 
The managerial implications of this study are that the investor relations function 
is well established and the programmes are sufficiently executed in German 
companies. Communication is the most appropriate measure. However, other 
typical and presumably more powerful measures like use of voting rights, 
engagement in the AGM, regular contact to the members of the supervisory 
board, taking a seat in the supervisory board, owning a meaningful company 
stake and collaboration with other shareholders seem to playa minor role. 
There is still potential for institutional investors to improve their role in corporate 
governance in German companies. In order to improve their influence in 
corporate governance institutional investors need to be prepared to pursue an 
escalation strategy. This encompasses for example to increase their stake to a 
meaningful and powerful level and/or they need to collaborate effectively and 
systematically with other shareholders to increase their acceptance vis-a-vis the 
company and to ask for a seat in the supervisory board. However, such an 
approach also needs a strong long-term commitment and investment 
perspective as well as an attitude that also considers the long-term interests of 
the company. 
It can be concluded that institutional investors with a high level of expertise can 
contribute to the widely discussed improvement of the competence and 
independence of German supervisory boards. Important prerequisites of 
institutional investors to playa role in corporate governance are no conflict of 
interest and a sufficient sector expertise. Therefore, disadvantages like conflict 
of interest and lack of expertise have to be addressed properly. 
The results from this research can be used to draw lessons for (1) members of 
supervisory boards, members of the management board (in particular CEOs, 
and CFOs), as well as investor relations officers of listed companies, who want 
to improve governance and the relationship with their institutional shareholders; 
(2) institutional investors who want to enhance their engagement in their 
portfolio companies; and (3) standard setters like institutions and commissions 
that want to improve corporate governance. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research background 
In recent years, corporate governance has emerged as a critical business issue 
and has attracted public attention for various reasons. 
Firstly, a number of shocking, high profile corporate scandals and the 
unexpected failure of several major companies in the Western Hemisphere at 
the beginning of the 21 st century, as well as the negative outcome of the 
financial crisis, have fuelled current discussions on good governance. Table 1.1 
gives a brief overview of those scandals and the respective results of bad 
governance. 
An event that had a significant impact on the development of corporate 
governance in Germany was the takeover of the telecommunications and 
engineering Mannesmann Group by Vodafone, the UK mobile phone company. 
After three months of an unfriendly takeover battle, the boards of both 
companies reached a merger agreement. Shortly after the announcement of the 
final takeover deal, it became public that some of the top managers had 
negotiated a 'golden handshake'. The merger was followed by a criminal trial, 
which began on 21 January 2004. The legal issues involved were whether or 
not former directors of Mannesmann had committed 'Untreue', or breach of 
fiduciary duty. The six defendants included prominent figures in corporate 
Germany, most notably Josef Ackermann, the former chief executive of 
Germany's largest bank, Deutsche Bank, and former members of 
Mannesmann's supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The enormity of the 
companies and personalities involved stretched the trial's magnitude beyond 
the confines of this single takeover (Kolla, 2004). This takeover deal was 
regarded as a sign of the 'end of the Deutschland AG'. The long-term, 
consensus oriented German approach has often been contrasted with the 
'Anglo-Saxon approach'. The Mannesmann case marked an important step 
towards a more shareholder value orientation and an acceleration of the 
transformation process in the German governance system (Jurgens et aI., 
2000). 
Investors lost confidence in companies, their managers and in the numbers 
recorded by them after the fraud committed by Enron and Worldcom. Both 
companies used inappropriate accounting practices to appear profitable in order 
to attract investors. An audit revealed that Worldcom's cash flow was 
overstated by $3.9 billion 1 (Backover et aI., 2002). Both cases forced investors, 
lawmakers, executives and regulators to review the system that allowed such 
disasters to occur. 
Parmalat, the biggest diary company based in Italy, declared bankruptcy for 
many reasons, including investment disasters, non-existent cash in bank, fake 
transactions, hidden debts and the use of derivatives and accounting fraud to 
hide these facts (httpJ/emievil.hubpages.com/hub/1 O-Scandals-That-Rocked-
the-Accounting-World, accessed 25 February 2012). 
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers is widely acknowledged as the starting 
point of the worldwide financial crisis. On 14 September 2008, the investment 
bank announced that it would file for liquidation after huge losses in the 
mortgage market and a loss of investor confidence crippled it and it was unable 
to find a buyer (http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/business/companiesl 
lehman_brothers_holdingsjnc/index.html, accessed 25 February 2012). The 
behaviour of the company resulted in socially unacceptable costs, and its 
collapse is acknowledged as the consequence of a financially and morally 
bankrupt institution, which failed its fiduciary duties and betrayed both public 
and private trust. (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2011/ 
dec/12/Iehman-brothers-bankrupt, accessed 25 February 2012). 
I All dollar amounts are expressed in US dollars. 
2 
Table 1.1: Selected corporate governance scandals. 
Company Country Corporate Scandal Year 
MannesmannNodafone Germany Betrayal in a hostile 1999/2000 takeover 
Enron USA Accounting fraud 2001 
Worldcom USA Accounting fraud/ 2002 bankruptcy 
Parmalat Italy Delayed filing of 2003 insolvency 
Lehman Brothers USA Accounting fraud, 2008 bankruptcy 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Corporate governance in the UK was influenced even earlier by financial 
malpractice in companies, such as Brent Walker, Polly Peck and the Maxwell 
Corporation in the '80s and early '90s. 
In the corporate financial crisis in 2002, CEOs at 23 US firms under 
investigation took home $1.4 billion from 1999 to 2001. However, at the same 
time, these companies had laid off 162,000 employees and the value of their 
shares had fallen by $530 billion - about 73% of their market value2. The 
magnitude of the financial crisis in 2008 and 2009, however, was even bigger. 
Through the Trouble Asset Relief Programme (T ARP) Capital Purchase 
Program, the US government had a net position of $134 billion in the banking 
sector, $75 billion in the automotive industry and $70 billion in AIG. Mervyn 
King, governor of the Bank of England, estimated that UK taxpayers had 
provided direct or guaranteed loans and had made equity investments just short 
of a trillion pounds or almost two-thirds of the UK's annual GOP (ECGI, 2009). 
Secondly, there are a number of controversial issues in corporate governance. 
Among these are pay policies, checks and balances, the separation of power in 
the management of public companies, diverse and remote shareholders, 
shareholder value versus stakeholder value, corporate risk assessment, short-
term profit orientation versus long-term value creation, board assessment, 
~ Study by United for a Fair Economy, quoted by Julia Homer, Editor in Chief CFO, in 2003: 
CFO Global Outlook, December 2002, p. 7. 
.., 
-' 
board effectiveness, board independence and aligning the interests of 
managers, directors and shareholders. 
Thirdly, in the last decades, the discussion of corporate governance has been 
emphasised in corporations, the academic literature and in public policy 
debates. After the corporate scandals in 2001 and 2002, new laws and 
guidelines have emerged, especially for listed corporations. However, not all of 
them have been able to prevent the irrational exuberance of the US real estate 
market in 2008, which was followed by a short but severe financial and 
economic crisis. 
1.2 Corporate governance in general 
Various definitions illustrate what corporate governance is, however the term 
'corporate governance', which was not used until approximately 25 years ago 
(Tricker, 2009), still does have not an adequate explanation (Gerum, 2007). To 
incorporate governance in a broader context, definitions from the Anglo-Saxon, 
as well as the European perspective have to be taken into account. They 
emphasise different aspects of corporate governance, such as a shareholder 
versus stakeholder approach, power, confidence, responsibility, accountability 
and trust, and the interest of the company, among others. Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) define corporate governance as the means by which a firm's outside 
investors try to ensure that senior managers within the firm do not exploit them. 
This narrow definition relates to just one stakeholder group, the shareholders. 
Demb and Neubauer (1992) see corporate governance as the process by which 
corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders. The 
internal dimension of corporate governance relates to internal control and board 
structure, whereas the external dimension relates to aspects, such as the role 
and influence of national and international independent institutional investors. 
This research focuses on the external perspective. 
1.3 Corporate governance in Germany 
Empirical research has shown that countries have an influence on the 
developments in corporate governance (Chizema and Buck, 2006; Rajan and 
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Zingales, 2003; Light et aI., 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008; Monks and Minow, 
2009). Germany is a 'late comer country' regarding corporate governance. In 
contrast to other countries, a code of corporate governance for German firms 
was regarded as unnecessary for a long time because the essential aspects of 
governance (e.g., the separation of management and supervision) were 
required under German law (v. Werder et aI., 2008). Today, German listed 
corporations are obliged to follow the German Corporate Governance Code. 
Therefore, the code has a certain impact on the corporate governance 
behaviour of corporations since companies initiated changes. Compared to the 
codes of other countries like the UK, the German code gives different 
recommendations regarding the requested shareholder involvement in 
corporate governance. In the UK, there is a clear emphasis on the role of the 
investors (Mallin et aI., 2005), but the German Corporate Governance Code 
does not go that far. It only stipulates that it is 'to promote the trust of 
international and national investors' and that 'shareholders exercise their rights 
at the General Meeting and vote there'. The code does not provide further 
recommendations regarding the role of the investors in corporate governance. It 
focuses more on the internal aspects, like the cooperation between the 
management board (Vorstand) and supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat), and the 
formation of committees, but does not stipulate the ongoing relationship 
between shareholders and the corporation. 
1.4 Institutional investors 
Institutional investors are organisations that pool large sums of money and 
invest those sums in companies. They can play an active role in corporate 
governance. According to Bassen (2002), investors can be categorised as 
private, entrepreneurial or institutional investors. A key point is that international 
institutional shareholders are motivated primarily or exclusively by financial 
returns rather than by the 'private' benefit of control, such as social status 
(Pendleton, 2005). 
Proportions of equity held by institutional investors - pension funds, insurance 
companies, hedge funds, endowments, private equity and mutual funds - are 
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rising across all DECO countries. Meanwhile German and international 
institutional investors are becoming more influential in corporate governance, 
even in bank-dominated countries like Germany, inter alia due to international 
investments, pension reforms and the EMU. The growth of institutional 
investors has been dramatic in most industrialised countries, therefore they 
have become an important factor in capital markets. This is also true for 
Germany, where total equity assets grew by 33% annually between 2000 and 
2005. In the same time span, the number of institutional investors has grown 
from 53 to 164 (Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Additionally, the shareholder 
structure of German listed companies is more international and more diversified 
than a decade ago. Pendleton (2005) differentiates between two kinds of 
investors, called insiders and outsiders. Insiders are large bloc holders, families 
and cross-owners, while outsiders are institutional investors. This thesis 
focuses on outsiders, i.e., German and international institutional investors who 
can, but do not need to be a major shareholder. The terminology 'institutional 
investor' implies German and international institutional investors and is used 
consistently throughout this thesis, if not stated differently. 
1.5 Framework of research 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the role of international institutional 
investors as owners of public companies in Germany. On the basis of an 
empirical study, the thesis aims to provide information regarding the influence of 
institutional investors in listed companies. Moreover, this paper examines how 
institutional investors exercise their role in corporate governance apart from 
official votes execution in the AGM's and unfriendly shareholder activism. 
1.5.1 Lack of prior research 
Since the nineties, a large body of corporate governance research has 
emerged. Most of the existing corporate governance research on boards and 
corporate governance has a US-inspired deductive approach, driven by the 
'publish or perish' syndrome that dominates the US academic community (Huse 
and Gabriellson, 2004). Doctoral students and scholars in tenure track positions 
conducting research using easily available data. The usual board measures 
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employed in these studies are CEO duality, insider/outsider ratio, the number of 
board members and the share ownership of directors (Finkelstein and Mooney, 
2003; Johnson et aI., 1996). Since 2001, a more multi-theoretical approach to 
the board strategy debate has been emerging, in which studies and academic 
research have shifted from a general analysis of the principal-agency theory to 
the nature and role of owners. 
The research of selected journals, 3 the findings were as follows: In 68% of the 
academic articles, the agency theory was used as the theoretical framework; 
more than half of the research (66%) was about common law countries like the 
US and UK; the most popular topics were compensation, firm performance and 
managerial behaviour and almost three-quarters of the articles were based on 
archival data. Only 7% used surveys and interviews as a research method and 
'investor' as a topic. 
However, the theory that institutional investors of publicly quoted companies are 
the best ones to carry out or at least to supervise the functions of corporate 
governance has distinct characteristics and limitations (Hadden, 1994; Mallin et 
aI., 2005; Mintz, 2006; Hirschman, 1970; Webb et aI., 2003, Hellmann, 2004). 
There is a strong need for more field research that captures the role of 
institutional investors in governance oversight and how boards and managers 
make decisions (Anderson et aI., 2007). Therefore, more insights into the role of 
institutional investors that go beyond the publicly available data are needed. 
Empirical studies that focus on the role of international institutional investors in 
the corporate governance of German listed companies could not be found. 
1.5.2 Focus of research 
In the academic literature, the expectations regarding the role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance is quite clear regardless of the controversy 
surrounding it. Ferreira and Matos (2008) found that institutional investors have 
a strong preference for firms with good governance and that firms with higher 
ownership by foreign and independent institutions have higher firm valuations, 
3 Journal of Finance; Journal of Financial Economics; Journal of Business Research; Corporate 
Governance: An International Review; Strategic Management Journal, years 2005 - 2009. 
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better operating performance and lower capital expenditure. Furthermore, their 
results indicate that institutions with fewer business ties to firms are involved in 
the monitoring of the corporation. 
I have almost 20 years of experience as investor relation officer and consultant 
to listed German and international companies in developing, building and 
maintaining their relationship with international institutional investors. 
Furthermore, I have conducted empirical research regarding investor relations 
and corporate reporting in Germany and Switzerland. This has given me a 
broad knowledge base of the development of corporate governance and the 
relationship between public companies and their institutional investors. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the role of institutional investors as 
owners of public companies in Germany. The research is based on the principal 
agency theory since this theoretical framework helps to understand a firm's 
relation to its equity stakeholders. This thesis aims to understand the viewpoints 
of the corporate managers of listed companies, and how institutional investors 
use their opportunities to monitor and influence German listed corporations. 
1.5.3 Research question 
The research question of this thesis is derived from the research objective and 
the academic literature. Based on the literature review, this thesis attempts to 
answer the following research question: 
• 'What is the role of institutional investors in the corporate governance of 
German listed companies?' 
The answer can be used to formulate a number of hypotheses or propositions 
about the role of independent institutional investors in the corporate governance 
of German corporations. 
Based on the research findings on institutional investors, this role is carried out 
through the investor's chance to make an impact by monitoring and/or 
influencing German companies. The influence of shareholders who press for 
shareholder value and the importance of the equity market have traditionally 
been minimal (Jurgens et aI., 2000). In order to answer the research question, 
an empirical framework has been developed. 
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1.6 Objectives of research 
This thesis aims to understand the actual role of national and international 
institutional investors in the corporate governance of German listed companies. 
The empirical research of this thesis aims to analyse and understand the 
following: 
• The perception of senior managers in German listed corporations 
regarding the role of institutional investors and their value for 
corporations 
• The interaction between companies and their institutional shareholders 
and potential shareholders from the perspective of corporate managers 
• The actual, but currently poorly understood (Webb et ai, 2003), role that 
is played by institutional investors in corporate governance. This means 
developing an understanding of the meanings, intentions and motives of 
those involved in creating these social realities (Thietart, 2001) 
• The role that institutional investors can or should play in German 
corporations even without a seat in the supervisory board. This thesis 
aims to investigate insights, which goes beyond the publicly available 
data. 
The research consists of developing an understanding of the reality 
experienced by the subjects of the study and goes beyond the publicly available 
data. Subjects in German corporations are those who are involved in creating 
the realities concerning the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance. These are people who are in direct contact with institutional 
investors because of their position and role in the company, such as the 
members of supervisory boards and investor relations officers. The objective of 
this thesis is to develop an understanding of the phenomenon of the role of 
institutional investors from the viewpoint of corporations (Thietart, 2001). 
It seems as if investors and corporations have different points of view. In their 
inductive study covering multinationals from different European countries, 
Hockerts and Moir (2004) found that companies are realising the need for 
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improved disclosure of corporate responsibility, which also includes corporate 
governance. However, there seems to be a tendency of corporate responsibility 
being taken more seriously on the company side than on the investor side. 
According to a survey on institutional investors in Germany (Bassen, 2005), 
internal mechanisms like personal conversations and direct communication 
between institutional investors and the different executive levels of the company 
and supervisory board members are the best way to influence management. All 
other mechanisms have almost no relevance in terms of influencing capital 
market participants. Furthermore, Bassen argues that especially for 
international institutional investors, direct contact with management is the most 
efficient way to implement good corporate governance. Bassen's findings 
support Carleton's (1998) results in the TIAA-CREF4 analysis in the US. 
Firstly, the investor's role needs to be analysed from a theoretical perspective. 
Secondly, a theoretical framework on the advantages and limitations of 
institutional investor participation in corporate governance is developed. Thirdly, 
an empirical study is carried out to understand how the actors in German listed 
corporations perceive the role of institutional investors. 
1.6.1 Research gap 
This thesis aims to bridge the gap between theory and practice, as well as gain 
deeper insight into how members of the supervisory board and corporate 
managers of German listed companies understand the actual role of national 
and international institutional investors in corporate governance. The objective 
is to gain a better understanding of the role of institutional investors and to 
develop recommendations on how the gaps between the theoretical 
assumptions and managerial reality can be bridged. 
Derived from this theoretical perspective on the role of institutional investors 
and its limitations, this thesis aims to provide a better understanding of the role 
4 TIAA-CREF serves 3.7 million active and retired employees partiCipating in more than 27,000 
retirement plans and has over $425 billion in combined assets under management (as of 
March 2010). 
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of institutional investors in the corporate governance of Germany's publicly 
traded corporations from the viewpoint of corporate management. 
1.7 Limitations of thesis 
In the literature, primary data regarding the role of institutional investors in the 
corporate governance of German listed companies is almost non-existent. The 
existing research is broadly focused on common law countries and archival 
data. One limitation of this interpretativist study is that external validity might not 
be addressed broadly enough since the research findings are concluded from 
only twenty members of supervisory boards and investor relations officers from 
German listed companies. Nevertheless, various statistical tests have proven 
the reliability of the research model and that there is good internal consistency. 
It can be argued that this limitation also makes it difficult to generalise the 
findings statistically, even though the interviews were carefully researched. The 
aim of this study was to develop an understanding of the role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance and how it can be exercised. An advantage 
of this research is that I was able to use my personal relationships and 
managed to get access to a very focused sample of companies and their 
interviewees at a very high level in the corporate hierarchy, which does not 
usually happen in such research studies. The author only talked to 
interviewees, who are active in this business and deal with these issues on a 
daily basis. 
1.8 Structure of thesis 
This thesis is organised as follows: The literature review in Section 2 starts with 
an overview of definitions and establishes the scope of corporate governance. 
Furthermore, the three main theoretical frameworks of corporate governance 
are explained, as well as the most common board structures. Finally, the 
literature review gives some general insights into the role and responsibilities of 
institutional investors in corporate governance. The research framework is 
based on these findings. Section 3 describes the methodology, the research 
design and research framework. Section 4 provides a description and profile of 
the interviewees and Section 5 presents the results of the empirical research 
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study. A summary and analysis of the findings is provided in Section 6 and a 
brief review of the conclusions and implications is given in Section 7 (see also 
Figure 1.1). 
Figure 1.1: Conceptual overview and structure of thesis. 
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2 Fundamentals of Corporate Governance 
The following section provides a general overview of the various definitions, 
developments and scope of corporate governance. It describes the different 
theoretical frameworks, elaborates on the empirical developments in the 
academic research and gives a summary of the relevant guidelines. 
Furthermore, this section focuses on the German corporate governance system 
and institutional investors. 
2.1 Definitions and scope 
The term 'corporate governance' is described in various definitions. It was used 
for the first time about 25 years ago (Tricker, 2009), however there is still not an 
adequate explanation for it (Gerum, 2007). To incorporate governance in a 
broader context, definitions from the Anglo-Saxon, as well as the European 
perspective have to be taken into account. They each emphasise different 
aspects of corporate governance, which are listed below: 
• A shareholder versus stakeholder approach 
• Power 
• Confidence 
• Responsibility 
• Accountability and trust 
• The interest of the company 
The next section looks at various definitions of corporate governance from 
different perspectives. 
2.1.1 Definitions 
Some definitions of corporate governance in an Anglo-Saxon context are 
narrow and restricted to shareholders, i.e., the means by which a firm's outside 
investors try to ensure that senior managers within the firm do not exploit them 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In their survey for the National Bureau of Economic 
Research, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) undertook extensive reviews of the 
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financial perspective. Their work is based on the analysis of transaction and 
agency costs. In this survey, corporate governance is defined as follows: 
'Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investments. How 
do the suppliers get managers to return some of the profits to them? How do 
they make sure that managers do not steal the capital or invest in bad projects? 
How do suppliers of finance control managers?' The second question implies 
that managers cannot be trusted, that there is a potential for criminal behaviour 
and that managers deliberately destroy money in bad projects. Obviously, the 
underlying assumption is that the financial suppliers do know what the "good" 
projects are. 
According to Tricker (2009), corporate governance is about the exercise of 
power over corporate entities. Governance issues arise whenever a corporate 
entity acquires a life of its own, like when the ownership of an enterprise is 
separated from its management and its basic framework still owes more to mid-
19th century thinking than to the realities of complex modern business (Tricker, 
2009). 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) offers 
the following definition in their revised principles (2004): 'Good corporate 
governance should provide proper incentives for the board and management to 
pursue objectives that are in the interest of the company and its shareholders 
and should facilitate effective monitoring. The presence of an effective 
corporate governance system, within an individual company and across an 
economy as a whole helps to provide a degree of confidence that is necessary 
for the proper functioning of a market economy.' Compared to the definition of 
Shleifer and Vishny, this definition is more balanced; it is based on trust and the 
interest of the company is seen as equal to the interest of the shareholders. 
According to Hart (1995), corporate governance invokes a narrow consideration 
of the relationships between the firm's capital providers and top management, 
as mediated by its board of directors. Also, the oldest definition of the term 
found in the Cad bury Report (1992) does not focus solely on the shareholders: 
'Corporate Governance is the system by which companies are directed and 
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controlled. The Board of directors is responsible for the governance of their 
companies. The shareholders' role in governance is to appoint the directors and 
the auditors and to satisfy themselves that an appropriate governance structure 
is in place.' Sir Adrian Cadbury has had a prolific influence on thinking in 
corporate governance and was a contributor to publications on corporate 
governance (Durisin and Puzone, 2009). The aim of the Cadbury Committee 
was to design best practices to achieve high standards in corporate behaviour. 
According to Demb and Neubauer (1992), 'Corporate governance is the 
process by which corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes of 
stakeholders.' Monks and Minow (2004) wrote, 'It is the relationship among 
various participants in determining the direction and performance of 
corporations.' Both definitions focus on the stakeholder approach. Corporate 
governance is concerned with ensuring that managers run firms honestly and 
effectively, so as to provide a fair and acceptable return to those who invest 
resources in them. This definition is compatible with both the shareholder and 
stakeholder orientations towards the subject (Blair 1995). Hurst (2004) links the 
definition to stakeholders and ethics: 'Corporate governance is part of the vast 
field of business ethics that addresses the entire scope of responsibilities that a 
company has to each of its stakeholders, those who have a vested interest in 
the decisions and actions of a company such as clients, employees, 
shareholders, suppliers and the community.' Corporate governance principles 
must be part of the culture of an organisation and should emphasise conducting 
business and managing the company in a manner that promotes ethical and 
honest behaviour, compliance with applicable laws and regulations, effective 
management of the company's resources and risks, and accountability for 
persons within the organisation. This implies that there are basically two criteria 
of good corporate governance. The first is that the conduct of managers should 
be ethical. The second is that they are competent in how they administer the 
resources under their charge (Child and Rodrigues, 2004). 
2.1.2 Scope 
As the various definitions indicate, corporate governance encompasses a broad 
range of outlooks on leadership and management. Diverse views exist because 
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different scholars investigate firms from different perspectives. They are related 
to different cultural contexts, intellectual backgrounds and the personal interest 
of the individual scholars. This is also acknowledged in the various definitions of 
corporate governance. One way of establishing the scope of corporate 
governance is to consider the more obvious influences that can affect the 
operations of publicly traded firms (Turnbull, 1997). They include relations with 
shareholders, other sources of finance like creditors and the influence of the 
stock market and financial institutions, which are fundamental. Other factors 
involve the effects of company law, the legal institutions and the regulatory 
mechanisms of the country concerned. The company's relationships with 
contractual stakeholders like employees, suppliers, and customers have also 
become vital in understanding the governance of corporations (Tricker, 2009, p. 
39) and are mentioned in various definitions, such as that of the OECD and the 
Cadbury Code. Figure 2.1 gives an overview of the scope of corporate 
governance and the various stakeholder groups that are associated with it. 
According to Tricker (2009), in a limited company, the shareholders, the 
members of the company management and supervisory boards are central. The 
power of shareholders to act is part of the political model of corporate 
governance. Hawley and Williams (1996) identify various restrictions in the 
authority of shareholders to act, which arise from security laws, agenda setting 
by management at general meetings and individual one-on-one meetings, proxy 
procedures, voting arrangements and corporate laws. Turnbull (1997) stated 
that the power of directors to control management is dependent upon there 
being a sufficient number of directors who also have the knowledge and will to 
act to form a board majority. 
The scope of this thesis will, however, stay close to the sources of finance and 
management. The thesis concentrates on institutional investors as an important 
external stakeholder group and the board of directors as an important internal 
stakeholder group because both groups have become influential drivers of 
corporate governance change by exercising their governance power (Tricker, 
2009, p. 46). 
16 
Figure 2.1: Scope of corporate governance. 
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2.2 Corporate governance frameworks - a theoretical review 
The academic literature differentiates between three major corporate 
governance theories: the principal-agency theory, the stewardship theory and 
the stakeholder theory. I have chosen these theories because each of them 
relates to corporate governance and includes the shareholders - and therefore 
the institutional investors of listed corporations - as an important constituency. 
Furthermore, these theories are used in the academic research (see also 
section 2.3) in the context of corporate governance, whereby the theory that is 
cited the most is the principal-agency theory. The stakeholder theory and the 
principal-agency theory focus on the outside perspective , whereas the 
stewardship theory concentrates on the insider approach . 
These major theories and how they relate to corporate governance are outl ined 
and discussed in the following sections. Table 2.1 gives a summary of the main 
ideas of the theories , as well as a comparative overview of their principles and 
objectives , scope, the stakeholders considered, the perception of corporate 
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managers, the disciplines that they arise from, the emergence of the theories 
and their authors. 
Table 2.1: Major corporate governance theories - an overview. 
Issues Principal-agency theory Stewardship theory Stakeholder theory 
Reduce conflict of interest Values are necessary between shareholders 
and the governing bodies and explicitly part of Management works in doing business 
of a corporation the best interest of the 
Reduce asymmetric company Managers need to 
Principles and information articulate the shared 
objectives Empowering structures sense of value creation 
Reduce agency costs Collaboration Responsibilities vis-a-
Relationship between Mentoring vis the stakeholders shareholder (principal) Ethics and economics 
and management (agent) 
are combined is based on a contract 
Focussed on internal Broad Narrow relationship between 
Focused on just one board of All relevant Scope 
external stakeholder directors/supervisory stakeholder groups of 
group: the shareholders board and the a company are taken 
managers into account 
Perspective Outside Inside Outside 
Customers, suppliers, 
Board of government, consumer 
Stakeholder Shareholder d irectors/su pervisory advocates, financial community, board shareholders, 
employees, etc. 
Manager perceived as Managers need to 
Perception of a good steward of articulate how they 
corporate Self-interested manager corporate assets want to do business 
managers and what kind of 
Loyal managers relationship they need 
Sociology and Organisational Discipline Finance and economics management and psychology business ethics 
Emergence of 1970s 1990s 1980s, 1990s theory 
Author Jensen, Meckling Donaldson Freeman 
Source: Petra Nix 
2.2.1 Principal-agency theory 
The agency theory primarily helps in understanding a firm's relations to its 
equity stakeholders. According to Figure 2.1, this comprises the sources of 
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finance, like institutional and private shareholders. The principal-agency theory 
does not consider management issues and other external and internal 
stakeholders of a corporation, like media, governments, and employees. 
Using data from US companies, in 1932 Serle and Means argued that a 
separation of ownership and control was the hallmark of large American 
corporations. Even though Serle and Means did not use the term corporate 
governance and did not create the modern study of corporate governance with 
The Modem Corporation (1932), it is still one of the most cited works in 
corporate governance. The focus of their work was more on restraining 
corporate power and referred to the observation that during the 1920s the 
structure of ownership in large corporations changed from the traditional 
arrangement of owners managing their own companies to one in which 
shareholders had become so numerous and dispersed that they were no longer 
willing or able to manage the corporations they owned. That ownership matters 
is proven in various research studies (Oswald et ai, 1991). The issue of 
ownership separation was generalised in terms of all principal-agency 
relationships and the resulting agency costs by Jensen and Meckling (1976). 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), who were early proponents of the 
principal-agency theory, 'Agency theory involves a contract under which one or 
more persons (the shareholders) engage another person (the directors) to 
perform some service on their behalf which includes delegating some decision 
making authority to the agent.' If both parties to the relationship are utility 
maximisers, there is a good reason to believe that the agent will not always act 
in the best interests of the principal. 
The principal-agency theory has its origins in finance and economics. The aim 
of the agency theory is to align the interests of board members and 
shareholders. This is not easy to achieve since shareholders may have a 
different interest in a company and the interest alignment can lead to self-
interested motivations by management. 
The main idea behind the principal-agency theory is to reduce the conflict of 
interest between the shareholders and management of corporations. The 
principal-agency theory, which focuses on the role of the directors, has evolved 
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as a result of the assumptions of asymmetric information and conflicting stakes 
between the executive management (agents) and the residual claimants 
(principals) of firms (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
2.2.2 Stewardship theory 
The stewardship theory looks at a company and the behaviour of its 
management, like the board of directors in Anglo-Saxon countries or 
supervisory boards in countries like Germany and the management (see Figure 
2.1). This theory assumes that management works in the best interest of the 
company. If that is true, this work must lead to appropriate performance and the 
shareholders would benefit from the results. 
The stewardship theory is an alternative to the principal-agency theory. This 
theory is a younger theoretical framework than the principal-agency theory. In 
1991, Donaldson, who developed the stewardship theory, stated that 'The 
"model man" underlying agency and organisational economics is that of the 
self-interested rational actor maximising his own personal economic gain. The 
model is individualistic and predicted upon the notion of an in-built conflict of 
interest between owner and manager. This theory has challenged the agency 
theory and become popular among many management scholars (Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). Moreover, the model is one of an individual 
calculating likely costs and benefits, and thus seeking to attain rewards and 
avoid punishment, especially financial ones.' 
Donaldson's thesis is that these assumptions are extreme and there are 
alternative concepts explaining what motivates human behaviour. The 
stewardship theory is derived from the disciplines of sociology and psychology. 
The underlying disciplines are legal and organisational studies. Stewardship 
predictions regarding board independence are directly opposed to those of the 
agency theory (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). The major differences of the 
principles of the principal-agency theory and the stewardship theory are that the 
principal-agency theory aims to reduce the conflict of interest between the 
governing bodies of a corporation and its shareholders through a contractual 
agreement. The principles of the stewardship theory are based on collaboration, 
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mentoring and the empowerment of structures. Another fundamental difference 
between these two theories is that in the stewardship theory the assumption is 
that management works in the best interest of the company. In the principal-
agency theory, the assumption is that the corporate manager is self-interested 
and wants to maximise his own benefit. 
The stewardship model is based on the manager as 'steward' rather than the 
entirely self-interested rational economic man of agency theory. According to 
Donaldson (1991), the stewardship theory does not focus on the motivation of 
the CEO, but rather on the facilitative, empowering structures, and holds that 
the fusion of the incumbency of the roles of chair and CEO will enhance 
effectiveness and produce, as a result, superior returns to the shareholder 
compared to the separation of the roles of chair and CEO. 
Stewardship theory holds that a manager may, when confronted with a course 
of action seen as personally unrewarding, may comply based on a sense of 
duty and identification with the organisation (Etzioni, 1975). Stewardship theory 
promotes board roles as collaboration and mentoring, and boards should thus 
also be active in the strategy formation and strategy implementation phases 
(Hillmann and Daziel, 2003; Shen, 2003). 
Critics of stewardship theory point out that in listed companies shareholders 
have become remote from the company and do not nominate the directors and 
that there is a lack of transparency despite the comprehensive financial and 
corporate reporting requirements and institutional investors. Another criticism is 
that institutional investors, such as pension funds are run by trustees whose 
accountability is not always apparent and seldom challenged, whose interests 
do not align with those of fund beneficiaries, and who may use investment 
funds to protect themselves from claims or negligence (Tricker, 2009). 
2.2.3 Stakeholder theory 
The stakeholder theory is a theory of organisational management and business 
ethics that came up in the mid-1980s. It addresses morals and values in 
managing an organization. Richard Edward Freeman's book Strategic 
management: a stakeholder approach published in 1984 was a very important, 
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groundbreaking work on the development of the stakeholder theory. Freeman 
argues that successful managers must systematically attend to the interests of 
various stakeholder groups. Freeman identifies and models the groups that are 
stakeholders of a corporation. He describes and recommends methods by 
which management can address the interests of those groups. The stakeholder 
theory assumes that values are necessarily and explicitly a part of doing 
business (Freeman et a!., 2004). 
The stakeholder theory deals with two core issues. The first issue is the 
purpose of the firm. The second issue is the responsibility of the management 
vis-a-vis the company's stakeholders. According to Freeman, managers must 
develop relationships, inspire their stakeholders, and create communities where 
everyone strives to give their best to deliver the value that the firm promises. 
Shareholders are part of the various stakeholder groups within the stakeholder 
theory. The stakeholder theory does not separate between ethics and 
economics. 
The stakeholder theory argues that business organisations have an impact on 
all other institutions of society. Bad governance and the undesired results of 
unethical corporate strategic behaviour that have been discovered in various 
corporate scandals go far beyond issues that only matter to shareholders. The 
outcome of bad governance, mismanagement and fraud can lead to stronger 
regulation, an increase in the unemployment rate and an economic downturn. 
This has been the case in various financial and economic crises. It follows then 
that the consequences of bad governance affect the stakeholders of 
corporations, other organisations and society as a whole. 
The stakeholder theory takes different stakeholder groups of a company into 
account, like customers, suppliers, governments, consumer advocates, the 
financial community, stockholders, etc. (see also Figure 2.2). Each group has 
different interests vis-a-vis the company, such as equity interests, 
environmental interests and economic interests. Therefore, the stakeholder 
theory is a much broader theory compared to the principal-agency and 
stewardship theory, which only focus on the relationship between the 
shareholders, management and board members of a company. 
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Figure 2.2: The stakeholder framework and interest groups of a corporation . 
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2.3 Developments in academic research - an empirical review 
The next section elaborates on the most important developments in corporate 
governance in academic research and highlights the theories, legal systems, 
topics and research methods in this area. Different approaches, models and 
theories characterise corporate governance. As an academic discipline, 
corporate governance is not that old. In the era of industrialisation , the 
processes by which corporations were governed in the modern sense received 
little attention (Mitchell , 2009). 
2.3.1 Developments of corporate governance research between 2005 -
2009 
In order to see if there was a pattern in the previous research , the following 
selection of academic journals were chosen for this analysis: The Journal of 
Finance, The Journal of Financial Economics, the Journal of Business 
Research , Corporate Governance: An International Review, and the Strategic 
Management Journal. Figure 2.3 provides a breakdown of the articles published 
23 
between the years 2005 and 2009 that have contributed to the agency, 
stewardship and/or stakeholder theory. A detailed summary is provided in 
Appendix 9.1. 
Figure 2.3: Corporate governance research in selected academic journals, 
2005 - 2009. 
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The regional focus of the analysis of academic articles was countries of the 
Western Hemisphere. Emerging countries were excluded since the study was 
conducted in Germany, which is an industrialised country with a developed 
corporate governance structure. In total , 44 articles were found . Most of the 
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papers (= 66%) were published in the academic journal, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review. 
The overwhelming majority of the papers are (= 68%) based on the agency 
theory. Only one paper (= 2%) focused solely on the stewardship theory and 
one paper (= 2%) used both the agency and stakeholder theory. Kim and 
Canella (2008) adopted the stewardship theory to explain how social capital at 
the individual level influences director selection and board effectiveness. They 
argue that the monitoring role of the board and supervisory board directors, 
respectively, downplays issues like providing advice and counsel. The 
conceptual research methodology is based on two types of social capital, 
namely, the internal and external social capital. The findings of Anderson et al. 
(2007) are interesting because they tried to understand the evolving 
perspectives and behaviour of directors and institutional investors. In their 
survey of corporate directors and institutional investors, they found that the role 
of institutional investors had shifted towards a complementary and collaborative 
role with management, which is consistent with the stewardship theory. They 
are seeking a more balanced role that encompasses collaboration and 
monitoring and reject the notion of the board as primarily a monitoring body. 
The study was carried out with 658 participants, which corresponds to a 
response rate of 14.6%. In semi-structured, face-to-face interviews, Anderson 
et al. tried to gain a deeper understanding of the survey results and to explore 
the evolution of board practices and director opinion on reform efforts, as well 
as regarding the role of the institutional investor. 
In West's article (2009) on the stakeholder theory, he argues that the morality 
underlying different models of corporate governance has largely been ignored. 
Filatotchev and Boyd (2009) suggested considering the new insights put forth 
by complementary theories, such as behavioural theory, institutional theory and 
the resource-based views. Bender (2008) used the principal-agency theory to 
explain the structure of the contracts and the expectancy theory to explain why 
schemes might be changed to motivate executives. This was also one of the 
rarely used interview-based studies adopting a multiple case approach. The 
study focuses on the views of the individuals, by means of semi-structured, 
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face-to-face interviews with protagonists in the remuneration setting process of 
FTSE 350 companies. 
Most of the research (= 66%) was conducted in common law countries like the 
US, Australia, Canada and the UK. There is a large body of corporate 
governance research in the US. Most studies are based the one-tier system, 
but hardly any of the works cited above examine a cross-national setting 
(Durisin and Puzone, 2009, Jungmann 2006). 
Almost three-quarters (= 73%) of all the papers reviewed used archival data. 
This is not surprising. Tricker (2009) stated that the majority of research is 
based on publicly available data, like annual reports, therefore access to the 
boardroom or individual directors is not considered (Tricker, 2009). At the end 
of the 1980s and 1990s, most of the research on boards and corporate 
governance had a US-inspired deductive approach, which was driven by the 
'publish or perish' syndrome that dominates the US academic community (Huse 
and Gabrielson, 2004). Doctoral students and scholars in tenure track positions 
have preferred research that uses easily available data and methods that can 
be evaluated by journal reviewers through well-established validity concepts. In 
my literature review of five dedicated journals, CEO duality plays a minor role. 
Finkelstein and Mooney (2003), and Johnson et al. (1996) found that the usual 
board measures employed in these studies, which are usually based on 
archival data, are CEO duality, insider/outsider ratio, the number of board 
members and the share ownership of directors. The principal sources of 
archival research analyses are administrative records and documents. Archival 
research is often highly quantitative, easy to access, focuses on the past and 
the changes that take place over time (Remeny et aI., 2005). A major constraint 
of that research approach is the necessity to establish the research question 
around the available data (Saunders et aI., 2007). Archival data is quite 
common since getting access to non-public available data can have a negative 
impact to carry out the research study. The majority of the existing archival 
research leads to the black box argument. The distrust of the company and its 
managers originated principal-agency theory. Only a few (= 7%) used actual, 
collected data from interviews or surveys. 
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The three main research topicS covered by the articles are compensation (= 
19%), firm performance and/or value (= 16%) and managerial behaviour (= 
11 %) (see also Figure 2.3). By linking different aspects of corporate governance 
with the firm, they test the hypothesis of whether there is a causal link between 
governance systems. The disadvantages of these deductive approaches are 
that the board level activities and interpersonal relations are treated as a black 
box. However, various definitions mention that confidence and trust cannot be 
built without personal relationships. The rest of the topics are evenly distributed 
across the subjects. Most of the papers were written after 2008. 
The research in this thesis supports the previous findings that most of the 
studies in this area are still conducted in common-law countries and that the 
principal sources are still archival. As this research analysis shows, the topic of 
'CEO duality', which was one of the major governance subjects in the past, lost 
the attention of the academic world between 2005 and 2009 (see Figure 2.3). 
During that time, the subject of CEO duality appeared only once. Only a few of 
the research studies reviewed used alternative research methods like a 
conceptual, interpretative or explorative research approach. 
2.3.2 Principal-agency theory 
The principal-agency theory can be considered as the starting point of 
corporate governance research. With the emergence of the theory in the 
eighties, academic research on corporate governance started to increase (see 
Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.4: Historical development research on boards and strategy. 
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Several theories have been used in the research on strategy and management 
(Hung 1998; Huse 2007; Zahra and Pearce 1989), but the agency theory of 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983) has dominated the 
academic discussion in the last two decades and become the most commonly 
used framework (Pulgiese et aI. , 2009). Most of the empirical literature on 
corporate governance has been rooted in the agency theory. According to 
Tricker (2009), the agency theory of corporate governance takes a less 
sanguine view of the behaviour of directors (see Figure 2.5) with regard to trust. 
The relationship between the shareholders and management is stipulated in a 
contract rather than built on trust since the management tries to take 
advantages, which might be not in the interest of the shareholders. 
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Figure 2.5: The governance relationship. 
Principal 
(shareholder/s) 
I t 
Contracts with Who takes 
advantaQes 
... I 
Agent 
( director/s) 
Source: Tricker, 2009, p. 219. 
The principal-agency theory considers organisational processes as a 'black box' 
and does not explain the processes surrounding managerial opportunism and 
information asymmetry (Huse and Eide, 1996). There is a need for approaches 
that allow investigations of organisational processes to be carried out. 
The assumptions of the principal-agency theory are that by managing the 
principal-agency problem, firms will operate more efficiently and perform better 
and that managers are more likely to place personal goals ahead of corporate 
goals, which would result in a conflict of interest between shareholders and 
managers (Mintz, 2005; Eugene Kang, 2006). To take this argument one step 
further, it would imply that all shareholders align their goals with the corporate 
goals and that they all have the same interest. A further assumption is that the 
only way to enrich executives is to increase the price of a company's shares 
through stock options (Dore, 2005). Both executives and shareholders benefit 
from this. Intrinsic motivations, such as the desire to do a good job and self-
fulfilment (which matters in the stewardship theory) are neglected completely. 
These are the major weaknesses in the principal-agency theory. There is no 
proven evidence in the research that the principal-agency theory leads to higher 
returns. Therefore, this theory is questionable. In the 1970s, it was observed 
that boards of directors in the US had been rather passive in the wake of 
corporate failure and more strategic involvement was necessary to restore 
public confidence (Clendenin , 1972; Heller and Milton , 1972; Mace, 1971 ; 
Machin and Wilson, 1979; Vance, 1979). This observation is supported by an 
assessment of the value of the agency theory that explains relatively little of the 
variance in shark repellent adoption (Frankforter et aI., 2000) . 
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2.3.3 Stewardship theory 
Stewardship theory recognises a range of non-financial motives for managerial 
behaviour. These include the need for achievement and recognition , the 
intrinsic satisfaction of successful performance, respect for authority and work 
ethic. These concepts are well supported in the organisational literature (Argyris 
1964; Herzberg 1966; McClelland 1961). Managers are essentially good 
stewards of corporate assets and loyal managers. The stewardship theory 
holds that managers are trustworthy and collectivistic (Gabrielsson, 2003) . The 
role of boards in the stewardship theory is one of guiding management in 
achieving the missions and objectives of the enterprise (Goel and Erkovic, 
2005; Hillmann and Dalziel , 2003; Shen, 2003). Trust in the boardroom is 
expected to stimulate cohesiveness, openness and generosity, as well as 
creativity and involvement (Huse, 2007). Inherent in the concept of the 
company is the belief that directors can be trusted (see Figure 2.6) , which 
reflects the classical ideas of corporate governance (Tricker, 2009). In the 
stewardship theory, the shareholders nominate and elect directors/managers 
who protect their interests. In return , the management/directors behave as 
stewards who accept their fiduciary duty. 
Figure 2.6: The shareholder/director relationship. 
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2.3.4 Stakeholder theory 
The stakeholder theory describes a firm's relation to economic stakeholders, 
whereas the literature on corporate social responsibility performance focuses 
on major influence-based stakeholders (Huse and Eide, 1996). Conceptually, 
the principles and processes of stakeholder management are still at the 
embryonic stage (Huse and Eide, 1996). Stakeholder thinking has proven 
especially valuable in understanding business ethics and strategic management 
(Carroll, 1979). 
Most large corporations have a stakeholder map that includes owners, the 
financial community, activist groups, customers, customer advocate groups, 
unions, employees, trade associations, competitors, suppliers, government, and 
political groups (see Figure 2.2). There may be variations among industries, 
companies, and geographies with respect to the intensity and importance of the 
stakeholders' stakes and power (Freemann, 1984; Huse, 1995). The stakes 
may vary as to whether they are based mainly on equity interests (stockholders, 
directors, and minority interests), economic interests (customers, competitors, 
suppliers, debtholders, unions), or environmental interests based on influence 
(customer advocates, government, trade associations). Even though Freeman 
(1984) emphasises the importance of integrating various theoretical approaches 
(equity, economic, and environmental) to understand stakeholder management, 
few attempts have been conducted to integrate them (Huse and Eide, 1996). A 
guideline that addresses the stakeholder theory in corporate sustainability 
reporting is G3 (see Section 2.6) 
2.3.5 General appreciation and critical evaluation of the theories 
According to Durisin and Puzone (2009), corporate governance research can 
be considered to have reached the status of a discipline and a common body of 
knowledge influential across contributions from economics, management, 
finance, law and accounting. 
Roberts et al. (2005) support the search for theoretical pluralism and greater 
understanding of board processes and dynamics. This leads to the conclusion 
that the agency theory was a good starting point, but it cannot be the only 
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explanation for good governance because of its very narrow perspective. 
However, focussing just on financial motivations, like share prices, can fuel the 
short term ism in capital markets. 
In order to gain more insight into corporate strategy and its objectives and make 
management decisions more understandable and transparent, corporations 
increased their communication with institutional shareholders. According to 
Roberts et a!. (2006), when management meets with well-informed investors 
face to face, a reciprocal understanding can develop through a dialogue. In an 
empirical study with German listed companies, it was found that one-on-ones 
with investors at road shows and analyst meetings are the most important 
instruments of communication (Kirchhoff and PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005). 
These meetings are a unique source of information for investors regarding the 
company's strategy, the personalities and relationships of the executives and 
the quality of management, as well as an opportunity to track performance. In 
addition, they can reduce the asymmetric information between the institutional 
investors as company outsiders and corporate management. Furthermore, 
continuous and regular personal relationships can build a certain level of trust. 
They can contribute to making management more open to their shareholders 
and increase their involvement if their opinions and concerns are perceived and 
respected by the corporate managers. 
Active institutional shareholders are able to reach agreements with the 
management of corporations. These agreements lead to changes in the 
corporations that are in line with the investors and reduce information 
asymmetry. In their analysis, Carleton et al. (1998) found that between 1992 
and 1996, TIAA-CREF was able to reach agreements with management on 
governance issues over 96% of the time in private negotiations. A common 
understanding of the aims and objectives of the corporations and their 
shareholders is decisive in order to reach successful agreements. Therefore, it 
seems that some instruments, such as one-on-one meetings, give investors an 
appropriate opportunity to express their opinion to the management of 
companies in order to align a company's interest with the shareholders' 
interests. 
Chen et al. (2010) have a different view of the interest alignment theory. Their 
findings, which are based on a sample of 502 listed Chinese firms, showed that 
CEO duality and CEO ownership contribute to the high level of executive 
compensation. The executive pay levels are largely influenced by the peer 
group's pay level, rather than by the performance of the firm. That leads to a 
maximisation of insider wealth instead of shareholder value. These findings 
strengthen the argument that financial incentives are not sufficient enough to 
ensure good governance and that institutional investors should enhance their 
engagement in corporate governance. 
The increase of regulation in capital markets and the emergence of the investor 
relations industry can be seen, in part, as a solution to the problem of 
information asymmetry. If management feels the need to attract and retain 
institutional investments in their company, they will have to incur the cost of 
implementing an investor relations programme. These costs can be viewed as 
agency costs because investor relations serve as a forum for meetings and 
communication between management and investors. The meetings can be 
used to explain the goals and strategy of the corporation; and investors can 
voice their opinions and concerns regarding the management of the enterprise 
(Craven and Marston, 1997). 
Therefore, they are good instruments for reducing information asymmetry apart 
from regular corporate reporting, like quarterly and annual reports. However, 
information asymmetry can only be reduced if the opinions and concerns are 
reflected within the company and are taken into account in strategic 
management decisions. 
Since 2001, a more multi-theoretical approach to the board strategy debate has 
been emerging. Other theories have slowly gained importance (Pulgiese et aI., 
2009) and distinct subfields have cropped up. Studies and academic research 
have shifted from a general analysis of the principal-agency theory to the nature 
and role of owners. The research investigates board size, board independence, 
board composition, the role of outside directors, separation of the role of CEO 
and chairmanship, meeting frequency, executive remuneration, financial 
reporting, board committees, audit structure, compensation, and the nomination 
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committee (Filatotchev and Boyd, 2009, p. 258). According to Daily and Dalton 
(2004, p. 16), the research that has been done over a 40-year period 
comprising over 40,000 firms suggests that there is no evidence of a systematic 
relationship between board composition and corporate performance. There is 
not just one important criterion of good governance. There are many external 
and internal issues that influence governance and performance and these may 
differ from company to company. Therefore, it can be concluded that each 
company needs to determine its own company-specific corporate governance 
principles in order to establish a successful governance system. Nevertheless, 
they have to be in compliance with the official guidelines and need to be 
explained. 
2.4 Trust 
In all three major theories, i.e., the principal-agency, stewardship and 
stakeholder theory, trust also seems to playa role in some of the definitions, 
such as in the OECD guidelines and the Cadbury Code of corporate 
governance. The perception of trust is considered differently within the various 
theories. Therefore, it would be worthwhile to elaborate on this aspect in more 
detail in the literature review. 
The essence of the agency problem is distrust between the shareholders and 
board of directors of a company. Their relationship is based on a contract rather 
than on the premise that management works in the best interest of the company 
and towards building empowering structures (stewardship theory). The 
principal-agency theory argues that agents (management) behave in 
opportunistic ways that serve their own interests at the expense of shareholders 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), seek to maximise their own personal benefit, and take 
actions that are advantageous to management, but not to the shareholders 
(Tricker, 2009). Critics of the agency theory have pointed out its 
'undercontextualised' nature and hence its inability to accurately compare and 
explain the diversity of corporate governance arrangements across different 
institutional contexts (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Filatotchev et aI., 2008). 
Ghoshal and Moran (2005) believe that the prosperity of companies and 
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economies greatly depend on the quality of their management. Management, 
including the board of directors and members of the supervisory board, is not 
only a key agent in achieving success, but also the main driver for economic 
and social progress. In organisational economies, the interests of the company 
and those of society do not collide, but coexist in a symbiotic manner. 
Furthermore, assumptions of the agency theory like the complete contracting 
ex-ante for all stakeholders, but for shareholders (Child and Rodrigues, 2003; 
Hoskisson et al. 2009) are questioned. Brehm and Scott (2004) pointed out that 
the essence of the principal-agency problem is one of asymmetric information, 
such that the abilities and preferences of the agent - here the management and 
the board of directors and members of supervisory board - are unknown 
(adverse selection), and that the actions of the agents are not entirely 
observable. This can lead to a moral hazard, to misunderstandings and to a 
lack of trust on the part of the shareholders. 
Contrary to the principal-agency theory, the stewardship theory believes that 
board members do not always act in a way that maximises their own personal 
interests and that the managers are trustworthy (Gabriellsson, 2003). The 
assumption in the stewardship theory is that the managers act responsibly and 
with independence and integrity (Tricker 2009). Furthermore, trust and 
behaving in a responsible manner matter in many of the definitions of corporate 
governance (OECD, 2004; Cadbury Reports, 1992). 
Nevertheless, the ingenuity of self-interest will lead to management devising 
new schemes to evade accountability. There will be more corporate governance 
standards and reforms in the future because of the increasing public concern 
that more of their wealth will be invested in companies, therefore they will insist 
on greater corporate responsibility (Clarke, 2004). 
Continued efforts in corporate governance are vital in order to improve 
corporate performance and to enhance corporate accountability. To avoid 
mandatory restrictive over-regulation, active voluntary self-regulation -
particularly in times of confidence and growth - is necessary. There will hardly 
be a 'perfect' system of corporate governance. Therefore, it is important that 
obvious abuses be outlawed and loopholes be eliminated. Corporate 
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governance needs an ongoing and permanent process for managing and 
running a company. Comparing governance systems cross-nationally provides 
a good opportunity to improve national systems and to adopt good practices at 
company levels. In order to this, it is necessary to have an open mind. 
In recent years, confidence in corporations has changed markedly. This can 
also be seen in the DECO principles (1999), which emphasise the duty of 
'fulfilling its accountability obligations to the company and to the shareholders'. 
The globalisation and liberalisation of financial markets, corporate governance 
scandals, and the stronger demand for accountability and transparency have 
placed the duties and functioning of boards of directors at the centre of the 
corporate governance debate (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Ingley and van der 
Walt, 2005). One approach for increasing accountability and lowering the 
asymmetric information problem of the principal-agency theory is to have an 
institutional investor appoint one or more directors on a pro rata basis in 
proportion to the level of their equity interest. Such an approach addresses the 
issues associated with acting in good faith, acting in the interests of the 
company and the investors, while providing boards with the depth and breadth 
of experience they require and overcoming some of the principal-agency 
problems. These measures can ultimately lead to a better application of the 
stewardship approach. 
Arjoon (2005) makes a distinction between legal and ethical compliance 
mechanisms and argues that the former has clearly proven to be inadequate as 
it lacks the moral fire power to restore confidence and the ability to build trust. 
Legal compliance mechanisms are insufficient in dealing with fraudulent 
practices and may not be addressing the real and fundamental issues. The 
tendency to overemphasise legal compliance mechanisms may result in an 
attempt to substitute accountability for responsibility and to legislate morality 
that consequently leads to legal absolutism. Bartlett and Ghoshal (2005) see 
trust as the most vital component in a management context and as a sense of 
fairness in organisational processes and management practices. Therefore, 
trust is a necessary building block for corporate governance, but is often 
neglected in academic research, especially in the principal-agency theory. Trust 
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and having a moral foundation matter for institutions since they lose their 
influence, as well as their effectiveness, when they lose their social legitimacy 
(Ghoshal and Moran, 2005). Therefore, disclosure and transparent processes 
of corporate governance are necessary. Confidence in management is a main 
investment criteria (Roberts et aI., 2006). Therefore, CEOs and CFOs dedicate 
time to managing their relationships with investors in face-to-face meetings in 
order to build trust. 
In particular, companies feel the increasing pressure to be accountable. 
Therefore, many multinationals have started to pay attention to board 
supervision (Kolk, 2008). A reason for that development might be a loss of trust. 
Surveys indicate that the levels of trust in companies are declining worldwide. 
For instance, a survey by Environics and Gallup International, which polled 
36,000 citizens in 47 countries on six continents and claims to be representative 
of 1.4 billion people, confirmed this decline. It indicated that trust was lowest in 
large companies and national legislative bodies (Elkington, 2003). This is an 
alarming development in connection with corporate governance. Trust has been 
identified as an important and under recognised aspect of leadership theories. 
Since little research has focused on showing how trust in leaders contributes to 
the effective functioning of groups and organisations and how it can be 
leveraged to meet this objective (Dirks and Skarlicki, 2004), the stewardship 
theory has so far not gained greater importance in the academic research. 
Studies show that promoting trust can be important for leader effectiveness 
(Bass 1990; Hogan et al. 1994) and is linked to positive job attitudes, 
organisational justice, psychological contracts, and effectiveness in terms of 
communication, organisational relationships, and conflict management. Up to 
now, these aspects of trust have received little attention in the development of 
corporate governance. However, they matter because the fiduciary duty of 
directors under most legislation has to do with doing what is best for the 
company (Monks and Minow, 2004). This is also the starting point for 
understanding accountability in the boardroom (Huse, 2005). Roberts et al. 
(2006) use Giddens' (1984, p. 30) definition of accountability as a starting point: 
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'To be accountable for one's activities is to explicate the reasons for them and 
to supply the normative grounds whereby they may be justified.' 
Brehm and Gates (2004) argue that although the principal-agency theory offers 
many insights for understanding relationships, one must be careful in applying 
models developed in the US to other legal and cultural environments. This is 
also the position taken in this thesis. It seems that corporate governance is not 
a context-free phenomenon (Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009) that can be 
applied in every country and company. In their research, Yoshikawa and 
Rasheed (2009) found that there is only limited evidence that corporate 
governance is converging. Corporate governance changes seem to be primarily 
attributable to the quest for greater effiCiency in governance and enhanced 
legitimacy in capital markets. Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009) argue that the 
ideal corporate governance may be institution and firm specific and an 
imposition of new practices and standards may not lead to the intended policy 
or performance outcomes. Therefore, laws and corporate governance 
guidelines can only build a framework in which each company has to define its 
own appropriate governance code and behaviour. This is supported by the 
concerns raised by Miller (2004) that overregulation and overemphasis on 
monitoring and on rules and contracts specifying pecuniary compensation might 
lead subordinates to work 'too' closely to the rule, not accomplishing all the 
aims, goals and objectives of a firm. 
Therefore, it is important for academic research to gain a deeper understanding 
of the processes and behaviour of boards. Publicly available information will 
also provide inSights, however the disadvantage is that it mainly consists of 
historic data. 
2.5 Board structures and board responsibilities 
This section describes and compares the two main systems of board structures 
that are most common in Western industrialised countries and the 
responsibilities of board members. 
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2.5.1 One tier and two tier systems 
In his analysis of the financial performance and board turnover of the largest 
companies listed on the stock exchanges in Frankfurt and London, Jungmann 
(2006) found that the one-tier and two-tier board systems are effective. 
Therefore, it is not possible to assign superiority to either of them. Like most 
studies in corporate governance, this study only uses publicly available data. 
Therefore, it does not address the black box argument. 
In the Anglo-Saxon countries like the UK and US, a single board - the one-tier 
board system - governs companies (see Figure 2.7). A single board system 
consists of executive and non-executive directors. The functions of 
management and management control are combined into a single body. The 
one-tier system can take one of the following two forms: 
(1) The members of the executive management team and the board of 
directors form a joint board. This form can be found in small and/or family 
owned companies. 
(2) The board of directors consists of an intersection of the board of 
directors and members of the executive management (Hilb, 2004). 
The second form is most common in listed companies. Therefore, it is more 
important for this thesis since the two-tier structure is mandatory in Germany. In 
general, the one-tier board supervises itself. In order to address this problem, 
independent outside directors were recognised and audit committees were 
introduced (Tricker 2009). A major disadvantage of the one-tier-system is the 
power concentration of the CEO and the lack of feedback from other 
stakeholders (Hilb, 2004). 
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Figure 2.7: Types of board structures. 
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In the second group of countries, such as Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands, the governance model embraces a wider conception of corporate 
governance that refers to the means by which stakeholders (creditors , 
employees, government, etc_) may impose control over a firm 's decisions. 
These companies are governed by the two-tier system with an executive 
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management board and a supervisory board (see Figure 2.7). In this system, 
executives exert a minimal influence on stock prices and shareholders, but a 
considerable influence on the voice of other stakeholders (Noteboom, 1999), 
who are highly committed to the firm and are prepared to contribute formally to 
its governance (Hall and Gingerich, 2001). The advantage is a clear 'checks 
and balances' approach. A disadvantage can be a power struggle at the 
expense of the competitive edge of the company. 
Table 2.2: Strengths and weaknesses of the one-tier and two-tier 
governance systems. 
Advantages and strengths Disadvantages and weaknesses 
One-tier system Limited Information asymmetry Responsibility of monitoring and 
Regular meetings strategy setting 
Direct access to information Independence of non-executive directors 
! 
i Two-tier system Separation of control and CCKletermination5 (a structural 
I 
: 
I 
management weakness because of two organs 
No conflict of interest of employee and shareholder 
representation) 
Independence of the members of Limited involvement in strategic 
I the supervisory board decision making I 
Information asymmetry 
Source: According to Jungmann (2006). 
In recent years. an important development in corporate governance has been 
the formalisation of board committees. The three principal board committees 
are the audit committee. the remuneration committee and the nomination 
committee (Tricker. 2009, p. 67). 
: Eg . Germany. 
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2.5.2 Responsibilities 
There is an ongoing debate on what the formal and appropriate structure of a 
board of directors should be. Board structures vary both within and between 
OECD countries. Some countries have two-tier boards that separate the 
supervisory function from the management function into different bodies like 
Germany. Such systems typically have a 'supervisory board' (Aufsichtsrat) 
composed of non-executive board members and a 'management board' 
(Vorstand) composed entirely of executives. Other countries, like the US, have 
one-tier boards, which bring together executive and non-executive board 
members like USA (OECD principles, 2004, p. 58). The OECD principles state 
that the key functions of the boards are the following: 
• Reviewing and guiding corporate strategy 
• Monitoring the effectiveness of the company's governance practices 
• Selecting, compensating, monitoring, and replacing key executives and 
succession planning 
• Alignment of key executive and board remuneration with the longer term 
interest of the company and its shareholders 
• Ensuring a formal and transparent board nomination and election 
process monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of 
management, board members and shareholders 
• Ensuring the integrity of the corporation's accounting and financial 
reporting system 
• Overseeing the process of disclosure and communications 
In fact. boards can and do delegate some activities to management. This can 
take two main forms. The involvement of management may be minimal, with the 
directors making most of the executive decisions; or the directors may expect 
top management to make a major contribution to governance. 
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Figure 2.8: Board functions working through management. 
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This section provides an overview of the guidelines that are important in the 
development of corporate governance. The focus is on the international and 
national corporate governance guidelines that are relevant for the development 
of corporate governance. In this regard, non-binding guidelines have been 
chosen . Also, institutional investors maintain that corporate governance should 
remain within a voluntary framework and reject the notion that reforms should 
be regulated through governmental measures (Solomon, 2000). Furthermore, 
the evolution of corporate governance shows that the investment decisions 
made by investors are complex due to many 'soft factor' issues not covered by 
law. Therefore, more practical tools have been necessary to improve corporate 
governance (Strenger, 2004). 
Codes of corporate governance aim to provide standards and 
recommendations for best practices regarding good governance systems. The 
issues involved are recommendations regarding board compositions, 
remuneration, nomination , accountability, independence, audit and relations 
wi h shareholders. The main scope of the various codes concern listed 
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companies. The codes have been designed to address deficiencies in the 
corporate governance system by recommending a set of norms to improve 
transparency and accountability among top managers and directors 
(Fernandez-Rodriguez et aI., 2004). 
Aguilera·s and Cuervo-Cazurra's (2009) research on codes of good governance 
give a comprehensive and detailed overview of the development of various 
guidelines. The codes of good governance have enjoyed rapid spread around 
the world. Despite the criticism that the codes' voluntary nature limits their ability 
to improve governance practices, codes of good governance appear to have 
generally improved corporate governance in the countries that have adopted 
them. An important debate in the international corporate governance world is 
whether countries should develop hard laws, such as the United States with the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002, or whether soft regulations, such as codes of good 
governance, are sufficiently effective to improve existing corporate governance 
practices across countries, and to address the pressing issues of corporate 
accountability and disclosure. In Germany, some soft laws like the disclosure of 
management remuneration have turned into hard law because an insufficient 
number of companies have adopted the recommendations of the guidelines. 
Since the middle of 2008, codes of good governance have been created in 70 
countries (ECGI. 2009). Most of the country codes were developed in the 1990s 
(see Figure 2.9), which was partly inspired by the Cad bury Report that had 
been created in the United Kingdom in 1992. The Cadbury Report has 
motivated other countries to introduce codes (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2009). Therefore, the UK is seen as a frontrunner country in the development of 
corporate governance and has established best practice standards. 
Furthermore. transnational entities (e.g., OECD, International Corporate 
Governance Network), institutional investors (e.g., Calpers, TIAA-CREF, 
Norges Bank), and shareholder associations (e.g., Ethos, DSW) also started 
issuing codes of good governance. O'Shea (2005) shows that most codes have 
some recommendations based on the following six governance practices: 
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(1) Balance of executive and non-executive directors, such as independent 
non-executive directors; 
(2) A clear division of responsibilities between chairman and the chief 
executive officer; 
(3) The need for timely and quality information provided to the board; 
(4) Formal and transparent procedures for the appOintment of new directors; 
(5) Balanced and understandable financial reporting; and 
(6) Maintenance of a sound system of internal control. 
In the wake of the discussion about accountability and sustainable 
management, other institutions (e.g., Dow Jones Indexes and SAM, Global 
Reporting Initiative) also included criteria of good corporate governance in their 
overall investment criteria and reporting guidelines. These are imbedded within 
a broader context, in which other criteria matter, like risk and crisis 
management, compliance, corruption and bribery, customer and human 
relationship. and eco-efficiency. 
Figure 2.9: Worldwide creation of codes of good governance by country, 
1978 to middle of 2008. 
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2.6.1 OECD guidelines 
The transnational guidelines, The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
were endorsed by the OECD Ministers in 1999 and have since become an 
international benchmark for policy makers, investors, corporations and other 
stakeholders worldwide (OECD, 2004). The OECD Guidelines were selected to 
develop the research framework for the following reasons : 
(1) They represent a common basis that OECD member countries consider 
essential for the development of good governance practices. Germany is 
a member country. Therefore, these guidelines were considered as 
appropriate for th is thesis. 
(2) The OECD Principles provide guidance for investors and corporations ; 
and 
(3) They focus on publicly traded companies. 
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Transnational codes like the DECO Guidelines are designed to improve the 
corporate governance of multiple countries and as such are more general than 
the codes developed in each country, which focus only on the issues that need 
to be addressed there (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). The DECO 
Principles are based on the following six areas: 
(1) Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework; 
(2) Rights of shareholders and key ownership functions; 
(3) Equitable treatment of shareholders; 
(4) Role of stakeholders in corporate governance; 
(5) Disclosure and transparency; 
(6) Responsibilities of the board. 
2.6.2 Dow Jones Sustainability Index 
Based on the cooperation of the Dow Jones Indexes, STDXX Limited and SAM, 
the Dow Jones Sustainability Index tracks the financial performance of the 
world's sustainability leaders. The DJSI World tracks the top 10% from each 
industry among the largest 2,500 companies worldwide. Sustainability investing 
is one of the major topics in the field of finance today, generating an increasing 
amount of interest among a wide range of investors (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
and SAM. 2009). The UN Principles for Responsible Investing, an initiative that 
promotes the integration of sustainability factors into investment decisions, now 
has signatories representing assets worth more than $18 trillion in 35 countries 
globally. At the end of 2009, 194 asset owners and 342 investment managers 
became signatories to the principles for responsible investment 
(http://www.unpri.org, 2009, accessed 31 December 2009). Institutional 
investors can no longer ignore the importance of sustainability factors and 
corporate governance is part of it. 
In the economic dimension of the sustainability assessment of SAM Research. 
corporate governance plays a major role. The issues addressed are the 
following: 
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(1) One-tier/two-tier system; 
(2) Non-executive, independent chairman and/or lead director; 
(3) Responsibilities and functions of various committees; 
(4) Corporate governance policy; 
(5) Female members on the company's board of directors/supervisory 
board; 
(6) Effectiveness and alignment with the long-term interests of shareholders; 
(7) Entrenchment provisions; 
(8) Fees paid to the company's auditing firm; 
(9) External communication of the remuneration/compensation of the board 
of directors/supervisory board and other highest paid senior 
directors/executives (SAM Research, 2009). 
2.6.3 Global Reporting Initiative 
The global reporting initiative (GRI), which was sparked by the UN, is a 
worldwide multi-stakeholder network-based non-profit organisation that has 
pioneered the development of the world's most widely used sustainability 
framework. The initiative is committed to its continuous improvement and 
application worldwide. The GRI facilitates transparency and accountability in 
organisations of all sizes and sectors (Tricker, 2009). The sustainability 
reporting framework provides guidance for organisations to disclose their 
sustainability performance and sets out the principles and indicators which 
organisations can use to measure and report their economic, environmental, 
and social performance. The GRI provides the companies with a meaningful 
framework to broaden their corporate reporting beyond the financial statements. 
The cornerstone of the framework is the sustainability reporting guideline. The 
third version of the guidelines - known as the G3 guidelines - was published in 
2006, and is a free public good. At the end of December 2009, 1,137 
companies submitted their annual and/or sustainability reports to the GRI. 
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Included in this amount were a total of 38 German companies 
(http://www.globalreporting.org, accessed 1 January 2010). 
It seems that companies use the GRI framework to gain a good understanding 
of which topics are relevant for them, allowing them to focus on developing 
further in the particularly relevant GRI indicators. E.ON, one of the world's 
largest power and gas companies followed that approach at the beginning 
(http://www.eon.com/en/unternehmen/29264.jsp. accessed 9 January 2010), 
however, at a later stage E.ON extended its corporate responsibility reporting to 
the specifications of the Institutional Investors Group on Climate Change6 
(1IGCe). A large number of investors active in this group also own E.ON shares. 
The following corporate governance criteria are part of the standard disclosures 
of the GRI framework: 
(1) Governance structure including committees, responsibilities, description 
of the mandate and composition, like independent members and/or 
non-executive members; 
(2) Indication whether the chair of the highest governance body is also an 
executive officer; 
(3) Organisations with a unitary board structure have to state the number of 
members of the highest governance body that are independent and/or 
non-executive; 
(4) Mechanisms for shareholders and employees to provide 
recommendations or direction to the highest governance body and the 
identification of topics related to economic, environmental and social 
performance addressed through these mechanisms; 
(5) Relationship between the compensation for members of the highest 
governance body, senior manager, and executives, and the 
organisation's performance; 
(6) Process in place to ensure conflicts of interest are avoided; 
6 International Investors Group on Climate Change (IIGCC) is a forum for collaboration on 
climate change for European investors. 
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(7) Process for determining the qualifications and expertise of the members 
of the highest governance body for guiding the organisation's strategy on 
economic, environmental, and social topics; 
(8) Statements of mission or value, code of conduct, and principles; 
(9) Procedures of the highest governance body for overseeing the 
organisation's identification and management of economic, 
environmental and social performance, including relevant risks and 
opportunities, and adherence or compliance with internationally agreed 
standards, codes of conduct and principles; and 
(10) Process for evaluating the highest governance body's own performance 
(GRI, 2000 - 2006). 
2.7 Countries matter 
Empirical research has shown that countries have an influence on the 
developments in national corporate governance. For reasons of consistency, 
the focus here is only on codes. Laws and legal regulations are excluded. 
Chizema and Buck (2006) point out that corporate governance operates 
differently in two broadly distinct worlds, namely that of 'stock market capitalism' 
(e.g., the US, the UK and most of the English speaking world) and 'welfare 
capitalism' (e.g., Germany, Austria, Japan and the Netherlands). Rajan and 
Zingales (2003) distinguish the market-based forms of governance in the Anglo-
American countries (typically the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, 
Australia) and the relationship-based countries or the network-oriented system 
(typically Germany and Japan), where governance is exercised through large 
block holdings and 'insider' forms of monitoring. Insiders are large bloc holders, 
families and cross-owners; and outsiders are institutional investors (Pendleton, 
2005). 
The legal approach groups countries according to legal families as follows: 
Common law countries like the United States and United Kingdom and civil or 
code law countries like Germany. The findings of Light et al. (2004) indicate that 
common law regimes grant a higher level of anti-director rights to minority 
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shareholders than cultural regions in which the dominant legal origins are civil 
law. Furthermore, they found that anti-director rights correlated negatively with 
uncertainty avoidance. This implies that the greater rights granted to minority 
shareholders in common law countries create more uncertainty in the business 
environment (Mintz, 2005). 
Zattoni and Cuomo (2008) show in their findings that there are significant 
differences between common law and civil law countries, regarding the 
diffusion, scope, coverage, and strictness of recommendations of codes. Civil 
law countries like Germany extend code recommendations to non-listed 
companies more often than common law countries like the USA and UK do. 
Civil law countries adopt codes later, issue a lower number of codes, and state 
more ambiguous and lenient recommendations. That the country of company 
origin matters is also shown in Gugler's et al. (2003) analysis, which indicates 
the following: 
(1) Companies in countries with English-origin legal systems earn returns on 
investment that are at least as large as their costs of capital; 
(2) Companies in all civil law countries earn on average returns on 
investment below their costs of capital; 
(3) Managerial entrenchment worsens a company's investment 
performance. 
Most studies found that the most important factors in individual firms' 
governance ratings are country related. Matos and Serra (2009) argue that 
companies in a given country are somehow harmed or helped by the aspects of 
governance of the country to which they belong, such as regulatory quality, 
government effectiveness, political stability or rule of law. Furthermore, they 
showed that country-specific effects are very significant and are the most 
important factors driving firm-level governance rating compared with industry-
specific effects that have a much smaller magnitude and significance. 
Doidge et al. (2007) show that country characteristics, such as economic and 
financial development, are important determinants of firm-level governance 
ratings. They expect that financial globalisation may reduce the importance of 
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country determinants. Bushman et al. (2004) highlight the role of political and 
cultural factors. Furthermore, Stulz (2010) argues that investors in poor 
governance countries are less likely to receive a return on their investment. 
Corporate governance varies widely and is changing very rapidly. Every country 
is undergoing extensive examination of its corporate governance codes and 
practices, but it is different from country to country (Monks and Minow, 2009). 
Mintz (2005) argues that corporate governance systems develop as a result of 
legal structures, different forms of financing and cultural underpinnings. 
Institutional investors, such as TIAA-CREF and Ethos, recognise that 
companies are subject to different laws, standards, customs and cultures. This 
is also applies to the OECD (2004) adopted non-binding principles of corporate 
governance that recognise the need to tailor the system to varying legal, 
economic and cultural circumstances. 
Regulators in the UK and EU utilise a principles-based approach to governance 
that incorporates the 'comply or explain' requirement with mandatory disclosure 
when a listed company fails to follow governance standards. In the UK, the 
Corporate Governance Guidelines of the Combined Code are connected with 
the listing requirements. The 'Entsprechenserklarung' (Declaration of 
conformity) according to §161 AktG is the legal foundation for German listed 
companies. In the US, the approach is rule based and can create a 'tick-the-
box' mentality that works against complying with the spirit of governance 
requirements (Mintz, 2005). 
With regard to the financing differences in the US and UK, the systems in both 
countries are represented by strong shareholder ownership of equity; and the 
German system relies more on creditor financing (Mintz, 2005). Today, German 
companies are more equity financed through domestic and international capital 
markets (Mintz, 2005 and Handelsblatt 2010) than they were just a few years 
ago. This has created a shift to a more equity-oriented culture in Germany. 
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Table 2.3: Underlying characteristics and cultural dimensions of the 
German corporate governance system. 
Characteristics and criteria Germany 
CG theory Stakeholder 
Legal system Civil law 
Legal basis/mandatory foundations § 161 AktG 
VorstAG 
VorstOG 
Code The German Code of Corporate Governance 
Financing/source of funds Creditors/Equity 
Cultural variables Small power distance 
Strong uncertainty avoidance 
Strong masculine 
Strong individualism 
CG approach Principles based 
Structure of supervisory board Two-tier 
Source: Petra Nix, the cultural variables are in accordance with Gert Hofstede, 
http://geert-hofstede.com/dimensions.html, accessed 30 January 2010. 
2.8 Corporate governance in Germany 
The German system represents a stakeholder approach to corporate 
governance and provides greater input for creditors, employees and other 
groups affected by the corporate decision making process (Mintz, 2006). 
2.8.1 The development 
In contrast to other countries, a code of corporate governance for German firms 
was regarded as unnecessary for a long time because essential governance 
aspects (e.g., the separation of management and supervision) were mandatory 
under German law (v. Werder and Talcauliar, 2008, see Figure 2.7). Corporate 
governance development in Germany supports the findings of Zattono and 
Cuomo (2008) that civil law countries are late adopters of corporate governance 
guidelines and that continental European countries are less dependent on 
equity financing have been the slowest to develop governance codes (Cadbury, 
2000). 
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The German law 'KonTraG,7 of 1998 was the first law covering corporate 
governance issues like risk management, the rights of the supervisory boards, 
as well as the rights and duties of external auditors. It was the starting point for 
a more capital market-oriented legislation. The following initiatives followed the 
same objectives to improve German corporate governance and international 
perception, especially with regard to institutional investors (Berrar, 2001). As 
the Handelsblatt statistic shows (Table 2.4), German corporations successfully 
increased their international shareholder structure. 
The government commission appointed by the Justice Minister in September 
2001 adopted the German corporate governance code on 26 February 2002. 
Through the declaration of conformity pursuant to Article 161 of the Stock 
Corporation Act (AktG) as amended by the Transparency and Disclosure Law, 
entered into force on 26 July 2002, the code has a legal basis. The aims of the 
German corporate governance code is to make Germany's corporate 
governance rules transparent for both national and international investors, 
setting out the particularities of the German business world in the language of 
the capital market and matching them to international standards (Cromme, 
2005)8, thus strengthening confidence in the management of German 
corporations. The German Corporate Governance Code as amended on 26 
May 2010 covers the following areas: 
(1) Foreword; 
(2) Shareholders and general meeting; 
(3) Cooperation between management board and supervisory board; 
(4) Management board: task, responsibilities, composition, compensation 
and conflict of interest; 
7 Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich/Corporate Sector Supervision 
and Transparency Act. 
a Cromme, Gerhard was chairman of the German Corporate Governance Commission until 30 
June 2008. 
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(5) Supervisory board: tasks, responsibilities as well as tasks and authorities 
of the chairman, formation of committees, composition and 
compensation, conflict of interest and examination of efficiency; 
(6) Transparency; 
(7) Reporting and audit of the annual financial statements. 
The code addresses major criticisms - especially from the international 
community - levelled against German corporate governance, and are as 
follows: 
(1) Inadequate focus on shareholder interests; 
(2) The two-tier system of executive board and supervisory board; 
(3) Inadequate transparency of German corporate governance; 
(4) Inadequate independence of German supervisory boards; 
(5) Limited independence of financial statement auditors 
(www.corporate-governance-code.de. accessed 2 January 2010). 
One major impact of the efforts to improve the German corporate governance 
system was a higher shareholder base of institutional investors (see Table 2.4), 
which increased from 35.5% of the OAX. 30 companies in 2001 to over 60% in 
2010. This development can be interpreted to mean that the companies 
improved their focus on shareholder interest in general and that they especially 
increased their ownership structure more towards institutional investors and 
strengthened their relationship with institutional investors. 
KObler (1994) explained the criticism of inadequate focus on shareholder 
interests: (1) The emphasis of corporate governance in Germany is still on 
creditor protection; (2) endowments are not existent since industrial foundations 
- like the Carl-Zeiss-Stiftung or the Robert-Bosch-Stiftung - are institutional 
owners but not really institutional investors because they are mostly limited to 
holding shares in just one enterprise; (3) pension funds and investment funds 
so far have very little importance since funding is largely controlled by the 
political process and by enterprises and therefore to a much lesser extent by 
55 
markets. Furthermore, the funding of German companies still had two main 
sources: retained earnings and loans (Cromme, 2005). 
The German two-tier system combined with co-determination is based on the 
stakeholder theory and not widely understood by the Anglo-Saxon cultures 
where the corporate governance systems are based on the principal-agency 
theory. The stakeholder theory believes that power should not be monopolised 
by owners (Dore, 2005). Furthermore, it is argued that employee controlled 
firms may not contribute significant value to modern economies (Turnbull, 
1997). Co-determination makes powerful intermediaries more pOlitically 
palatable than they have been in America because the employee 
representatives are in the boardroom. Employee presence also impedes the 
ability of powerful intermediaries to bring about rapid organisational change if 
that change would disrupt employment (Roe, 1994). 
The definition of independence of the board of directors in the Anglo-Saxon 
world is neither comparable nor applicable to German corporations. Therefore, 
it is not mentioned in the German Corporate Governance Code (2009). After the 
failure of Enron, the limited independence of financial statement auditors is not 
just a German issue. Dewing and Russel (2003) maintain that there will be a 
need for auditors to demonstrate that there is no cosy relationship between 
regulators and the auditing profession, especially the 'Big Four' firms, and for 
corporate governance to look outside the 'one-size-fits-all' approach. The 
DCGC (2009) addresses this subject. Prior to submitting a proposal for election, 
the supervisory board or audit committee shall obtain a statement from the 
proposed auditor stating whether, and where applicable, which business, 
financial, personal and other relationships exist between the auditor and its 
executive bodies and head auditors on the one hand, and the enterprise and 
the members of its executive bodies on the other hand, that could call its 
independence into question. This statement shall include the extent to which 
other services were performed for the enterprise in the past year, especially in 
the field of consultancy, or which are contracted for the following year. The code 
focuses not only on an efficient corporate monitoring, but also stresses the 
cooperation between the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and the executive 
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management board (Vorstand), so that the supervisory board can assist and 
collaborate in the strategic decision making process (Ringleb et aI., 2008). 
Studies by v. Werder et al. (2005) and v. Werder and Talaulicar (2008) found 
that the recommendations of the German Corporate Governance Code attain a 
high degree of acceptance but still face some neuralgic points like committees 
of the supervisory board, election to the supervisory board, age limit and 
supervisory board compensation, fast close, stock option design, 0&0 
deductible and compensation disclosure. Nevertheless, companies that comply 
with the governance code enjoy a share price premium. Goncharov et al. (2006) 
revealed in their study that the degree of compliance with the code is 
consistently value relevant information for the capital market. Furthermore, they 
showed that sample firms with higher compliance are priced at an average 
premium of EUR 3.23. 
One of the neuralgic points - the disclosure of management compensation -
has, in the meantime, been regulated by the VorstandsvergOtungs-
Offenlegungsgesetz (VorstOG) since 2005. The compensation issue was 
further strengthened by the Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der 
VorstandsvergOtung (VorstAG) in 2009. 
However, it seems that internationally, these efforts were not rewarded and 
viewed differently. Heidrick & Struggles (2009) claim that the quality of 
corporate governance in Germany is highly uneven. While a number of 
companies have achieved quite respectable ratings, there are those companies 
that still ignore corporate governance standards. According to v. Werder et a!. 
(2005), code compliance tends to increase with the size of the company. 
Overall, Germany is one of the lowest ranking countries in Europe (Heidrick & 
Struggles, 2009 and 2007). 
2.8.2 The German system 
Historically, the German system of corporate governance emphasised 
cooperative relationships among banks, shareholders, boards, managers and 
employees in the interests of labour peace and corporate efficiency (Mintz, 
2005). The most distinguishing characteristic of German corporate governance 
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is the two-tier board structure in Germany that dates back to the 1870s. 
Companies must have both a management board (insiderNorstand) and a 
supervisory (outsider/Aufsichtsrat) board (Monk and Minow, 2009, p. 363). The 
management board (Vorstand) is charged with managing the company for the 
benefit of a wide array of interests. The supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) is 
elected by the shareholders at the annual meeting and consists of non-
management members and it appoints, supervises and advises the members of 
the management board on policy, but does not participate in the company's 
day-to-day management (Mintz, 2005). The two-tier structure does not itself 
resolve the matter of independence since board members who are employees, 
or who represent creditor or government interests, are not in a position to take 
an entirely objective view of where the true long-term interest of the company 
lies (Cadbury, 2000). 
Another distinguishing characteristic is co-determination. The German 
corporate governance system is implemented according to the co-determination 
concept. Therefore, work councils have extensive participation rights and 
employees are represented in the boardroom. The company is seen as a 
partnership between capital and labour (Ticker, 2009, p. 11). In companies with 
over 500 employees, one-third of the supervisory boards are employee 
representatives. In larger companies, the supervisory board is made up of equal 
numbers of shareholder and employee representatives. The German corporate 
governance system has long been cited as a standard example of a 
stakeholder-oriented system where the companies' main sources of founding 
are retained earnings and loans (Hackethal et aI., 2005, Cromme, 2005). The 
latter point could be an explanation for why Germany is a latecomer to the 
development of corporate governance and still lacking international recognition. 
Cromme (2005) states that the starting point for the corporate governance 
debate in Germany was the globalisation and liberalisation of the financial 
markets, privatisation of state-owned companies and calls from the Anglo-
Saxon world for more protection for investors. Since foreign investors increased 
their shareholdings in German blue chip companies, it seems that the focus on 
shareholder interests has been improved and the German governance system 
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is better understood. Different international codes from Great Britain, like the 
Cadbury Code, the developments of the EU Commission and the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act influenced the development of corporate governance in Germany. Sir 
Adrian Cadbury chaired a committee set up in May 1991 by the Financial 
Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and the accountancy 
profession. His contributions to the development of corporate governance have 
been very significant. Aspects like 'comply or explain' have been incorporated 
into corporate governance systems around the world, including the United 
States and Germany (Sheridan et aI., 2006). However, other aspects, like 
encouraging institutional investors to have a dialogue with companies based on 
a 'mutual understanding of objectives' and making use of their votes (Mallin et 
aI., 2005) are not. Some recommendations of the UK still go far beyond the 
recommendations of the German Code. 
In the academic literature on comparative corporate governance, Germany is 
compared with Japan to a remarkable extent since they share some similarities, 
such as a stable network of strategically oriented shareholders, suppliers, 
bankers, and joint venture partners (Dore, 2005; Jackson and Moerke, 2005). 
Both countries build the counterpart to the corporate governance system in 
Great Britain and the United States. Monks and Minow (2009) argue that 
Japanese and German corporations are instruments of national policy to a 
greater or lesser extent. The argument is limited for listed blue chip companies. 
2.8.3 The structure of ownership 
Pendleton (2005) argues that in the relationship or insider system, the 
ownership is far more concentrated upon a single dominant or majority owner in 
many cases. This is the case in Germany where banks have been especially 
important as suppliers of credit, owners of shares and controllers of voting 
rights. Pendleton's argument is only true for some of the German DAX 30 
companies. There are only four listed companies, like the Deutsche Bank and 
VW, where the share of international shareholder declined between 2001 and 
2009. The vast majority of companies have broadened their international 
shareholder base in the past few years (see Table 2.4). On average, the base 
of institutional shareholders of the DAX 30 companies in Germany increased 
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from 35.4% to 61.7% at the end of 2010. It seems that Germany as a 
relational/insider/network country is converging towards the market model. 
Even in former federal state owned companies like Deutsche Telekom and 
Deutsche Post, foreign institutional investors form the major shareholder base. 
Table 2.4: Share of foreign, institutional and strategic shareholders in 
German DAX 30 companies. 
Company Share in 2001 Share 2009 Share 2010 
Adidas 53.0% 59.0% 88.0% 
Allianz 32.0% 68.1% 71.0% 
BASF 35.0% 50.0% 64.0% 
Bayer 39.0% 82.2% 73.0% 
Beiersdorf - no information no information 
BMW (ord. shares) no information 36.2% 35.8% 
Commerzbank 37.0% no information 60.0% 
Daimler no information 62.3% 71.8% 
Deutsche Bank 53.0% 45.0% 53.0% 
Deutsche Borse 32.0% 82.0% 82.0% 
Deutsche Post 15.9% 51.2% 64.3% 
Deutsche Telekom 37.6% 43.0% 62.0% 
EON 42.2% 72.0% 64.0% 
FMC no Information 40.3% 84.5% 
Fresenius (ord. 
- 63.0% -shares) 
Henkel no Information no Information no Information 
Infineon no Information no Information no Information 
K+S 40.9 56.2% 
Linde 23.8% 59.3% 79.0% 
Lufthansa 36.6% 27.0% 27.2% 
MAN 19.0% 41.0% 42.0% 
Merck 75.2% 84.0% 
Metro no Information no Information no Information 
MOnchener ROck 35.0% 67.2% 70.7% 
RWE 15.0 % 39.0% 40.0% 
SAP 49.3% 47.2% 88.7% 
Siemens 48.0% 58.4% 71.0% 
Thyssen-Krupp 25.0% 27.4% 30.9% 
Volkswagen 23.3% 17.7% 17.0% 
Average 35.5% 51.6% 61.7% 
Source: Ulf Sommer, Handelsblatt, 4 January 2010, page 27 and company 
annual reports and websites. 
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2.9 Institutional investors 
In general, the replacement of owner-managers by widely dispersed 
shareholders like institutional investors led to the concern that listed 
corporations are essentially ownerless. The active ownership is a vital element 
in the monitoring of a company. Institutional investors have generally welcomed 
the corporate governance reforms and attach relevance to initiatives aimed at 
monitoring the principal agency problem (Solomon et aI., 2000). Institutional 
investors are a dominant force in financial market today, yet their preferences 
about corporate governance are generally undisclosed and their activities in this 
area tend to be performed privately (McCahery et aI., 2009). Their market 
dominance implies that their advisory and activist role in corporate governance 
is increasing and they prefer to perform their active role without attending 
annual general meetings (Solomon et aI., 2000). 
Therefore, it is necessary to provide some background information about the 
current status and discussions. The next section gives an overview of 
institutional investors. It defines the various types of institutional investors and 
their characteristics. Furthermore, the section elaborates on the relationship 
between institutional investors and companies, as well as the ownership and 
control issue discussed in the academic literature. Finally, the section discusses 
the role and responsibilities of institutional investors. 
2.9.1 Definition and classification 
The term 'institutional shareholder' is often used, but with different meanings. 
The relationship between the owners of a company and the company itself is 
often an indirect one. Beneficial owners may include penSion fund trustees, 
mutual and life assurance funds, which in turn represent individual pension fund 
beneficiaries, unit trust and other policyholders. The beneficial owner will 
usually agree on fund mandates with their investment manager as to how their 
money will be invested and how their shares will be voted (FinanCial Reporting 
Council, 2010). But the right to vote, which is recognised as an important aspect 
of share ownership, rests with the institutional shareholders, not the ultimate 
beneficiaries (Mallin, 2004). 
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Institutional investors are organisations that pool large sums of money and 
invest those sums in companies. They include banks, insurance companies, 
pension funds, hedge funds, mutual funds, endowments, sovereign wealth 
funds and private equity. On the strength of their financial power, they can 
engage in an active role in corporate governance. A key point is that 
institutional shareholders are motivated primarily or exclusively by financial 
returns rather than by any 'private' benefits of control, such as social status 
(Pendleton, 2005). 
Table 2.5 provides an overview of the various characteristics and types of 
investors and how they might exercise their influence to initiate changes in 
corporations. The terminology 'institutional investor' implies German and 
international institutional investors and is used consistently throughout this 
thesis, if not stated differently. 
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Table 2.5: Classification of different investment styles and the execution 
of voice policy. 
Type of investor Investment Voice behaviour Funds selections 
characteristics 
Passive index tracker Cheap No exercise of voting ETX funds 
implementation of a rights 
specific investment 
segment 
Passive stock picker Buy, hold and sell No exercise of voting Small institutional 
strategies rights, voting with the investors 
feet 
Active stock picker No activism in Exercise of voting Large institutional 
corporate rights in particular investors like Fidelity, 
governance, goal is events, sometimes in Capital International, 
to find good collaboration with Black Rock, 
investment other investors UHWNl/Family 
opportunities offices9 
Active index tracker No buy, hold and sell Exercise of voting Pension funds like 
strategy since the rights in malcontent Calpers or the 
investment volumes governance issues advisors of pension 
are too large - funds like Ethos, 
enforced to invest UH NWI/F amily 
offices, sovereign 
wealth funds 
Hedge funds and Strive for change, Active governance in Hermes, Janus, The 
focus funds 10 focussed investment difficult and Children's investment 
portfolio, above malcontent company funds (TCI), Laxey 
average return situations, focus on Partners, 
undervalued UH NWI/F amily 
companies, offices 
collaboration with 
other investors 
Raider, Private Corporate control, at Active governance InCentive Capital 
Equity, Buyout Funds least for some time (Rene Braginsky), 
Guy Wysser-Pratt, 
Blackstone, Carlyle, 
KKR. Perm ira 
Source: Nix, Petra. 
Major corporate governance guidelines and principles refer to the shareholders 
as the most important addressee. Boards of directors are responsible for 
representing the interest of shareholders in the running of the firm through the 
hiring, monitoring, and replacement of management (Filatotchev and Boyd, 
2009). 
9 Ultra High Net Worth Individuals. 
10 Mutual funds, where the major share of the portfolio is invested in only a few companies. The 
investment approach is not diversification ('buy a few of a lot'). They focus on less share 
positions with relatively high interest ('buy a lot of a few'). 
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Ferreira and Matos (2008) found that all institutional investors have a strong 
preference for the stocks of large firms and firms with good governance. All 
investors preferred countries with strict disclosure standards. Firms with higher 
ownership by foreign and independent institutions have higher firm valuations, 
better operating performance, and lower capital expenditures since the 
institutional investors are able to exert pressure because they have fewer 
business relations. Institutional investors can push for change by directly 
voicing their interests to corporate management, or indirectly, by influencing 
managers by exiting. Furthermore, the findings suggest that investors do track 
firm-level governance indicators, and there is some hope for a 'good firm' in a 
'bad country'. In another study, Ferreira et al. (2009) found that institutional 
investors act as facilitators in the international market for control and that they 
build bridges between firms and reduce transaction costs and information 
asymmetry in cross-border mergers and transactions. 
2.9.2 Ownership, control and relationship 
Shareholders have become more numerous and are spread out geographically 
(Tricker, 2009, p. 9). A vital influence in the practice of corporate governance is 
the reality of the ownership structure. The UK represents shareholder models of 
ownership and control, whereas in Germany a stakeholder approach to 
corporate governance provides greater input for creditors, employees and other 
groups affected by the corporate decision making process. Three 
characteristics of the German model of corporate governance distinguish it from 
the common law models: (1) the pattern of ownership and control; (2) a two-tier 
board of directors system; and (3) employee co-determination (Mintz, 2006). 
The German system of corporate governance builds on insider relations while 
the UK system relies on external relationships. According to Mintz (2006), 
recent trends indicate that German companies are increasingly relying on equity 
financing through both domestic and international capital markets. The resulting 
broadening of the shareholder base in German companies has created a subtle 
shift towards an equity culture (see also Table 2.4). 
It seems that internationally, the German system and the efforts to establish a 
trusted corporate governance system are viewed differently. Jackson et al. 
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(2004) argue that work councils promote greater accountability and thereby 
decrease agency costs by monitoring managerial pay, fighting for transparency 
and also siding with shareholders in corporate restructuring. Mintz (2006) 
recommended developing a system that enhances employee participation and 
contributes toward improving long-term share value. 
The separation of ownership and control creates an agency problem, which is 
that managers may run the firm in their own, rather than the shareholders' 
interest, choosing to maximise their own utility rather than shareholder value 
(Pinto, 2008). The dispersion of ownership puts the control in the hands of 
management. The closer alignment of ownership, finance and control in 
countries like Germany and Japan is said to facilitate much closer and more 
informed monitoring by the owners (Pendleton, 2005). 
Institutional investors have indicated that shareholders should be adopting a 
more activist stance, but this should be performed without the representation of 
corporate boards (Solomon, 2000). Therefore, the 'hands-off' relationship 
approach seems to be the preferred way of buidling a relationship with 
corporations. Guy Jubb, Head of Corporate Governance at Standard Life 
Investments (2000) classifies the interaction with companies according to 
whether it is preventative or reactive governance. The preventative governance, 
which is the preferred form, involves discussions with companies to gain a 
better understanding of the way a company is run. When appropriate, they give 
advice or encouragement when there is room for improvement. Reactive 
governance arises when corporate governance breaks down and companies, 
either independently or in conjunction with other shareholders, take steps to find 
a solution. 
When it comes to relationships with listed companies, Hirschman's (1970) 
theoretical concepts can be applied: voice implies the use of ownership power 
to change the company's action, exit implies voting with your feed, and loyalty 
implies remaining quiet and not selling based on Hirschman's concept. The vote 
is recognised as one of the key ways for institutional shareholders to exercise 
'voice' and make corporate boards accountable. A key concern is that many 
institutional investors are not, in reality, acting as shareowners (Mallin, 2004). 
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The relationship of investors with the listed companies can be categorised as 
follows: 
Table 2.6: Relationship of institutional investors with listed companies. 
Low Relationship - Weak relationship - Strong relationship -
no voice exit or loyalty exercise of voice 
Index funds, small investors Large institutional investors like Hedge funds, buyout 
mutual funds, insurances, funds, raider, private 
sovereign wealth funds equity 
Source: Petra Nix. 
The categorisation in Table 2.6 is not mutually exclusive because weak 
relationships can become strong relationships if corporate situations change 
and vice versa. 
The financial logic tends to favour exit behaviour, that is, the institutional 
investor does not want to be stuck in corporate governance bodies, but be free 
to make reallocations in the portfolio at any time. At the same time, the 
increased power of institutional investors has enabled them to participate more 
actively in corporate governance activities (Hellmann, 2005). 
The growth of institutional investment has created a new class of professional 
shareholders who are in a position to carry out the functions of governance 
(Hadden, 1994). In their survey at institutions, McCahery et al. (2009) found that 
shareholders are willing to engage in a variety of shareholder activism methods 
with the most prevalent being the 'exit' strategy, i.e., voting with their feet by 
selling their shares. However, this level of relationship is pretty weak since it 
does not actively force any changes in the company's strategy or in the 
behaviour of management. Furthermore, McCahery's research showed that the 
three most important triggers for activism were dissatisfaction with its (long-run) 
corporate strategy in general, goals and planned acquisitions. Interestingly, 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the stock price and the company did not 
appear to be key drivers. Therefore, a clear communication of the corporate 
strategy, the goals and future investments in conjunction with an ongoing close 
relationship with important shareholders matters in creating a common 
understanding of the way a company is run. 
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According to Pendleton (2005), the combination of increasingly concentrated 
and stable ownership among some institutional investors has important 
implications for corporate governance regarding the relationships between firms 
and investors, and the forms of coordination between investors. Cooperative, 
stable relationships are maintained with regular meetings and other channels 
for the two-way flow of information and feedback mechanisms after meetings. 
These meetings are the most important source of company information for fund 
managers. Also, German companies consider one-to-one meetings with 
investors as one of the most important relationship instruments (Kirchhoff and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2005) and internationalisation is very essential for 
German corporations in their relationships with investors (Konigs and 
Schiereck, 2007). Therefore, it is necessary for German corporations to respect 
international development in order to attract the capital of international 
institutional investors. Investors with similar interests can act in broadly similar 
ways since they have created institutions that enable them to mobilise their 
influence over corporations (Pendleton, 2005). 
2.9.3 Role and responsibilities 
The role of shareholders plays a major role in the debate on effective corporate 
governance. Boards have to become more accountable to institutional investors 
because they have grown in power, use their votes and influence and are likely 
to do so even more in the future (Cad bury, 2000). In January 2010, the 
Financial Reporting Council11 (FRC) published the first Stewardship Code for 
institutional investors. One of its key aims is for shareholders to take action if 
they believe that the directors are not serving their own or the interests of the 
beneficial owners, including pensioners, insurance companies, policyholders 
and unit trust investors, in the best way. Some policy objectives of the 
Stewardship Code of the FRC are the following: 
• A more effective engagement should improve the governance and 
performance of investee companies 
11 The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is the UK's independent regulator responsible for 
promoting high quality corporate governance and reporting to foster investment. 
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• Assist the efficient operation of capital markets and increase confidence 
in business 
• Improve the communication between shareholders and the boards of the 
companies in which they invest 
The Green Paper of the European Commission (2010) on corporate 
governance in financial institutions and remuneration policies also focuses on 
the role of shareholders. The purpose of the EU is to motivate shareholders to 
engage in a dialogue with financial institutions and monitor senior 
management's decision making and consider the long-term viability of the 
financial institution (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer LLP, 2010). It is explicitly 
stated in the Green Paper that the role of shareholders does not only affect 
financial institutions. Therefore, the factors raised in the paper can also be 
applied to industrial companies. A major concern is that the financial crisis has 
shown that confidence in the model of the shareholder-owner who contributes 
to the company's long-term viability has been severely shaken. It seems that 
shareholders sometimes show little interest in the long-term governance 
objectives of the businesses and financial institutions in which they invest. This 
raises questions about the effectiveness of corporate governance rules based 
on the presumption of effective control by shareholders. 
Institutional investors like TIM CREF and CalPERS in the United States 
(Carleton et al. 1998; Gillan and Starks 2007), Hermes in the UK (Becht et a!. 
2009) and, more recently, hedge funds (Brav et al. 2008; Greenwood and 
Schor, 2009; Klein and Zur, 2009) have been pioneers in shareholder activism, 
by using the proxy process and other approaches to pressure corporate 
managers to make changes. In January 2010, Hermes 12 nominated its own 
candidate for the chair of the supervisory board of Infineon, one of Germany's 
DAX 30 companies. Furthermore, Hermes asked large German corporations for 
the 'say on pay' vote in its shareholders' meeting in 2010. Another example of 
the engagement of international institutional investors in German listed 
12 Hermes is an asset manager and pension fund, which is 100% owned by British Telecom 
Pension Scheme (BTPS). 
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companies is Merck, the global pharmaceutical and chemical company. Merck 
is one of the 30 largest listed companies in Germany. Around 30% of the 
company's total capital is publicly traded, while 70% is owned by the Merck 
family via the general partner E. Merck KG (httpJ/www.merck.de/en/company/ 
merck_at_a_glance.html, accessed 23 December 2010). Merck does not 
disclose the individual remuneration of its management and supervisory boards. 
The displeasure of some large institutional investors like Black-Rock, Capital 
Group and Templeton regarding this fact is recorded in the resolution on the 
approval of the actions of the executive and supervisory board (Manager 
Magazin, 2010). Both got an approval of only 56% at the AGM 2010, which 
forced the executive management and supervisory board to change to an 
individualised remuneration disclosure policy. Already in 2005, the UK hedge 
fund TCI blocked the takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche 
Borse AG and the CEO of Deutsche Borse had to step down. These events 
support the argument that foreign institutions can play more of a role in effecting 
changes in corporate governance practices than domestic institutions (Gillan 
and Starks, 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Therefore, it can be concluded 
that German corporations also need to be prepared to adjust their relationships 
with institutional investors according to international practices and 
developments in order to attract the investments of international institutional 
investors. 
Institutional investors are publishing their own codes, which can lead to different 
governance criteria between investors (Cad bury, 2000). Nevertheless, several 
concerns have arisen as to whether institutional investors are likely to be able 
or willing to carry out the governance functions for the following reasons 
(Hadden, 1994; Tricker, 2009; Hellmann, 2005; Pinto, 2008; EU commission, 
2010): 
• The obligation of institutional investors is to pursue investment policies 
that lead to the maximisation of the value of their funds rather than of the 
companies they invest in 
• Greater involvement by pension funds in the process of governance is 
not always justifiable. Therefore it is only likely to occur if the costs of 
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monitoring are less than the benefits from reducing the agency costs that 
stem from the separation of ownership and control in large corporations 
• Institutions may have difficulties in ensuring compliance with insider 
trading laws 
• Exercising power in corporate governance in an informed and effective 
manner can become considerably difficult in foreign companies 
• Different interests of the beneficial owners of institutional investors 
• Accountability of proactive institutional investors in governance when 
stock prices falls 
• Institutional investor organisations are designed for exit behaviour, but 
not for voice behaviour. Only relatively large company information 
oriented institutions are because they are generally too big to be able to 
sell quickly without making a material impact on share prices 
• Possession of portfolios of different shares leads to the abstraction, or 
even disappearance of the concept of ownership normally associated 
with holding shares 
• Costs can dissuade institutional investors if they want to actively engage 
in governance, particularly if their participation is minimal 
• Conflict of interest (e.g., exercising incompatible roles of activities), such 
as providing advice on investments while managing an investment fund 
or one's own account, cross-shareholdings or business links between an 
institutional investor and the financial institution in which it is investing 
There has been mounting pressure for major investors to take a more active 
role in the formal aspects of corporate governance, such as participation in 
AGMs. Some institutional investors, such as Hermes have clearly championed 
the activist cause (Pendleton, 2005). Executing the vote can become decisive in 
the redistribution of power since investor passivity in governance increases the 
power of directors and company management (Goergen and Renneboog, 
2001 ). 
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2.10 Research gaps 
As the literature review has shown, much of the research in corporate 
governance has its origin in common law countries and uses the deductive 
positive approach. In the deductive methodology, public archival data is the 
most common source of information. The main subjects of past research have 
been board structure, compensation, firm and performance. Given these 
findings, attention is given to the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance, which has received relatively little attention in the research. In 
Germany, the development of the relationship between corporations and their 
equity providers is still lagging behind the AnglO-Saxon countries (Konigs and 
Schiereck, 2010). Therefore, this research contributes to the body of knowledge 
in various respects. It focuses on Germany, a civil law country and uses the 
inductive and interpretative empirical exploration research approach. 
Furthermore, data which is not publicly available is gathered through in-depth 
interviews to provide more insight into the 'black-box' regarding the role that 
institutional investors play in the corporate governance of German companies. 
Table 2.7: Research gaps. 
Positioning/characteristics of academic Positioning and focus of thesis 
research 
Common law countries like the UK and US Germany, a civil law country 
Deductive - positivist approach Inductive - interpretativisUempirical exploration 
approach 
Archival Data In-depth interviews to gather data which is not 
publicly available 
Main subjects: board structure, Subject: Role of institutional investors in German 
compensation, firm performance corporate governance 
Soure: Petra NIX. 
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3 Methodology 
The starting point in all research is to add value to the body of accumulated 
knowledge (Remeny et aI., 2005). The research should not be self-indulgent 
and has to matter to others (Salomon, 2003). 
3.1 Research paradigms 
All research work is based on a certain vision of the world, employs a 
methodology, and proposes results aimed at predicting, prescribing, 
understanding or explaining (Thietart et aI., 2001). This thesis aims to 
undertake research in the area of business and management. There are two 
major advantages of business research. Firstly, it can use knowledge from a 
range of disciplines to gain new insights that cannot be obtained through all of 
these disciplines separately. Secondly, management research should be able to 
develop ideas and relate them to practice (Saunders et aI., 2007). To evaluate 
the status of knowledge, researchers can draw inspiration from paradigms. 
According to Kuhn (1970), paradigms are models or intellectual frameworks, 
with which researchers in organisational science can affiliate them. There are 
three major paradigms representing the main epistemological streams in 
organisational science: the positivist, interpretativist and constructivist 
paradigms (Thietart, 2001). The two latter ones belong to the non-positivist 
approach, which is referred to as phenomenology. The paradigm that is 
adopted is important since the epistemological positioning will have a decisive 
influence on the design that a researcher will be able to implement (Thietart, 
2001). 
3.1.1 Positivist approach 
Until the 1950s, the approaches to research were primarily centred on the 
positivist paradigm. Pure positivism accepts only the scientific method based on 
using quantitative data to test hypotheses to produce scientific knowledge. 
Positivists consider that reality has its own essence, independently of what 
individuals perceive. The research problem consists essentially of examining 
facts (Thietart, 2001). The central issue in the positivistic approach is the 
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relationship between that part of the world which is the object of a particular 
study and the theoretical framework which is constructed in order to explain the 
observations that are made (Remenyi et aI., 2005). The positivist ideal would be 
to find a universal law that explains reality and reveals objective truth (Thietart, 
2001). In positivist management research, the aim is to ensure that there is 
distance between the researcher and what is being researched so that the 
research process and findings are not contaminated by the actions of the 
researcher. 
3.1.2 Interpretativist approach 
Interpretativism has its philosophical origins in phenomenology or non-
positivism. Interpretativists consider that individuals create their environments 
by their own thoughts and actions, and are guided by their goals (Thietart, 
2001). In the interpretativism approach, it is necessary for the researcher to 
understand the differences between humans in our role as social actors. This 
emphasises the difference between conducting research among people rather 
than objects, such as trucks and computers (Saunders et aI., 2007). The 
process of creating knowledge involves understanding the meaning that actors 
give to reality. Interpretativists try to understand it through the actors' 
interpretations. Therefore, the actors' intentions, motivations, expectations, 
motives and beliefs have to be taken into account. Crucial to the interpretivist 
epistemology is that the researcher has to adopt an empathetic stance to enter 
the social world of the research subjects and understand their world from their 
point of view (Saunders et aI., 2007). The privileged status that interpretativists 
accord to understanding is based on the concept of understanding ('verstehen') 
developed by Max Weber (Thietart, 2001). According to Lee (1991), the 
knowledge creation process is united on two levels. Firstly, understanding is the 
process by which individuals are led, in their daily lives, to interpret and 
understand their world. Secondly, understanding is the process by which 
researchers interpret the subjective meanings behind the behaviour of the 
individuals they are studying. Interpretativist researchers contextualise research 
to analyse the daily functioning. This involves carrying out field studies, which 
favour on-site interviews (Thietart, 2001). The phenomenological approach is 
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an appropriate method to cope with the problems of people and organisations 
(Remenyi, 2005). At the heart of phenomenology is the relationship between 
self and society (Mead, 1934). 
3.1.3 Constructivist approach 
Constructivism is the second paradigm in the phenomenological approach. 
Constructivist researchers construct their own reality, starting from and drawing 
from their own experience in the context in which they act. For constructivists, 
knowledge and reality are created by the mind. There is no unique pre-existing 
real world. All observation depends on the person doing the observing. The 
research problem is only fully elaborated at the end of the research process and 
is guided by the researcher's initial knowledge project (Thietart, 2001). 
3.2 Research methods 
The two building blocks of research are the deductive and inductive research 
processes (Sekaran, 2003). Saunderson (2005) summarised the major 
differences between deduction and induction (see Table 3.1). Deductive 
research has its roots in the natural sciences, whereas inductive research 
emerged from the social sciences. 
In deductive research, the strategy is to test hypotheses and theories by using 
quantitative data. The scientific research involves the development of a theory 
and is subject to a rigorous test. Other characteristics include finding 
explanations for the causal relationships between variables, a highly structured 
process and the need to measure facts quantitatively. In order to gain a better 
understanding of the problem, the principle of reductionism is applied. 
Furthermore, a sufficient sample size is necessary to be able to make statistical 
generalisations. The deductive logic consists of one or more general 
hypotheses and comparing them against a particular reality in order to assess 
the validity of the initial hypotheses formulated (Thietart, 2001). Salomon (2003) 
criticises that in reality the hypotheses are not hypotheses since they are written 
after the data has been analysed. 
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The emphasis of the induction method is to gain an understanding of the 
meanings. In the induction method, certain phenomena are observed. The 
inductive research enables the researcher to move from particular observations 
to general statements. In a less structured process, qualitative data and a 
smaller sample can be used. Generalisation is of less concern than in the 
deductive research approach. In the inductive research method, it is about 
understanding the nature of the problem, deriving a meaning from the results 
and formulating a theory (Saunderson 2007; Thietart, 2001). Induction owes 
more to interpretivism (Saunderson, 2007). Here the general position is based 
on observed facts (Sekaran, 2003). 
Both research processes help us to understand, explain, and/or predict 
business phenomena; what they both have in common is that they should be 
rigorous (Salmon, 2003). 
Table 3.1: Major differences between the deductive and inductive 
approaches to research. 
Deductive approach Inductive approach 
Scientific principles Gaining an understanding of the meanings 
that humans attach to events 
Moving from theory to data A close understanding of the research context 
The need to explain causal relationships The collection of qualitative data 
between variables 
The collection of quantitative data A more flexible structure to allow the research 
emphasis to be modified as the research 
progresses 
The application of controls to ensure the The realisation that the research is part of the 
validity of the data research process 
The operationalization of concepts to ensure Less concern with the need to generalise 
clarity of definition 
A highly structured approach Less structured approach 
Researcher independence with respect to Empathetic stance of the researcher 
what is being researched 
The necessity to select samples of sufficient Small sample size 
size in order to generalise conclusions 
Source: Petra Nix, according to Saunders et aI., 2005, p. 120. 
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3.2.1 Quantitative research 
The quantitative approach is grounded in the positivist paradigm (Thietart, 
2001). Quantitative research is a well-established methodology. It is generally 
acknowledged that quantitative approaches offer greater assurance of 
objectivity than qualitative research (Thietart, 2001). Furthermore, it is the 
dominant research approach in natural sciences (Saunders et aI., 2007). 
However, Salomon (2003) criticises that quantitative researchers rarely address 
what the audience can take from the research clearly and often quantitative 
researchers hide behind the 'generalisability' of their findings. Saunders (2007) 
lists five sequential steps in the deductive research process: (1) deducting a 
hypotheses; (2) expressing the hypotheses in operational terms; (3) testing the 
operational hypothesis; (4) examining the specific outcome of the inquiry; and 
(5) modifying the theory in terms of the findings, if necessary. 
3.2.2 Qualitative research 
Qualitative research is only one of the appropriate methods, however some 
academic journals have worked diligently to increase the number and quality of 
qualitative research papers. The challenge of qualitative research is that there 
is no accepted 'boilerplate' for writing up qualitative methods and determining 
quality. Unlike quantitative findings, qualitative findings lack an agreed upon 
'significance level', a 'magic number' of interviews that should be conducted in a 
qualitative research project (Pratt, 2009). Qualitative research is particularly 
important in both social science theory and practice-oriented organisational 
development (Patton, 2002). Qualitative management research initially appears 
to be a commonly applied umbrella term for the use of a vast array of non-
statistical data collection and analysis techniques (Johnson et aI., 2006). The 
purpose here is to gain a better understanding of the nature of the problem. The 
result of this analysis is the formulation of a theory (Saunderson, 2007). Much 
of the existing qualitative research has focused on the nature of managerial 
work (Johnson et aI., 2006). Therefore, the study of a small sample of subjects 
might be more appropriate than a larger sample as is done with the deductive 
approach (Saunders et aI., 2007). The researchers must position themselves as 
interpreters of the field they are studying. However, the qualitative approach 
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does not rule out the epistemological posture of objectivity of the research with 
regard to the world that it is studying (Thietart, 2001). The limitation of 
qualitative approaches lies in the fact that such studies are necessarily carried 
out within a fairly delimited context. 
3.3 Research strategy and design of thesis 
The essence of modern knowledge is that it is derived from observations made 
on the world (Remenyi et aI., 2005). Management research fundamentally deals 
with the production and legitimation of the various forms of knowledge 
associated with the practices of management. In order to create knowledge, the 
author has to choose from various research paradigms; the difference between 
them is the status of knowledge. A related question to consider is the nature of 
reality. Here, the author has to determine if reality exists independently of the 
observer or if the perception of reality is subjective. The research strategies 
belong to the deductive or inductive approach, however neither is superior or 
inferior. What matters is that the particular research question can be answered 
with the chosen strategy and that the research objectives can be met 
(Saunderson et aI., 2007). 
3.3.1 Research paradigm 
In this thesis, the goal is to develop an understanding of the role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance in German corporations. The impact of 
institutional investors may vary from subject to subject and also differ between 
companies. The role of the institutional investors also strongly depends on the 
relationship between a listed company and its institutional investors, in terms of 
corporate strategy and performance. It is important for corporations to 
understand the degree to which institutional investors have an effect. To 
determine this, an inductive qualitative research approach has various 
advantages over a deductive quantitative research approach, which are as 
follows: 
• The research study wants to develop an understanding of what 
phenomena and issues matter if institutional investors can have an 
impact on the corporate governance of German listed corporations. In 
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comparison, the scientific research approach of the quantitative research 
is to test one or more hypotheses and move from theory to data. 
Therefore, it is not an appropriate approach. 
• The research is based on primary data and not on the secondary data 
used in quantitative research. The primary data is collected in interviews, 
which means that it is not archival or publicly available. The advantage is 
that the researcher can gain insight into information that is not publicly 
available and which opens up the often-mentioned 'black box'. This study 
is one of the few that uses interviews as a method of data collection. 
• The aim of this research study is to identify the role that institutional 
investors play and the impact they have. The causal relationships cannot 
be explained by variables since the data is collected in interviews. In fact, 
this study aims to develop a set of relevant issues that matter when 
institutional investors execute their role and to gain an understanding of 
which types of institutional investors have an impact on corporate 
governance. 
• The results and findings will be limited to listed companies where 
institutional investors constitute part of the shareholders. The requested 
generalisation of the quantitative research method is therefore not an 
issue and of less concern. 
• The data will be collected in a small but relevant sample size. The 
representatives of the companies identified are key players. This is done 
in order to build and maintain the relationship between a listed company 
and its major shareholders. Usually, such an exclusive sample can only 
be reached if there is a personal and trusting relationship. 
• The issue of the research question is strongly linked to a managerial and 
practice-oriented issue rather than a natural science issue. 
In the academic literature, clear definitions exist regarding the role of 
institutional investors in corporate governance, their responsibilities and how 
they can execute their power (see Section 2.9.3). The research model is built 
upon these elements. These aspects of the role of institutional investors are 
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investigated in an inductive process. An epistemological reflection helps to 
develop an understanding of the various paradigms that can be applied. 
Therefore, the epistemological position applied here will be based on a non-
positivist approach - the interpretativist paradigm. In the interpretativist 
paradigm, reality has a more precarious status and remains unknowable 
because it is impossible to reach it directly. The reality is dependent on the 
subjects and creates its environment by its own thoughts and actions (Thietart, 
2001). Using a qualitative research approach, data is collected in semi-
structured interviews in a field study. In this empirical field research, the 
objective is to find out what corporate managers in German listed companies 
have experienced and how they view the role of institutional investors in 
corporate governance. The nature of the knowledge produced in this thesis is 
therefore subjective and contextual. The result of the study does not claim that 
it can be generalised. Nevertheless, this is an appropriate method in practice 
oriented management and business research, which deals with the 
expectations of people. 
During the research process, an inside understanding can be developed of the 
role of institutional investors in the German corporate governance that exists in 
German corporations and how managers experience it in their managerial 
practice. With this perspective, the research process is not directed by an 
external knowledge goal like in the positivist research approach, but consists of 
developing an understanding of the reality experienced by the subjects of the 
study (Thietart, 2001) at a speCific point in time. 
The subjects of this thesis are members of the supervisory board and IROs. In 
German corporations, the relationship and communication with financial 
analysts and investors is the responsibility of investors relations. This 
department reports to the CEO or CFO in 81 % of all German listed companies 
(Nix and Wolbert, 2005). Therefore, they are the right subjects for the in-depth 
interviews. 
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3.3.2 Research method 
In a business and management research project, various methods can be used. 
Questionnaires, and semi-structured, in-depth and group interviews can be 
used to collect primary data (Saunderson et aI., 2007). In this research project, 
the following approach is used: The research question is answered in semi-
structured, in-depth interviews. The interview guideline for the semi-structured 
interviews covers some open-ended and closed-ended questions (see 
Appendix 9.2). The advantage of these interviews is that the interviewees can 
give open answers about the roles that institutional investors play, which they 
feel are important and relevant to their particular environment and company. 
The semi-structured nature of the interview guideline helps to structure and 
guide the interviews without pre-defined issues. The interviewees are not 
restricted to narrowly pre-determined subjects and variables like in standardised 
interviews. They can give answers that are closely linked to the particular 
company they represent and their own practical, managerial experience. This 
method was chosen because it helps to identify general patterns (Saunderson 
et aI., 2007) and to explore important issues about the role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance from the perspective of the respondents. 
Afterwards, the results can be coded and categorised to develop a list of 
themes, subjects and issues and give an overview of which ones matter most. 
The interviews are conducted with powerful managers as a target group, like 
the members of supervisory boards and IROs. By adopting an inductive and 
rigorous research process, the phenomena of the role of institutional investors 
can be observed and interpreted. The interpretativist approach is an appropriate 
research paradigm since this research project is being done among people and 
the differences between the various humans of the target group can be 
analysed. With the personal interviews, an empathetic stance can be assumed 
to enter the social world of the target group and how the respondents view the 
role of institutional investors from their perspective. The semi-structured 
interviews are an appropriate method in practice-oriented organisational 
development to gain a better understanding of the nature of the role that 
institutional investors can play in corporate governance. 
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3.3.3 Research process 
Constructing a research problem consists of formulating a question linking the 
theoretical, empirical or methodological elements. The question allows other 
theoretical, empirical or methodological elements to be discovered that help to 
understand reality (Thietart, 2001). 
The research process is outlined in Figure 3.1. The research topics that were 
identified are corporate governance and institutional investors. Starting with the 
literature review, the aim was to examine the various definitions of corporate 
governance, followed by a discussion of the existing theories of corporate 
governance and the role of institutional investors, as well as their limitations in 
general. It was found that most of the academic research is based on the 
principal-agency theory. Common law countries like the UK and US have been 
the main focus of the academic research. In contrast, Germany, as a civil law 
country, does not attract much interest for international research studies. 
Furthermore, most of the research focuses on topics like compensation, firm 
performance and managerial behaviour. Finally, the literature gives insights into 
the various classifications of institutional investors, their relationships to 
companies and their roles and responsibilities. Based on these findings and the 
conclusions of the theoretical research, the objective of the study, and the 
research problem and question were defined in the research design. 
Additionally, a theoretical basis was developed for the questionnaire for the 
semi-structured interviews. After a pilot test of the questionnaire, the data 
collection process with the semi-structured interviews was started. After the 
interviews were transcribed, the results were coded, categorised and analysed. 
Finally, the analysed results were linked to the theoretical research framework 
and conclusions and recommendations were derived. 
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Figure 3.1: Research process. 
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Since the shareholdings of international institutional investors have been 
increased in German listed companies in recent years, it is necessary to 
understand the viewpoints of corporate managers and how they perceive the 
monitoring , control and influence of institutional investors in corporate 
governance. In order to gain insight into this under-researched area, field 
research was conducted by way of approximately 20 in-depth, personal 
interviews. The interviews were conducted with members of the supervisory 
boards and the investor relations managers of German listed companies. 
Th is thesis aims to go beyond the publicly available data . It wants to gain a 
better understanding of the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance in German corporations. Therefore, it is necessary to collect actual 
and primary data, opinions, expectations and recommendations regarding the 
relationship between the members of the board of directors and important 
institutional shareholders. It is not possible to use a deductive research 
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approach with publicly available archival data and publicly available archival 
data cannot answer the research question. This study is less oriented towards 
representativeness and more towards finding associations and explanations 
(Oppenheim, 2005). 
The research problem is the general question that the research is trying to 
answer. It is a key element of the research process since it starts with a specific 
problem and translates the researcher's knowledge project into a research 
objective (Thietart, 2001). It can be expected that, in reality, the role of 
institutional investors in corporate governance in German corporations is still 
weak and, if at all, only partly consistent with the role of institutional investors 
discussed in the academic theory. 
3.3.4 Research objective and question 
The linkage of the research question is provided in Figure 3.2. The starting 
point was the general focus of the research. This includes the subjects and 
theoretical elements of institutional investors and corporate governance. The 
literature review (see Section 2) provides a theoretical and empirical overview 
of the major subjects and issues regarding these topics. 
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Figure 3.2: Linkage of research question. 
Linkage of research question 
Theoretical elements: role 01 institutional investors and corporate governance -
their problems actual situabon and limitations 
~7 
Research aim and objective 
Understand the reality of the role of Intemational Institutionai investors in corporate govemance o~ 
German listed companies 
~7 
Research problem 
Discovery o' the role ano responsibilities o' institutional investors in German listed companies 
~7 
Research model 
Development 0' a theoretical trameworx 
~7 
Research goal 
Explore and interpret the role ct institutional investors In corpo."'8te govenance 
of German listed companies 
Source: Petra Nix. 
The thesis aims to develop an understanding of the actual role and the reality of 
national and international institutional investors in corporate governance in 
German listed companies. Corporate representatives who represent the 
shareholder interests in governing bodies, members of supervisory boards 
representing the shareholders, as well as IROs who are in regular contact with 
institutional investors, are the appropriate groups of people to address in 
tackling the research problem. In semi-structured interviews, primary data about 
their views are collected. Therefore, it is necessary to know what the 
responsibilities of institutional investors are and the various roles that they can 
execute and play in corporate governance. Furthermore, it is important to know 
what their impact is. Therefore, a theoretical framework with a set of six 
variables (see Figure 3.3) was created to develop an understanding. The 
theoretical framework builds the foundation of the semi-structured questionnaire 
and was used as a guideline to structure the in-depth interviews with the 
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representatives of the corporations. The theoretical framework helps to gain an 
understanding of the several meanings, responsibilities, intentions and motives 
of the members of the supervisory boards and IROs that are involved in 
creating the social realities (Thietart, 2001) of the role that institutional investors 
play in corporate governance. Furthermore, the research study develops an 
understanding of the reality experienced by the subjects based on the six 
variables of the research model. The research study aims to investigate the 
actual, but currently poorly understood (Webb et aI., 2003) roles played by 
institutional investors in corporate governance. Furthermore, this thesis aims to 
develop an understanding of the phenomenon of the role of institutional 
investors from the viewpoint of corporations (Thietart, 2001), which is derived 
from the six variables (see Figure 3.3). 
It seems that investors and corporations have different viewpoints. In their 
inductive study covering multinationals from different European countries, 
Hockerts and Moir (2004) found that companies are realising the need for 
improved disclosure on corporate responsibility that includes corporate 
governance. However, there seems to be a tendency for corporate 
responsibility to be taken more seriously on the company side than on the 
investor side. In a survey with institutional investors in Germany, Bassen (2005) 
found that internal mechanisms, like personal conversations and direct 
communication between institutional investors and the different executive levels 
of the company and supervisory boards represent the most suitable way to 
influence management. All other mechanisms have almost no relevance in 
influencing capital market participants. Furthermore, Bassen argues that 
especially for international institutional investors, direct contact with 
management is the most efficient way to implement good corporate 
governance. Bassen's findings support the results of the study of TIAA-CREF in 
the US. 
Firstly, it is necessary to analyse the investor's role from a theoretical 
perspective. Secondly, a theoretical framework on the advantages and 
limitations of institutional investor participation in corporate governance has to 
be built. Thirdly, an empirical study is carried out to understand the viewpoints 
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of how the actors in German listed corporations obtain the theoretical role of 
institutional investors. This thesis aims to bridge the gap between theory and 
practice. Furthermore, it aims to give a deeper insight into how members of the 
supervisory board and investor relations managers of German listed companies 
understand the actual role of national and international institutional investors in 
corporate governance. The objective is to gain a better understanding of the 
role of institutional investors and to develop recommendations of how the gaps 
between the theoretical assumptions and managerial reality can be bridged. 
Derived from this theoretical perspective covering the role of institutional 
investors and its limitations, this thesis aims to provide a better understanding 
of the role of institutional investors in the corporate governance in Germany's 
publicly traded corporations from the viewpoint of corporate management. The 
findings are limited to listed companies. 
The research question of this thesis is derived from the research objective and 
the academic literature. Based on this starting point, the thesis addresses the 
following research question: 
What is the role of independent institutional investors in the 
corporate governance of German listed corporations? 
It is expected that institutional investors in German listed corporations play a 
weak role in corporate governance. In order to answer the research question, a 
research model (see Figure 3.3) that is based on the findings in the academic 
literature is developed. 
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3.4 Research model and variables 
3.4.1 Research model 
The rise of institutional investors has the potential to transform corporate 
governance since they have an incentive to improve the quality of governance 
because the return on their portfolio is tantamount to the average return in the 
whole economy (Aglietta, 2008). 
In the research model, the responsibilities of institutional investors are broken 
down into various variables by monitoring and influencing factors. In a highly 
diffused ownership structure, there is no incentive for any owner to monitor 
corporate management because the individual owner would bear the entire 
monitoring costs, yet all shareholders would enjoy the benefit (Gillian and 
Starks, 2003). Nevertheless, monitoring is one of the seven principles according 
to the Financial Reporting Council (2010). The Code of the Financial Reporting 
Council aims to enhance the quality of the dialogue of institutional investors with 
companies to help improve long-term returns to shareholders, reduce the risk of 
catastrophic outcomes due to bad strategic decisions, and help with the efficient 
exercise of governance responsibilities. Principle three says that institutional 
investors should monitor their investee companies. A decisive issue in the 
monitoring is to determine when it is necessary to enter into an active dialogue 
with their boards. The monitoring should be regular and the process clearly 
communicable and checked periodically for its effectiveness. 
Principle four of the FRC says that institutional investors should set out the 
circumstances under which they will actively intervene and regularly assess the 
outcomes of doing so. This intervention is carried out regardless of whether an 
active or passive investment policy is followed. Instances of when institutional 
investors may want to intervene include when they have concerns about the 
company's strategy and performance. 
In the context of this thesis, the investee company is the German listed 
corporation and the board represents the subjects of this study, like the 
members of the supervisory boards, CEOs, CFOs and IROs. In the following, 
the monitoring and influencing tasks are broken down into six variables: 
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Figure 3.3: Research model: Responsibilities of institutional investors. 
/ 
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Source: Petra Nix, 
3.4.2 Variables 
Six variables form the basis of the questionnaire for the in-depth interviews, 
These are explained in the following sections, 
Board oversight. FRC requests that institutional investors should make sure 
that the investee company's board and sub-committee structure are effective, 
and that independent directors provide adequate oversight. An important factor 
to ensure effective oversight by directors is effective oversight by shareholders 
(Monk and Minow, 2009). 
Board nomination. Board nomination is a shareholder right. The board , as the 
agent of the shareholder, has the responsibility to monitor corporate managers 
and their performance (Gillian and Starks, 2003). Tricker (2009) states that the 
nomination committee was an attempt to prevent the board from becoming a 
cosy club. The right to appoint to the board of management or the supervisory 
board goes to the very heart of corporate power. Monks and Minow (2009) 
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claim that in many cases, the nomination committee receives the names from 
the CEO. Some nominating committees are now turning to search firms and 
limiting the involvement of the CEO to improve the independence and reach of 
the supervisory board nominating process. Empowered shareholders should 
focus on the composition and agenda of the supervisory and management 
board. The job of effectively involved shareholders can be described as 
ensuring that the supervisory board does its job, focuses on the right issues and 
operates under a structure that enables them to ask the right questions and 
reach the right answers. This is the answer to the agency cost issue and the 
most effective way for the ownership to exercise the appropriate level of control. 
Identification of weaknesses. According to the FRC, institutional investors 
should identify problems at an early stage to minimise any loss of shareholder 
value. If they have concerns, they should seek to ensure that the appropriate 
members of the investee company's board are made aware of them. In the 
questionnaire, this variable is positively designated as 'improvement of 
company value'. 
Recommendations to company. After identification of a weakness, the 
responsibility of institutional investors is to make recommendations to the 
company. The FRC (2010) recommends that initial discussions should take 
place on a confidential basis. 
Inducing changes in corporate strategy. Gillian and Starks (2003) argued 
that institutional investors, often foreign institutional investors, playa certain role 
in prompting change. Connelly et al. (2010) found out that a firm's ownership by 
dedicated institutional investors was positively associated with the extent to 
which executives undertook strategic competitive actions. Furthermore, they 
present evidence that institutional investors may look to other institutional 
owners for guidance when they decide to endorse strategic or tactical 
competitive actions. 
Execution of institutional power. A direct control by voice is irrelevant 
because of the institutional investors' weak stake in corporations. They must 
use voice to promote general principles in organising the boards and their 
subsidiary committees, which are the ones that hold SUbstantial control 
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(Aglietta, 2008). The FRC (2010) states that if boards do not respond 
constructively when institutional investors intervene, then institutional investors 
will consider whether escalating their action by holding additional meetings with 
management, meeting with the chairman and other members of the supervisory 
board, intervening jointly with other institutions on particular issues, making 
public statements in advance of the AGM, submitting resolutions at 
shareholders' meetings and requisitioning an AGM. The collaboration with other 
investors may be the most effective manner in which to engage. This 
collaboration is known under the term 'acting in concert', which means that 
different parties undertake the same investment actions to achieve their goal or 
to put pressure on the management. According to the German takeover law, a 
shareholder with at least 30% of the voting rights has the obligation to make a 
mandatory offer. The Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof - BGH) has 
stated that 'acting in concert' is not the case if the agreement is just for one 
issue. Acting in concert is the case if the shareholders use their voting rights in 
the annual general meeting (http://www.dsw-info.de/Wann-Iiegt-ein-acting-in-
conc.845.0.html, accessed 6 November 2010). 
3.5 Data analysis and interpretation 
The type of items and scales will play a large part in determining which 
statistical techniques are suitable to address the research question (Pal/ant, 
2007). The research model (see Figure 3.3) is defined by the six variables: 
board oversight, board nomination and identification of weaknesses, 
recommendations, inducing changes, and execution of power. These variables 
affect the responsibilities of institutional investors. The questionnaire and 
interview guideline are designed based on open-ended and closed-ended 
questions (see Table 3.3). The data analysis will be qualitative. The main data 
analysis will be adopted to measure the variables and to answer the research 
question by using descriptive statistics and grounded theory. Descriptive 
statistics will be adopted for the closed-end questions and the grounded theory 
for the open-ended questions. For the general information about the profile of 
the participating company, like key figures and market capitalisation (see Table 
3.2), descriptive statistics will also be used. 
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3.5.1 Correlation 
Correlation techniques are partly used to test models and theories, predict 
outcomes and assess the reliability and validity of scales (Pal/ant, 2007). 
Correlation allows a sophisticated exploration of the interrelationship among a 
set of variables. It would be an ideal type of analysis for the investigation of the 
complex real-life research question like the role and responsibilities of 
institutional investors in corporate governance if the necessary number of cases 
were satisfied. According to Pal/ant (2007), for six independent variables, a 
sample size of 98 cases (N > 50 + 8 * number of independent variables) is 
required. Additionally, a ranking of the most influential variables can be set up. 
The close-ended questions will be analysed by descriptive statistics, diagrams 
and correlation (see Table 3.2). 
3.5.2 Grounded theory 
The grounded theory was 'proposed' in the 1960s by Barney G. Glaser and 
Anselm L. Strauss (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). The main objective of the 
grounded theory research approach is the construction of an explanatory theory 
about a social phenomenon. According to Chamaz (2010), the researcher 
studies how the research participants explain their statements and ask what 
analytic sense we can make of them. Further strengths of the grounded theory 
are the following: 
(1) The coding derives from a concentrated, active involvement in the 
process; 
(2) The categories 'emerge' from the data; and 
(3) The researcher can move across interviews and observations and can 
compare people's experiences, actions and interpretations. (Charmaz, 
2010) 
Grounded theories enable the researcher to develop theories from research 
grounded in data rather than deducing testable hypotheses from existing 
theories. Following this approach, the researcher is able to draw conclusions 
and can develop a hypothesis implementing the grounded theory research 
methodology. Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss developed the 
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grounded theory between 1965 and 1967 and the defining components of its 
application include the following: 
(1) Simultaneous involvement in data collection and analysis; 
(2) Constructing analytic codes and categories from data, not from 
preconceived logically deduced hypotheses; 
(3) Using the constant comparative method, which involves making 
comparisons during each stage of the analysis; 
(4) Advancing theory development during each step of data collection and 
analysis; 
(5) Memo writing to elaborate categories, specify their properties, define 
relationships between relationships, and identify gaps; 
(6) Sampling aimed toward theory construction, not for population 
representativeness; 
(7) Conducting the literature review after developing an independent 
analysis (Chamaz, 2010). 
Glaser and Strauss aimed to move qualitative inquiry beyond descriptive 
studies into the realm of explanatory theoretical frameworks, thereby providing 
an abstract, conceptual understanding of the studied phenomena. Postgraduate 
education and research has generated a demand for more explicit procedural 
guidelines for qualitative analysis. This has prompted the 'codification' of 
grounded theory, expressed in the formalisation of its analytic procedures and 
an emphasis on 'coding' as a major analytic procedure (Bryant and Charmaz, 
2007). Strauss viewed human beings as active agents in their lives and he 
assumed that process, not structure, was fundamental to human existence and 
human beings created structures through engaging in process. 
The data collection is an iterative process with interaction between data, 
analysis and theory. The methods used are interviews and the use of written 
material like company websites and annual reports (Thietart, 2001). In 
grounded theory, the· collected data is separated, sorted and synthesised 
through qualitative coding (Charmaz, 2006). The codes point to the areas to be 
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explored during the data collection. The categories can be both 'analytical' and 
'sensitising'. They allow us to conceptualise the key analytical features of 
phenomena, but also to communicate a meaningful picture of those phenomena 
in words (Bryant and Charmaz, 2007). 
The grounded theory strategy is helpful for research to predict and explain 
behaviour. Furthermore, the grounded theory was developed to generate a 
theory around the core theme that emerges from the data. The emphasis being 
upon developing and building theory and can be used to explore the wide range 
of the role of institutional investors (Saunders et ai, 2007). 
3.5.3 Data types 
For the general information (section II and III of the questionnaire), categorical 
and continuous data is used. This is information about the participating 
company (see Table 3.3) and the frequency and quality of the contacts with 
institutional investors (see Table 3.4). Categorical data refers to data whose 
values cannot be measured numerically, but can be classified into sets 
(categories) according to the characteristics that either identify or describe the 
variable (Saunders et aI., 2007). These include belonging to a stock market 
index, the category of the interviewee or the frequency of contacts with 
institutional investors. It does not make sense to ask for means, standard 
deviations, etc. (Pallant, 2007). For the key figures, continuous data will be 
used. Continuous data refers to data whose values can theoretically take any 
value (Saunders, et aI., 2007). For continuous variables, descriptive such as 
mean, median and standard deviation can be used (Pallant 2007). 
For section I - the role of institutional investors in corporate governance -
ordinal data will be used for the closed-end questions. This section covers the 
responsibilities of institutional investors (see Table 3.2). Ordinal data is a more 
precise form of categorical data where the relative position of each case is set 
and scores are used (Saunders et aI., 2007). This is the case for the rating 
scales, like not at all, very weak, weak, medium, strong, and very strong. In 
section II of the questionnaire, the understanding of the strategy and business 
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model of the company by the institutional investors is measured by the 
categorical data. 
Table 3.2: Structure and measurement of questionnaire - Section I: 
Responsibilities of institutional investors. 
Independent Category of Quest. Question type Data type Method of 
variable variable evaluation 
Board oversight Monitoring 1.1 Closed-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
Board oversight Monitoring 1.2 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
Board oversight Monitoring 1.3 Closed-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
Board oversight Monitoring 1.4 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
Board nomination Monitoring 2.1 Closed-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
Board nomination Monitoring 2.2 Closed-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
Board nomination Monitoring 2.3 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
Identification of Monitoring 3.1 Closed-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
weaknesses! 
Improvement of 
value 
Identification of Monitoring 3.2 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
weaknesses! 
Improvement of 
value 
Identification of Monitoring 3.3 Closed-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
weaknesses! 
Improvement of 
value 
Identification of Monitoring 3.4 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
weaknesses! 
Improvement of 
value 
Recommendations Influence 4.1 Closed-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
Recommendations Influence 4.2 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
Recommendations Influence 4.3 Close-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
Recommendations Influence 4.4 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
Inducing changes Influence 5.1 Closed-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
Inducing changes Influence 5.2 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
Inducing changes Influence 5.3 Closed-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
Inducing changes Influence 5.4 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
Execution of power Influence 6.1 Closed-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
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Execution of power Influence 6.2 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
Execution of power Influence 6.3 Closed-ended Ordinal Descriptive statistic 
Execution of power Influence 6.4 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
Development of the Summarising 7 Open-ended Categorical Grounded theory 
role of institutional question 
investors 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Table 3.3: Structure and measurement of questionnaire - Section III: 
General information about the participating company. 
General Information Question Type of data Method of measurement 
Stock Market Index 1 Categorical Descriptive statistic 
Category of interviewee 2 Categorical Descriptive statistic 
Key figures like sales, 3 Continuous Descriptive statistic 
employees, EBIT 
Shareholder structure 4 n.m. Descriptive statistic 
Market capitalisation 5 Continuous Descriptive statistic 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Table 3.4: Structure and measurement of questionnaire - Section II: 
General information about the frequency and quality of the contacts with 
institutional investors. 
General Information Question Type of data Method of measurement 
Frequency of contacts 1 Categorical Descriptive statistics 
Sufficiency of frequency 2 Categorical Descriptive statistics 
Investors' understanding 3 Ordinal Descriptive statistics 
Differences between 4 Categorical Grounded theory 
investors 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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3.5.4 Pilot test 
A pilot test was done prior to the data collection process to test the semi-
structured interview guideline. The pilot test was executed during the period 
from 25 September to 24 October 2010. The pilot test is a small-scale study to 
test questionnaires and interview guideline to minimise the likelihood of 
respondents having problems in answering the questions and data recording 
problems, as well as to allow some assessments of the validity of the questions 
and the reliability of the data to be collected (Saunders et aI., 2007). Six 
corporate governance experts were asked to comment on the 
representativeness and suitability of the questions. Three of the experts were 
members of the scientific board of the German Investor Relations Association 
(DIRK). The group of experts consisted of a university professor and a head of 
investor relations at a UK listed private equity company, a CFO of a listed 
company in Germany, a managing director of an analyst and investor 
association and an IRO of a German listed company. Four of them gave their 
feedback by phone, one in a one-to-one discussion and by email and one just 
by email. The phone discussions with the experts and the one-to-one 
discussion took between 30 and 70 minutes. 
The experts received the following documents: the questionnaire/interview 
guideline, an information sheet and consent form, as well as the information 
sheet for the pilot test and a feedback sheet of the pilot test (see Appendix 9.4). 
The objective of the pilot test was to check the following issues: the clarity of the 
instructions, unclear or ambiguous questions, questions that were not easy to 
answer, topic error, and the layout and length of the questionnaire. All of these 
topics were included in the feedback sheet of the pilot test. In general, the 
feedback was positive. The experts found that the questionnaire was 
appropriate, clear and understandable. Furthermore, they found that the length 
and selected topics were appropriate. One stated that it was a very rigorous 
methodology. Others found the topic of the thesis very contemporary and 
interesting. 
The attendees of the pilot test gave some additional suggestions. Following are 
the ones that were added to the questionnaire: 
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(1) A question about the frequency of the contacts with institutional investors 
and another regarding the understanding of the business model and the 
strategy of the company were added. Both were put into section II of the 
interview guideline. 
(2) The section 'general information about the participating company' was 
expanded to include the number of employees, EBIT and free float of 
market capitalisation. Furthermore, the shareholder structure was broken 
down by type of investor and regional. 
(3) Concerns about ambiguous questions were expressed with respect to 
the term 'boards' since Germany has the dual board structure with the 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and the management board (Vorstand). 
Therefore, the term 'board oversight' was added in section I, question 1.1 
and 1.3 distinguishing between the supervisory and management board. 
(4) One expert recommended making a distinction between the types of 
institutional investors. Therefore, a table with the different types of 
investors was added in section I for questions 2.1, 3.1, 4.1 and 5.1. 
(5) A concern about the difficulty in answering a question was expressed for 
the term 'weaknesses' in question 3 (,Identification of weaknesses'). The 
expert felt that corporate managers would be unwilling to admit that 
weaknesses exist in their company. Therefore, this part of the 
questionnaire was rephrased to the positive wording 'improvement of 
company value'. However, in the research model, the wording is kept as 
'Identification of weaknesses' since it is the term derived from the 
literature review. 
(6) In question 6.1 ('execution of institutional power'), the issue 'seat in the 
supervisory board' was added. 
(7) Some questions were reformulated to be more specific. 
3.6 Data sampling 
The term 'sample' is used to indicate a smaller group, which is usually but not 
always a representative one, within a population (Oppenheimer, 2005). A 
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sample is defined as the set of elements from which the data is collected 
(Thietart, 2001). This thesis focuses on large and mid-sized German listed 
corporations using a population of 110 corporations based on the DAX 30, 
TecDax and MDAX. The DAX 30 is the blue chip index of Deutsche Borse and 
represents around 80% of the market capital authorised in Germany. This index 
includes the 30 largest and most actively traded companies that are listed on 
the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. The TecDAX comprises 30 medium-sized 
German companies from the various technology sectors that, in terms of size 
and turnover, rank below the DAX. The MDAX comprises 50 mid-cap 
companies from traditional sectors that, in terms of size and turnover, rank 
below the DAX (www.deutsche-boerse.com. accessed 15 August 2010). 
According to Saunders et al. (2007), the sampling techniques can be divided 
into probability and non-probability samplings. In the exploratory stage (e.g., 
this research), a non-probability sample is the most practical one and is the 
domain of the phenomenologist (Remenyi, 2005), which is where the 
interpretivist paradigm belongs (Thietart, 2001). To answer the research 
question and to meet the research objectives, an in-depth study focusing on a 
small number of approximately 20 participants is carried out. A combination of 
different sampling techniques is used. The selection of the sample is conducted 
in three ways: self-selection sampling, judgement sampling and snowball 
sampling (see Table 3.5). 
In the self-selection sampling, the need for cases is publicised (Saunders, 
2005). A cooperation with the scientific advisory board of the Deutscher 
Investor Relations Verband e.v. (DIRK) was established for this purpose. 13 The 
objective was to raise the awareness and profile of this research project in order 
to increase the attention and participation rate of the target group. In this 
regard, the investor relation officers were one of the main target groups. The 
judgement samples are approached directly if they are considered to have the 
knowledge and information to provide useful insights (Remenyi, 2005). This 
approach was primarily used to approach the members of the supervisory 
13 DIRK is the German association for Investor Relations. Its aim is to define and to set 
standards for the communication between corporations and the capital markets. 
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board. The advantage of the self-selection and judgement sampling is the 
relatively low cost. Due to the cooperation with the DI RK, and the personal 
relationship of the researcher, negative aspects like a low level of control over 
the sample can be excluded. 
Additionally, the snowball sampling was used to identify and acquire members 
of the target group. In the snowballing technique, a few appropriate individuals 
are located and then they are asked for the names and addresses of others 
who might also fit the sampling requirements (Oppenheim, 2005). The main 
challenge of this study is making the initial contact (Saunders, 2007) since the 
persons defined are very busy managers at the top level of the corporate 
hierarchy. Therefore, an informant was used to help find the next appropriate 
informant. The informant was asked to introduce another person who was in a 
position to provide useful information regarding the issue being researched 
(Remenyi, 2005). With snowball sampling, the problem of bias is huge because 
respondents are more likely to identify other potential respondents who are 
similar to them, which results in a homogeneous sample (Lee, 1993). This 
disadvantage was overcome by narrowing the objective criteria of target group 
and target company to those that belonged to the three indices representing the 
large and medium-sized listed companies, namely DAX 30, MDAX or TecDax, 
as well as applying the three different ways of selecting the sample. 
Table 3.5: Non-probability sampling techniques and their impact of 
various factors. 
Sample type Likelihood of Types of Relative costs Control over 
sample being research in sample 
representative which useful contents 
Snowball Low, but cases If it is difficult to Reasonable Quite low 
will have the identify the 
characteristics cases 
desired 
Self-selection Low, but cases If exploratory Low Low 
and Judgement are self-selected research is 
needed 
Source: Saunders, 2007, p. 228. 
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3.7 Exploratory in-depth interviews 
Interviews remain the most common method of gathering data in qualitative 
research (King, 2006). This approach requires interpersonal skills of a high 
order (Oppenheim, 2005). Interviewing is a technique to obtain a certain kind of 
information (Oppenheim, 2005). It is aimed at collecting discursive data for later 
analysis, which reflects the conscious and unconscious mind-set of the 
individual interviewees (King, 2006). According to Oppenheim (2005), the in-
depth interviewer gets out more information since he/she is more deeply 
involved in designing the research and developing hypotheses and instruments. 
The purpose of the exploratory interview is to develop ideas and research 
hypotheses rather than gather facts and statistics. The interview process is 
structured as shown in Figure 3.4. It starts with the development of the 
questionnaire based on the research model. In the interviews, the standpoint of 
the several interviewees is observed. Summarising the various pOints of view of 
the interviewees in a transcript helps to develop an understanding of the role of 
institutional investors in the governance of German listed corporations. This 
allows the results to be interpreted and ideas, solutions and hypotheses about 
their role to be developed. 
Figure 3.4: Data gathering process. 
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Source: Petra Nix. 
In the earlier exploratory stage, no more than twenty interviews take place. 
These respondents are unlikely to be properly representative. 
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The data and ideas in this thesis are gathered in semi-structured interviews in 
one-on-one, face-to-face interviews or in telephone interviews. The purpose of 
the interviews is to try to understand how the respondents think and feel about 
the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. In semi-structured 
interviews, the researcher has a list of topics and questions (Saunders et aI., 
2007). In this research project, they are related to the research model (see 
Figure 3.3). Taking notes during the interview and producing a transcript 
afterwards recorded the data. The goal is to consider the research topic from 
the perspective of the interviewee and the reasons for it. Therefore, the 
qualitative research interviews generally have the following characteristics: a 
low degree of structure; a preponderance of open questions; and a focus on 
'specific situations and action sequences in the world of the interviewee' (King, 
2006). In an exploratory study, in-depth and semi-structured interviews are very 
helpful to 'find out what is happening and to seek new insights' (Saunders et aI., 
2007). In an exploratory study, semi-structured interviews are used to 
understand the relationships between variables. 
According to Saunders et al. (2007), the lack of standardisation in such 
interviews may lead to concerns about reliability. The concerns are related to 
interviewer bias, the attempt to impose one's own beliefs on the situation and 
the interpretation of the responses. Furthermore, if the interviewer is unable to 
develop the trust of the interviewees or lacks credibility, the value of the 
information given may also be limited. 
3.8 Questionnaire 
A questionnaire enables researchers to question individuals directly, to collect 
primary data and to obtain information that cannot be easily observed or that is 
not already available in written or computerised form (Thietart, 2001, Remenyi 
et aI., 2005). The attitude and opinion of organisational practices can be 
identified and described with questionnaires (Saunders et aI., 2007). Therefore, 
conducting interviews using semi-structured questionnaires is the right 
approach for answering the research question. In this theSis, questionnaires 
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were used. The interviewer sent the questionnaire to the interviewee in 
advance. The interviewer conducted the interviews either on the telephone or 
face-to-face or the interviewee can send back the completed questionnaire. The 
advantage of interviewer-administered questionnaires is that the respondent is 
a person who fits the selection criteria (Saunders et aI., 2007). This improves 
the reliability of the data. Another advantage is that a high response rate is 
likely. According to Saunders (2007), the response rate for telephone or 
personal interviews is between 50% and 70%. Additionally, those individuals 
who refuse to participate can be documented. The average length of the 
interviews is expected to be between 30 and 60 minutes. The corporate 
governance experts confirmed this estimate in the pilot test. 
The questionnaire of this thesis covers three main sections (see Appendix 9.2). 
The total number of questions is 33. Section I is the main section of the 
questionnaire comprising all the questions regarding the six variables in order to 
answer the research question. Section I has 24 questions, of which 12 are 
closed-ended questions. Section II contains four questions on the frequency of 
contacts and the institutional investor's understanding of the company. Section 
III includes five questions and gathers general publicly available information 
about the participating company. The researcher filled in the data. 
3.9 Reliability and validity of the methodology 
The internal validity and reliability of the data and the response rate depend to a 
large extent on the design and structure of the questionnaire, and the rigour of 
the pilot testing. The key to a successful interview is careful preparation. A valid 
questionnaire will enable accurate data to be collected. (Saunders et ai., 2007). 
The goal of the interviewer in this study is to demonstrate credibility and gain 
the confidence of the interviewees. Furthermore, the interviews were prepared 
on the basis of a checklist provided by Saunders, which covered the following 
points: 
Level of knowledge. The interviewer needs to be knowledgeable of the 
organisational or situational context in which the interview takes place. Before 
the interview, the interviewer reads the publicly available information about the 
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company and the interviewee. Most of the informational materials used are 
annual reports, corporate websites and recent press releases. This puts the 
interviewer in the position to draw on this type of information during the 
interview. This helps demonstrate the credibility of the interviewer, which 
encourages the interviewee to provide a more detailed account of the topic 
under discussion. 
Level of information supplied to the interviewee. The author provides a pre-
prepared participant information sheet (see Appendix 9.3) and the 
questionnaire (see Appendix 9.2) before the interview takes place. This ensures 
validity and reliability by enabling the interviewee to consider the information 
being requested and allowing them the opportunity to assemble supporting 
organisational documentation from their files. 
Appropriateness of location. The location should be convenient for the 
interviewee, they should feel comfortable and the interview should be carried 
out in a place that is unlikely to be disturbed. The interviews will be conducted 
either by telephone or in the office of the interviewee or in another meeting 
room that is convenient for the interviewee. 
Opening comments to the interview. At the beginning, the research project is 
explained to establish credibility and to gain the interviewee's confidence. 
Therefore, the pOints explained in the information sheet (see Appendix 9.3) are 
repeated. 
Interviewer's behaviour during the course of the interview. Comments or 
non-verbal behaviour that indicates any bias is to be avoided. According to 
Oppenheim (2005), the ideal interview consists of a continuous monologue by 
the interviewee. The interviewer should try to reduce his own role to an absolute 
minimum to avoid leading the interviewee. 
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4 Description of Interview Partners and Categories 
This chapter describes the selection criteria and profiles of the interview 
partners selected for this research project, as well as the process of data 
collection. Furthermore, it provides detailed information about the participating 
companies, the managers that were interviewed and the methods applied in the 
semi-structured interview techniques. In addition, insights regarding the data 
analysis are discussed. 
4.1 Semi-structured interviews 
4.1.1 Selection criteria 
The main criteria for choosing the companies and interview partners for this 
study were as follows: 
(1) The companies had to be listed on the Deutsche Borse, which is one of 
the world's leading exchange organisations. 
(2) The managers interviewed had to be a member of the supervisory board 
or an IRO. 
(3) The companies that the managers represent had to be a member of the 
DAX, MDAX or TecDAX index. 
These three German stock market indices are customised indices for issuers 
and investors. Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the most important stock market 
indices of the Deutsche B6rse. These index members were selected because 
they attract the attention of investors, enhance the attractiveness of issuers and 
comprise the companies with the highest market capitalisation. 
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the most important selection indices. 
Source: Deutsche Borse, 2010. 
The DAX reflects the blue chip segment and comprises the 30 largest and most 
actively traded companies listed on the FWB Frankfurt Wertpapierborse (the 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange) . The TecDax tracks the 30 largest and most liquid 
issues from the various technology sectors. The index portfolio of the MDAX 
comprises 50 mid-cap issues from traditional sectors, which , in terms of size 
and turnover, rank below the DAX. All three indices are part of the prime 
standard of the Deutsche Borse, which is an EU-regulated segment for 
companies to position themselves vis-a-vis international investors. The Prime 
Standard Companies must comply with the high international transparency 
standards (www.deutsche-boerse.com. accessed 28 December 2010) and the 
declaration of conformity pursuant to Article 161 of the Stock Companies Act 
(AktG) . 
In the selection process, companies with an ownership structure of more than 
30% institutional investors were picked . The objective of this thesis is not to 
study companies in a specific industry (e.g ., automotive, utilities, technology, 
etc.), but to get an overview of the largest listed companies across different 
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industries. This research study targets companies, in which the controlling 
shareholder does not act in a dual capacity as a money manager. 
4.2 Profile of interviewees and their companies 
The interview partners listed in Table 4.1 have been selected because they 
were willing to participate in the study and fulfil the above-mentioned criteria. 
The companies are located across Germany. All the participating companies 
and interviewees fulfilled the criteria mentioned in section 4.1. The interviews 
started in the middle of December 2010 and the last one took place on 
5 April 2011. 
According to Chamaz (2010), small sample sizes and limited data do not pose a 
problem because the grounded theory methods aim to develop conceptual 
categories; therefore the data collection was directed to highlight the properties 
of a category and the relationships between them. A total of 20 interviews were 
carried out. Five participating members of the supervisory boards had more 
than one board seat in a listed DAX, MDAX or TecDAX company. One member 
of the supervisory board represented four companies, whereas the rest 
represented between one to three companies. Therefore, a total of 29 
companies were covered in the research (see Table 4.1). These companies are 
marked with a star in Table 4.1. Of the 20 interviews, 11 were done face-to-
face, 6 on the telephone and 3 interviewees sent back the completed 
questionnaire. The participants in the latter group explicitly stated that they 
preferred giving feedback in writing instead of doing a face-to-face or telephone 
interview. The longest interview took about 110 minutes and the shortest about 
45 minutes. The average length of the interviews was about 70 minutes, which 
is longer than the originally expected 30 to 60 minutes from the pilot test. This 
can be taken as a positive, constructive sign of the willingness of the 
interviewees to contribute to this research project. 
Of the 20 interviewees, 10 were members of the supervisory boards 
representing the capital side. They were not employee representatives. Two of 
the supervisory board members were even chairpersons, two were the deputy 
chairman and the rest were ordinary members of the supervisory board. 
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According to an article in the German newspaper Handelsblatt (2011), two of 
the supervisory board members are among the most powerful and influential 
supervisory board members of German corporations. One was ranked 18 and 
the other 30. 
The snowballing method was adopted with four of the participating supervisory 
board members. The ten investor relations officers interviewed were 
approached directly. Seven of the ten investor relations officers interviewed 
were heads of IR departments. 
The survey covered 33% of the DAX 30 companies, 16% of the MDAX and 
10% of the TecDax companies. The largest company had a market 
capitalisation of around EUR 56 billion as of 30 December 2010 and the 
smallest company belonging to the TecDax had a market capitalisation of 
around EUR 200 million. The companies represent a broad spectrum of 
industries. Seven interviewees (one member of a supervisory board and six 
investor relations officers) that were asked to participate in the survey by email 
were not willing to do so. Three of them declined to participate due to a heavy 
workload; two were DAX 30 companies and one was a TecDax company. Four 
of the seven interviewees did not respond at all - three of them had received 
one reminder and one was asked just once. 
In order to reduce travel costs and increase the chances of getting an interview 
with the help of professional networks, my relationships and the support of the 
SIRN, the personal and telephone interviews were conducted entirely at the 
convenience of the participants. 
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Table 4.1: Overview of interview partners. 
Companies Interview Industry of the company Market cap IRiSS Index Date Interview type Length in Contact 
covered No. in EUR million minutes 
(30 Dec 2010) 
I 
1 1 Chemicals 56,349 IR OAX 30 15.12.10 Written n.m. Direct 
2 2 Utilities 28,205 IR OAX 30 04.01.11 Phone 45 Direct 
3 3 Logistics 15,403 IR OAX 30 06.01.11 Phone 60 Direct 
4 4 Real estate 828 SB MOAX 19.01.11 One-on-one 75 Direct 
5** 5 Speciality fertilisers 10,839 SB* OAX 30 24.01.11 One-on-one 60 Direct 
6 5 Travel 2,640 SB* MDAX 24.01.11 One-on-one 60 Direct 
7** 6 Telecommunication 41,934 SB* DAX 30 24.01.11 One-on-one 75 Direct 
8 6 Utilities 45,933 SB* DAX 30 24.01.11 One-on-one 75 Direct 
9 6 Manufacturer of machine 
tools 765 SB* MOAX 24.01.11 One-on-one 75 Direct 
10 7 Airport business 4,383 SB* MOAX 01.02.11 Written n.m. Direct 
11 7 Travel 2,640 SB* MDAX 01.02.11 Written n.m. Direct 
12 8 Automotive 38,480 IR OAX 30 08.02.11 Phone 60 Direct 
13 9 Glass and plastic products 993 IR MOAX 17.02.11 Phone 50 Direct 
14** 10 Software 47,098 IR DAX 30 18.02.11 One-on-one 70 Direct 
15 11 Financial services 36,655 IR OAX 30 18.02.11 One-on-one 70 Direct 
16** 12 Telecommunication 41,934 IR DAX 30 28.02.11 Phone 45 Direct 
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17** 13 Software 3,126 SS TecDax 09.03.11 One-on-one 
18 14 Technology 1,031 SS TecDax 09.03.11 One-on-one 
19** 15 Software 3,126 IR TecDax 09.03.11 One-on-one 
20** 16 Speciality fertilisers 10,839 IR DAX30 10.03.11 Written 
21 17 Solar 199 SS TecDax 17.03.11 One-on-one 
22 18 Speciality chemicals 6,780 SS MDAX 17.03.11 One-on-one 
23 19 Financial services 10,220 SS* DAX30 22.03.11 One-an-one 
24 19 Supplier of lubricants 2,614 SS* MDAX 22.03.11 One-on-one 
26 19 Financial services 4,894 SS MDAX 22.03.11 One-on-one 
26** 19 Software 47,098 SS* DAX30 22.03.11 One-on-one 
28 20 Financial services 10,220 SS* DAX30 05.04.11 Phone 
29 20 Health care 10,279 SS* DAX30 05.04.11 Phone 
.- --
___ L ____ 
-
* Supervisory board member of more than one company. 
** Included two times because interviews with members of the supervisory board and IR were conducted. 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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4.3 General Information about the participating companies 
In total, 20 representatives of German stock market listed companies participated 
in the empirical research study. Of these, 10 participants were members of 
supervisory boards and the other 10 were investor relations officers. In terms of 
the indices, 60% represented DAX 30 companies, 20% were from MDAX 
companies and 20% from TecDax companies (see Table 4.2). Table 4.3 shows 
the averages of the key figures of the participating companies. On average, sales 
for the fiscal year 2010 came to EUR 22.2 billion. The largest company had sales 
of EUR 92.9 billion and the smallest company had sales of EUR 272 million. The 
average of the market capitalisation was EUR 18.6 billion. This indicates that the 
majority of the participants in this research study came from larger companies. 
Most of the companies have a large shareholder base of institutional investors. 
Institutional investors form the major shareholder group in most of the companies. 
Institutional investors constitute more than 50% of the shareholder group in 65% of 
the companies. In only 5% of the companies is the share of institutional investors 
below 25% (see also Table 4.4). In 75% of the companies, there is an international 
shareholder base, of which less than 50% are German shareholders. In 20% of 
the companies, the German shareholder base is between 0% and 25%, and in 
55% it is between 25% and 55% (see Table 4.5). Therefore, we can conclude that 
most of the participating companies have a foreign shareholder base. 
Table 4.2: Members of the stock indices. 
Frequency Percent lValid Percent Cumulative Percent 
Valid DAX 30 12 60.0 60.0 60.0 
MDAX 4 20.0 20.0 80.0 
TecDax 4 20.0 20.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Table 4.3: Key figures of the participating companies. 
2010 High Low Mean 
Sales (EUR billion) 92,863 0,272 22,179 
EBIT (EUR million) 9,454 - 0,140 2,521 
Number of Employees 421,274 500 70,632 
Market Cap 31.12. (in EUR 56,349 0,199 18,635 
billion) 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Table 4.4: Shareholder structure - share of institutional investors. 
IShare of institutional 
~requency !Percent ~alid Percent !cumulative Percent nvestors 
0-25% 1 5.0 5.0 5.0 
25 - 50% 2 10.0 10.0 15.0 
50 -75% 9 45.0 45.0 60.0 
75 -100% 4 20.0 20.0 80.0 
n.a. 4 20.0 20.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Table 4.5: Shareholder structure - share of German shareholders. 
IShare of German 
~alid Percent !cumulative Percent Ishareholders Frequency Percent 
~alid 0-25% 4 20.C 20.0 20.0 
25 - 50% 11 55.0 55.0 75.0 
50 -75% 2 10.0 10.0 85.0 
75 - 100 1 5.0 5.0 90.0 
n.a. 2 10.0 10.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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4.4 Data collection process and protocol 
The collection of qualitative data involves interviews in order to gather complex 
information about a particular characteristic or subject. The in-depth nature of an 
intensive interview fosters eliciting each participant's interpretation of his or her 
experience. The interviewer seeks to understand the topic and the interview 
participants, which in this case are the members of the supervisory boards and the 
investor relations officers, and has the relevant experience (Charmaz, 2010). 
According to Remenyi et al. (2005), in-depth surveys generally attempt to obtain 
detailed information from a relatively small number of informants through a series 
of interviews. In this research project, 20 interviews were conducted. A semi-
structured interview guideline has been prepared with the issues to be addressed 
in the interview. 
The interviewees were approached in various ways. First, a long list of the various 
companies that met the selection criteria explained in Section 4.1 was put 
together. Afterwards, the interview partners - members of supervisory boards and 
investor relations officers - were specified. The interview request to the potential 
interview partner was first made by telephone or email in order to explain the 
research objective and the intention of the researcher. If the potential interview 
partner agreed to participate in the interview, an appointment was made, which 
was then confirmed by email. Subsequently, the semi-structured interview 
guideline, as well as a one-page information sheet containing more information 
and a description of the research project was sent to the participants in advance, 
so that they could prepare for the interview. This was done in order to conduct the 
interview in the most efficient manner and to save time for the interviewee. The 
interviews were originally scheduled to last between 30 and 60 minutes. However, 
the average length turned to be about 70 minutes. The interviews were conducted 
on a semi-structural manner based on the questionnaire. At the beginning of each 
interview, the researcher gave a short introductory overview of the purpose of the 
research project, answered open questions and explained the process of the data 
gathering. The interview covered closed-ended and open-ended questions 
regarding the six variables with respect to the role and responsibilities of 
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institutional investors in corporate governance (see Figure 3.3). As suggested by 
Charmaz (2010), open-ended questions encouraged the participants to make 
spontaneous statements and tell stories. The balance of the interviews was 
secured since the semi-structured questionnaire focused on the six variables. 
During the interview, the researcher assumed a passive role by letting the 
interviewee elaborate on the various points in the questionnaire and remained 
open to what was said in order to learn as much as possible about the participant's 
experience (Charmaz, 2010). The interviewer interacted with the participant in 
order to request more detail or an explanation, slow or quicken the pace, explore a 
statement or topic, keep the participant focused on the subject, restate the 
participant's point to check for accuracy, etc. (Charmaz, 2010). According to the 
grounded theory, the researcher tried to look at the participants' world through 
their eyes and to understand, but not necessarily adopt or reproduce their views 
as her own (Charmaz, 2010). Therefore, the interview partner was free to 
emphasise specific points and issues that they felt were important. 
A tape recorder can have various impacts on interviews. Taped data is more 
reliable and can be used by other researchers to carry out different analyses 
(Thietart et a!, 2001). The drawbacks are: The researcher is absorbed by taking 
notes and runs the risk not paying enough attention of the interview dynamics. 
Since the interviews were mostly settled by the high profile of the interviewer there 
was a high risk of refusal. Tape recording can disconcert the interviewees and can 
lead to less open answers and does not work in telephone interviews. It can 
malfunction, than the content is lost. The search for a particular sequence is time-
consuming. To improve the reliability and exhaustiveness, the researcher took 
copious notes during the interviews and double-checked them. The interviewer 
was used to interviews without tape recording and was therefore experienced 
enough. Thereafter, a structured data analysis process was started (see Figure 
4.2). Right after the interview, the researcher wrote the transcript and saved it as a 
separate word file. The benefit of transcribing the interviews is that it gives a better 
and deeper level of understanding of the situation (Charmaz, 2010). Some codes 
already start to come up during the transcription process. In addition, it was 
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possible to play with the acquired data, develop ideas, improve the involvement 
with the data and to learn from it, which made the work more specific and 
manageable. The transcript was written right into the questionnaire because that 
was the guideline for the interview. Since the interview guide was well planned and 
semi-structured, the answers could be easily matched to the appropriate question, 
which added to the reliability of the primary data. A transcript is a reproduced, 
written, filed in a word document using the actual words of the interviewees 
(Saunders et aI., 2007). I was involved in all of the interviews (data collection) and 
writing of the transcripts (data analysis). According to Charmaz (2010), this works 
best since the research can explore nuances of meaning. Additionally, potential 
problems like careful checking for errors, inaccuracy of software, and 
familiarisation with the data could be eliminated, which might not be the case if a 
touch typist. transcription machine, or voice recognition software is used. As 
recommended by Saunders et al. (2007), the interviews were summarised in the 
transcripts as soon as possible after they were conducted in order to avoid a build-
up of transcription work (see Figure 4.2). The transcripts were written within 48 
hours after the interview took place. Summarising one interview in a transcript took 
about 100 - 120 minutes on average. In order to make sure that the transcription 
was accurate, an email was sent to the interview partner with the summary of the 
interview, in which the person was thanked for participating in the study. They 
were also asked to have a look at the summary to check for errors, 
misunderstanding and completeness of information. Just very few participants 
made slight changes to the transcript and returned it by email. Personal, follow-up 
conversations were not necessary to clarify any issues or subjects. Saunders et al. 
(2007) raised the concern that interviewees often want to correct their own 
grammar and use of language because spoken and written language is very 
different. This was not the case in these interviews. If an interviewee explicitly 
stated not wanting to receive the transcript, the person's wishes were respected. 
4.5 Data analysis 
The intensive interviews provided a large amount of primary data. They revealed 
the supervisory board member's and investor relations officer's views, feelings, 
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intentions, and actions, as well as the context and structure of their experiences of 
the role of institutional investors in corporate governance in German companies 
from the inside (Chamaz, 2010). This helped to develop an understanding, get an 
overview of the nature of the primary data, and identify key themes and patterns in 
the information (see Figure 4.2). 
The richness of the data made it necessary to organise the collected mass of 
qualitative data into meaningful and related parts by categorisation in order to 
explore and analyse it systematically and rigorously (Saunders et aI., 2007). The 
categories represented relevant phenomena, thereby the data to be reduced and 
combined (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Coding is the first step in moving beyond 
concrete statements in the data in order to make analytical interpretations. It was 
the bone of this analysis, shapes the analytic frame from which the analysis was 
built, defined what was happening in the data and tried to understand the 
interviewee's standpoints and situations (Charmaz, 2010). The codes and 
categories are summarised in Table 4.6. 
After the transcriptions of all 20 interviews were completed, the open-ended 
questions of the transcripts were summarised in a separate document in the form 
of a memo. Memo writing is a pivotal intermediate step between data collection 
and writing drafts of papers. Memo writing constitutes a crucial method in 
grounded theory because it prompts the researcher to analyse the primary data 
and codes early in the research process (Charmaz, 2010). Furthermore, memos 
catch the thoughts, capture the comparisons and connections that the researcher 
makes and crystallise the directions to pursue. This step constituted a focused 
phase, in which the large amount of primary data was sorted, synthesised, 
integrated, and organised in order to code it into higher level concepts according 
to shared properties called categories (see Table 4.6 and the codebook in 
Appendix 9.6). The aim was to scrutinise the data to understand the essence of 
what was being expressed in the primary raw data and to define the meanings 
within it (Charmaz, 2010). All the possible meanings were considered and 
examined carefully. The answers were put into conceptual categories. This step is 
called a researcher-denoted concept (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). Conceptualising 
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data reduces the amount of data and provides a language for talking about it. The 
classification of the data into meaningful categories was derived from the data . In 
order to improve the understanding of the answers and the research subjects as a 
whole, the answers were broken down into its coded elements (Thietart et ai , 
2001). According to Saunders (2007), this allows us to do the following : 
(1) Comprehend and manage the data ; 
(2) Integrate related data drawn from different transcript notes; 
(3) Identify key themes or patterns for further exploration ; 
(4) Develop and/or test theories based on these apparent patterns or 
relationships ; 
(5) Draw and verify conclusions. 
Figure 4.2: Data analysis process. 
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Source: Petra Nix. 
Using the approach of categorising the answers, it was possible to follow a more 
structured path to discover regularities (Saunders et aI. , 2007) and to analyse how 
116 
often the interviewees mentioned them. Therefore, for most of the answers to the 
open-ended questions, a more formalised and procedural approach could be 
adopted. No single measure determines the role and responsibilities of an 
institutional investor. 
What matters most is identifying the elements that constitute the six variables. 
Therefore, the answers were coded into categories - where possible - to get a 
more structured overview of the open-ended answer. According to Corbin and 
Strauss (2008), coding requires searching for the right word or two that best 
describe, in conceptual terms, what the researcher believes is indicated by the 
data. 
With this approach, it is easier to interpret and analyse the qualitative data. In 
effect, these categories are codes or labels that are used to group the data. They 
provide an emergent structure that is relevant for organising and analysing the 
qualitative data further (Saunders et aI., 2007). The general principal is to study 
the variables by gathering the observations by category. These are homogeneous 
groups that facilitate our comprehension of reality (Thietart et aI., 2001). According 
to Saunders et al. (2007), the names of the categories are derived from the data 
and are based on the actual terms used by the interviewees. Therefore, they are 
meaningful and related to the primary data collected in the interviews. The 
categories were derived from the interviewees' answers and are as follows: 
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Table 4.6: Categories of open-ended questions. 
Subject of the Question Variable of the Category/Code 
questionnaire No. research model 
Measures, Section I: Board Oversight; Use of voting rights 
added value, 1.2; 1.4; Nomination Direct Communication (personal, written, 
Identification Improvement of 
contact to supervisory board) 
of weaknesses 2.3; company value Third-party communication (sell side analysts, 
3.2; 3.4; Recommendations media) 
4.2; Inducing changes Shareholder cooperation 
5.2; Exercise of power Seat in the supervisory board 
6.2 Expertise/active consultative relationship 
Self-interest/conflict of interest 
Ownership/meaningful stake 
Research and Analysis - identification of 
weaknesses 
Investment horizon 
Objective and new thoughts (Denkanstbsse) 
Sparring partner for management 
Company Section I: Inducing changes M&A 
situations Exercise of power Shareholder remunerations 5.4; 
6.4 Underperformance 
Capital expenditure 
Sustainability issues 
Management remunerations 
Corporate finance 
Special situations 
Business portfolio 
Management quality 
Future Section I: n.m. Shareholder engagement 
developments 7 Regulation 
Dialogue 
Expertise 
Different types Section II n.m. Investment style 
of investors Investment horizon 
Engagement 
Expertise 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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The next activity was to unitise the data (Saunders et aI., 2007). A unit refers to 
how often the interviewees mentioned a category. Undertaking this step of the 
analytic process allows the researcher to analyse the relevance and importance of 
each category, develop theories and draw conclusions (see Figure 4.2). 
4.6 Validity and reliability 
The findings and primary data derived from non-standardised research methods 
are not necessarily intended to be repeatable since they reflect reality at the time 
they were collected. The circumstances explored in non-standardised interviews 
are complex and dynamic (Saunders et aI., 2007). 
In this research study, this is particularly true for the open-ended questions. There 
is a tendency to accord greater truth-value to research based on primary data 
because the author has witnessed the phenomena personally. In qualitative 
research, validity and reliability largely depend on the skill of the researcher, i.e., 
the person who records the answers to the questions. Reliability is assessed 
through the work of coding the raw data obtained in the interviews. Ensuring that 
a" the interviewees understand the questions in the same way and that the replies 
can be coded unambiguously enhances the reliability of the interview (Thietart et 
aI., 2001). Therefore, the questionnaire was pre-tested in a pilot study (see also 
Section 3.5). 
For the closed-ended questions, scales were used for the valued structural data, 
which enabled exact evaluation of the links. Likert scales were used, which are the 
most commonly used scales (Thietart et aI., 2001). The respondents answered the 
questions or defined statements based on five or six levels, starting with '0 = none 
at a'" to '5 = very strong' or '0 = I strongly agree' to '4 = I very strongly agree'. One 
of the main issues with this method is with regard to the scale's internal 
consistency. Cronbach's alpha coefficient is the most commonly used indicator of 
internal consistency. Idea"y, the Cronbach alpha coefficient of a scale should be 
above 0.7 (Pallant, 2007). This reliability check is executed for the closed-ended 
questions. 
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5 Study Results 
This section describes and summarises the results from the interviews with the 
20 study participants regarding the responsibilities and role of institutional 
investors in German corporate governance. The section starts with a general 
picture of the results with respect to corporate governance; then it focuses on 
the individual results regarding the six variables derived from the research 
model, which are board oversight, nomination, identification of 
weaknesses/improvement of company value, recommendations, inducing 
changes and execution of institutional power. 
The section, which outlines the detailed results of each variable, also provides 
the results of the answers given by the interviewees for each closed-ended and 
open-ended question of the questionnaire. A summary following each of the six 
variables highlights the most important results. The aspects addressed in the 
questionnaire are based on the research model (see Figure 3.3). Four variables 
supervisory board nomination, improvement of company value, 
recommendations to company, and inducing changes in corporate strategy -
are differentiated according to the type of institutional investor, like insurances, 
pension funds, etc. 
In a separate part of the questionnaire, the interviewees were asked additional 
questions regarding the institutional investors' understanding of the strategy 
and business model of the company, the various investor types, the frequency 
of contacts and the differences that they perceive between the different types of 
institutional investors. This section concludes with statistical tests, including a 
distribution of the results, reliability tests, and correlation. In addition, it 
compares whether there are differences in the answers that the members of the 
supervisory board members gave versus the IROs. 
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5.1 General picture of the results 
Weak to medium term role of institutional investors. The results regarding 
the six variables of the research model show that overall the extent of the role of 
institutional investors in the corporate governance of German companies is 
weak to medium. The interviewees agree that institutional investors can add 
value if they execute their role in corporate governance. 
Institutional investors an improve corporate governance. Furthermore, the 
results show that most of the interviewees see more advantages than 
disadvantages in the role that institutional investors play in corporate 
governance. The most important advantages that the interviewees mentioned in 
terms of what institutional investors can contribute to corporate governance 
included an objective view, new thoughts, sector expertise, their knowledge in 
terms of research, and analysis. The limitations and disadvantages that were 
expressed had to do with the institutional investor's self-interest, conflict of 
interest and lack of sector expertise. 
Communication is the overriding measure. The results reveal that 
communication is seen as the main measure that institutional investors should 
exercise in their role in corporate governance, which in this context mainly 
refers to personal communication and discussions with the companies' 
management. The frequency of contacts between institutional investors and the 
German listed companies has reached a satisfactory level. The results indicate 
that institutional investors also have a sufficient level of knowledge about their 
investee companies. 
Underperformance is the most common situation for prompting change. 
The most common company situations, in which institutional investors try to 
initiate change and exercise their power is when companies underperform, are 
in a crisis situation or if there are issues with their business portfolio. 
More engagement expected in the future. The interviewees perceive the 
future role of institutional investors as positive. They expect that institutional 
investors will exercise their power in terms of shareholder engagement. The 
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major differences that the interviewees see between investors have to do with 
their investment style and investment horizon. 
5.2 The six variables of the research model 
5.2.1 Board oversight 
One responsibility of the institutional investors is to ensure effective oversight of 
the investee company's board structure and its subcommittees. The extent of 
effective oversight is broken down by supervisory board and management 
board in order to take the two-tier board structure of German companies into 
account. 
Extent to ensure effective oversight. The interviewees were asked a closed-
ended question regarding the extent to which institutional investors ensure 
effective supervisory and management board oversight. The scale of the 
variable 'extent to ensure effective board oversight' has good internal 
consistency. In this study, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.82. 
Oversight of supervisory board. About 55% of the 20 respondents perceive 
the oversight function of institutional investors with regard to the members of the 
supervisory boards as medium or strong. None of the interviewees saw the role 
of institutional investors with regard to board oversight as very strong. A total of 
30% perceive it as very weak or weak and 15% as non-existent. The mean is 
2.2 (see Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1 : To what extent do institutional investors ensure effective 
supervisory board oversight? 
0= none at all , 1 = very weak , 2 = weak, 3 = medium; 4 = strong, 5 = very strong 
- J 0 2 5 
Extent 10 ensure effective board oversight (58) 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Oversight of management board. Of the 20 respondents, 70% perceive the 
extent to which institutional investors ensure oversight with regard to the 
members of the management board as medium or strong . None of the 
interviewees saw the role of institutional investors with regard to board oversight 
as very strong . A total of 25% perceive the role of institutional investors in board 
oversight as very weak or weak and 5% as non-existent. The mean is 2.7 (see 
Figure 5.2). 
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Figure 5.2: To what extent do institutional investors ensure effective 
management board oversight? 
o = none at ali , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium; 4 = strong, 5 = very strong 
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Measures to oversee and control the supervisory and management 
boards. 
In an open-ended question, the participants were able to name up to five 
appropriate measures that have been or should be used by institutional 
investors to oversee and control the board. Figure 5.3 summarises what 
percentage of the interviewees named each of the categorised measures. Table 
5.1 summarises the qualitative answers and comments of the interviewees to 
the open-ended question regarding the measures to oversee and control the 
supervisory and management boards. The comments are sorted according to 
the categorised measures. Figure 5.3 and Table 5.1 are closely related . 
Together, they give an indication of what the participants said about the various 
categorised measures and how often they were named. 
Communication was mentioned by 80% of the interviewees as the most 
important measure for institutional investors to oversee and control the 
supervisory and management board . Communication is further divided into 
personal communication , (e .g., one on ones, which are usually carried out by 
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the IRO and/or members of the management board) , written communication 
(e.g ., letters or emails) and contact to the supervisory board. The second most 
important measure mentioned by 50% of the respondents was participating and 
voting in the AGM. The remain ing measures, like expertise/consultative 
management, a seat on the supervisory board, ownership/meaningful stake , 
and collaboration are of minor importance or a less typical measure. Self-
interest was also mentioned. Self-interest does not seem to be a measure, 
however some interviewees named this factor. Therefore, it is also included in 
the categorisation of the codes . 
Figure 5.3: Board oversight - important and typical measures. 
Board oversight· important and typical measures I perccntag of em'- • 
Communications 
Communocation 800/. 
Use ot voting righlsiengagemenlln AGM 50% 
EKpenosel consultallve management ... 20% 
P ".onal communica tion 75% 
Seal in the superv,sory board "'- 20% 
Ownerslllpimeaningful stake • 10% 
Selt·lnteres!loonflict of Interest • 100/. 
Shareholder collaboratIOn • 10% 
Other _ 200/, 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Wml n communlcahon _ 35% 
Contaclto 6UPOrYl ory board _ 25% 
Thtrd party comnlLJnlcaltOn • 10% 
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Table 5.1: Measures to oversee and control the boards - selected 
comments of respondents. 
Communication Regular exchange and dialogue. Institutional investors give feedback. A perception 
analysis is carried out once a year. Regular exchanges take place with the top 100 
investors. If requested, meetings also take place with the chairman of the 
supervisory board. A discussed subject was the distribution policy. 
Media campaigns are effective tools to approach the public; rumours can be 
circulated in this way. 8y doing so, public awareness of investors can be heightened 
and campaigns of this kind can be used for own PR purposes. 
AGM/Use of Only German institutional investors make an appearance at the AGM. Foreign 
voting rights investors have the opportunity to speak, but until now they never made use of this. 
Investors should take a close look at the agenda of the AGM and deal with the 
various issues rather than simply listen to the recommendations of the proxy 
agencies. These sometimes make negative recommendations since they do not 
have enough understand of the facts. 
There are essentially two reasons for using proxy agencies: (1) The investor does 
not wish to make a public appearance; (2) the investor does not have sufficient 
capacities of his own to prepare for the AGM. 
Contact to SB The direct contact between the S8 and institutional investors has been stigmatised 
in Germany by the German Stock Corporation Law and thus limited. 
Direct exchange between institutional investors and S8 makes sense, especially 
when it comes to expressing an opinion and exchanging sector-specific expertise. 
The members of the S8 frequently lack a close relation to the operating business. 
They are not particularly 'down to earth'. The appointment is separated from 
economic aspects and focussed far too strongly on corporate policy, personal 
contacts and relation networks. 
The S8's position not all that long ago was: 'I don't talk to investors, I'm not a 
representative of shareholder interests'. 
A general increase can be noted in institutional investors directly approaching the 
supervisory board and establishing direct contact with the S8, especially active 
institutional investors, like Hermes and F&C. 
Seat in S8 By exerting their influence, foreign investors attempt to bring about a change in 
behaviour and, in some cases, to also assert their own interests. However, when it 
comes to accepting responsibility for their engagement, e.g., by accepting a seat in 
the supervisory board, this meets with a show of reluctance on the part of the 
investors. However, a long-term commitment to the company would be necessary to 
prevent being influenced only by the short-term benefit. 
Institutional investors contribute towards a more transparent and standardised 
selection process for nominating the S8 members. 
Meaningful The degree of influence and monitoring of institutional investors heavily depends on 
stake whether they have a meaningful stake in the particular company or not. Without a 
meaningful stake, it is almost impossible to add value. 
The degree of oversight is higher if an institutional investor has a participation in an 
organ - if not, good contacts are decisive. 
Collaboration The more proposals that are made by a larger group of investors, the greater the 
interest that is generated within the company. Individual opinions are more likely to 
trickle away and not be taken so seriously. 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Value added to supervisory board oversight. The picture is mixed. About 
55% of the 20 respondents are convinced that institutional investors add value 
to the oversight of supervisory boards, whereas 10% strongly disagree and 
35% somewhat agree. The mean is 1.85 (see Figure 5.4) . 
Figure 5.4: Institutional investors add value to supervisory board 
oversight. 
0=1 strongly disagree, 1 =somewhat agree, 2=agree, 3=1 strongly agree; 4=1 very strongly agree 
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Value added to management board oversight. About 65% of the 20 
respondents are convinced that institutional investors add value to the oversight 
of management boards, and 35% somewhat agree. The mean is 2.05 (see 
Figure 5.5). The scale of the aspect 'institutional investors add value to 
supervisory and management board oversight' has good internal consistency. 
In this study, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.81 . 
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Figure 5.5: Institutional investors add value to management board 
oversight. 
0=1 strongly disagree, 1 =somewhat agree, 2=agree, 3=1 strongly agree; 4=1 very strong ly agree 
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Institutional investors can add value to board oversight 
In these open-ended questions, the corporate managers where asked to 
elaborate on their experiences. Figure 5.6 summarises what percentage of the 
interviewees named each of the categories . Table 5.2 summarises the 
qualitative answers and comments of the interviewees to the open-ended 
question about the added value of institutional investors to board oversight. The 
comments are sorted according to the categorised measures. Figure 5.6 and 
table 5.2 are closely related . Together, they give an indication of what the 
participants said about the various categorised measures and how often they 
named the measures. 
In this open-ended question , almost all the interviewees (95%) mentioned the 
advantages of how and why institutional investors can add value to board 
oversight. Even respondents who only somewhat agreed that institutional 
investors could add value to supervisory board oversight also mentioned 
advantages at that point in the interview. An explanation for this gap might be 
that currently, the interviewees experience less added value, however they are 
convinced that institutional investors could be in a position to add value. A total 
of 40% of the respondents mentioned that institutional investors would be 
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objective and that they can bring in new thoughts regarding board oversight. 
The interviewees also mentioned sector expertise (30%) as an advantage and 
that the investors can become a sparring partner (35%) for management. Both 
aspects are closely related since an institutional investor with good expertise 
and a sound knowledge base about the company and its sector can be a good 
partner for corporate management in discussions, as well as to exchange ideas 
and knowledge in order to improve the strategic decision making process of the 
company. A few respondents (10%) felt that institutional investors can identify 
weaknesses in board oversight. Various disadvantages were mentioned by 
60% of the respondents . The major concerns of the interviewees were conflict 
of interest and self-interest (45% of the respondents) and lack of expertise 
(25%). 
Figure 5.6: How and why institutional investors can add value to 
supervisory and management board oversight - advantages and 
disadvantages. 
Advantages Disadvantages 
" 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Table 5.2: Added value of institutional investors to board oversight -
selected comments of respondents. 
Advantages 
Expertise Institutional investors can add structured targets and the pursuit of systematic 
methods. 
Institutional investors can offer a good overview of the sector. They are familiar 
with the main features and know the development of the competition. As a 
result, a company does need not to buy market intelligence or market research 
studies. 
Institutional investors know the market very well. They offer sector expertise 
and they know the way that capital markets tick. Institutional investors express 
their views from the market's perspective so that companies know what has to 
be taken into account. 
New thoughts Institutional investors offer a new perspective and new ways of thinking in 
particular they offer a capital market perspective. The perspective is objective 
and strictly geared to value generation. Institutional investors have a 
comparative perspective within the sector from which they are able to derive 
best practices. 
Sometimes institutional investors give fundamental and well-researched 
criticism. They offer 'thought-provoking-ideas'. An outside perspective is worth 
listening to. Institutional investors are able to express themselves more easily 
and thus offer the supervisory board an objective viewpoint. The can have a 
better outside perspective and are free to put pressure on the supervisory 
board. 
Sparring Well-informed investors can become a sparring partner for management in 
Partner strategy discussions. This is especially the case with issues like competitive 
environment and rival strategies. This gives management interesting food for 
thought as to the best way to improve the company's competitiveness. 
Institutional investors give their opinion of what is good and what is bad and 
thus put pressure on management. Above all, they should seek talks with the 
company's management and give feedback. 
Research & Institutional investors are frequently very quick to expose 'uncomfortable truths' 
Analysis and prepare comprehensive presentations for weaknesses and problem zones 
in the company. 
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Disadvantages 
Conflict of In particular, hedge funds generate a very high level of self-interest. They act in 
interest their own interest or in the interest of the beneficial owner - if at all. They put 
external pressure on the companies, but do not pursue a stewardship approach 
and do not to act in the interest of the company. They are strongly deal oriented 
and want to maximise their value within a short period of time. 
Institutional investors - above all hedge funds - also focus on purely financial 
aspects (e.g., distribution policy, high debt), causing the company to be 'bled 
out' as a result. They focus too greatly on their own interest. 
Most institutional investors sell their shares in critical company situations and 
adopt a 'vote with the feet' position. The long-term perspective (investment 
horizon of 5 to 10 years) for active shareholder engagement does not exist for 
an effective control function to be exercised. 
Shareholder engagement is generally restricted to individual persons. There 
are no cases of 'wide-spread' engagement of institutional investors. Those who 
do generally have a personal interest of their own. 
Lack of In some cases they try to break the company up into various divisions. but 
expertise without taking appropriate account of future growth opportunities. 
Investors focus too frequently on certain financial ratios (e.g., ROE). This leads 
to capital having to be borrowed to improve the ratios. This financial 
engineering vs. operating performance raises the valuations on the capital 
market. but also heightens the risk profile of the company. 
The investors' perspective of the strategic alignment is not necessarily the best 
one for the company. 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Board oversight - summary of results 
According to the research model, the variable 'board oversight' is a monitoring 
responsibility of the shareholders. The summarised results of Table 5.3 show 
how the interviewees judged the level of shareholder responsibility regarding 
the various aspects of the variable 'board oversight'. Furthermore, the table 
shows the means, calculated from the likert scale of the closed-end questions. 
The means are derived from the descriptive statistic and show what they tell us. 
The results indicate that the interviewees see the extent to which institutional 
investors can ensure effective supervisory board oversight as weak, but as 
medium for management board oversight. Communication is the top measure 
mentioned in executing board oversight. For both the supervisory board and the 
management board, the interviewees agree that institutional investors could 
add value to board oversight. As figure 5.6 shows, almost all the interviewees 
see advantages in that respect. The most important advantage of institutional 
investors mentioned by the interviewees is that institutional investors can 
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provide objectivity and new thoughts. Fewer participants see disadvantages. 
The most important disadvantage or limitation with regard to the added value of 
institutional investors in terms of board oversight is conflict of interest. 
Table 5.3: Board oversight - the role of institutional investors in German 
companies. 
Aspects of the question Results and meanings of the 
answers 
Extent of effective supervisory board oversight Mean = 2.2 = weak 
Extent of effective management board oversight Mean = 2.7= medium 
Top measure of board oversight Communication 
Added value to supervisory board oversight Mean = 1.85 = agree 
Added value to management board oversight Mean = 2.05 = agree 
Most important advantage for added value Objective and new thoughts 
Most important disadvantage for added value Self-interest/conflict of interest 
Source: Petra Nix. 
5.2.2 Nomination 
The second responsibility and also a right of institutional investors is the 
election of members to the supervisory board at the AGM. One objective of the 
nomination committees is to ensure an independent, transparent and structured 
process to recommend and appoint appropriate candidates for election. This 
right empowers shareholders, decreases the agency costs and is an effective 
way of exercising the control and monitoring function. 
Extent to which institutional investors focus on the composition of the 
supervisory board 
In a closed-ended question, the interviewees were asked to what extent various 
types of institutional investors, like insurances, pension funds, hedge funds, 
etc., focus on the composition of the supervisory board. There was one 
respondent from a DAX 30 company who did not differentiate between the 
particular types of investors and rated them all with a response of 'none at all'. 
Answers of 'no opinion' were not included in the calculation of the mean and the 
standard deviation. The scale of the variable 'to what extent do institutional 
investors focus on the composition of the supervisory board' has good internal 
consistency. In this study, the Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.85. 
In general. A total of 50% of the respondents view the role of institutional 
investors as medium to very strong , whereas 45% view their role as very weak 
or weak and one participant stated that they do not playa role at all . The overall 
mean is 2.55 (see Figure 5.7). 
Figure 5.7: To what extent do institutional investors focus on the 
composition of the S8? (general) 
o = none at ali , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Banks . Only 36.8% of the respondents view their role as medium to very 
strong. One interviewee had no opinion. A total of 10.5% perceive their role as 
non-existent and 52.7% as very weak or weak. The mean is 2.26 (see Figure 
5.8) . 
Figure 5.8: To what extent do institutional investors focus on the 
composition of the 5B? (banks) 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Insurances. A total of 30% of the respondents view the role of insurances as 
medium to very strong, whereas 55% view it as very weak or weak and 15% 
answered that they do not playa role at all. The mean is 1.95 (see Figure 5.9) 
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Figure 5.9: To what extent do institutional investors focus on the 
composition of the 58? (insurances). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Source: Petra Nix. 
Pension Funds . A total of 42 .2% of the respondents perceive the role of 
pension funds as medium to very strong. One had no opinion. More than half 
(52.7%) view their role as very weak or weak and one interviewee said they do 
not focus on the composition at all. The mean is 2.26 (see Figure 5.10) , wh ich is 
on the same level as the banks. 
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Figure 5.10: To what extent do institutional investors focus on the 
composition of the S8? (pension funds) 
o = none at ali , = very weak, 2 = weak , 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong , 6 = no 
opinion 
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Hedge funds . A total of 75% of the respondents feel that hedge funds playa 
medium to very strong role in the composition of supervisory boards. Only 20% 
view their role as weak or very weak. One respondent said they do not playa 
ro le at all. The mean is 3.3 (see Figure 5.11) . 
Figure 5.11: To what extent do institutional investors focus on the 
composition of the S8? (hedge funds). 
o = none at ali , = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong , 6 = no 
opinion 
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Source : Petra Nix. 
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Endowments . Only 30% view their role as medium to very strong. Two 
respondents have no opinion and two respondents view their role as non-
existent. A total of 61 .1 % perceive their role as very weak or weak. The mean is 
1.83 (see Figure 5.12) 
Figure 5.12: To what extent do institutional investors focus on the 
composition of the 58? (endowments). 
o = none at ali , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak , 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Sovereign Wealth Funds. Only 33.4% view their role as medium to very 
strong. Two respondents have no opinion. Two interviewees view their role as 
non-existent. A total of 55.6% perceive their role as very weak or weak. The 
mean is 1.89 (see Figure 5.13). 
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Figure 5.13: To what extent do institutional investors focus on the 
composition of the S8? (SWF). 
o = none at ali, 1 = very weak , 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Private Equity. A total of 65% view their role as medium to very strong. One 
respondent views their role as non-existent. One participant who judged private 
equity as very strong was the IRO of a company in which the private equity 
fund , The Blackstone Group, owns a significant stake and also has a seat in the 
supervisory board. Only 30% perceive their ro le as very weak or weak. The 
mean is 3.15 (see Figure 5.14). 
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Figure 5.14: To what extent do institutional investors focus on the 
composition of the S8? (PE). 
o = none at all . 1 = very weak. 2 = weak. 3 = medium. 4 = strong . 5 = very strong. 6 = no 
opinion 
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German funds . More than half (55%) of the respondents view their role as 
medium to very strong. One interviewee views their role as non-existent. A total 
of 40% perceive their role as very weak or weak. The mean is 2.55 (see Figure 
5.15). 
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Figure 5.15: To what extent do institutional investors focus on the 
composition of the 58? (German funds). 
o = none at all, 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Foreign funds. A total of 60% of the respondents view their role as medium to 
strong. One respondent views their role as non-existent. The remaining 30% 
perceive their role as very weak or weak. The mean is 2.8 (see Figure 5.16) 
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Figure 5.16: To what extent do institutional investors focus on the 
composition of the 58? (foreign funds). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Added value to supervisory board nomination . Less than half (45%) of the 
respondents th ink that institutional investors add value to a board nomination. 
Half (50%) somewhat agree and one respondent is not convinced that 
institutional investors can add any value at all to a nomination. The mean is 1.7 
(see Figure 5.17). 
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Figure 5.17: Added value to supervisory board nomination. 
o = none at ali , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Institutional investors can add value to a supervisory board nomination 
In this open-ended question , the corporate managers were asked to elaborate 
on their experiences. Figure 5.18 summarises what percentage of the 
interviewees mentioned each of the categories. Table 5.4 summarises the 
categorised and qualitative answers and comments of the interviewees to the 
open-ended question regarding how and why institutional investors can add 
value to the nomination of supervisory board members. The comments are 
sorted according to the categorised measures. Figure 5.18 and Table 5.4 are 
closely related . Together, they give an indication of what the participants said 
about the various categorised measures and how often they were mentioned. 
A total of 75% interviewees gave positive arguments as to why they can add 
value to a supervisory board nomination. Even respondents who only 
somewhat agree that institutional investors add value to a supervisory board 
nomination talked about the advantages at that point in the interview. An 
explanation for this gap might be that, currently, the interviewees experience 
less value added to a supervisory board nomination , however they are 
convinced that institutional investors could be in a position to add value. 
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The majority of the answers referred to 'sector expertise' (40%) and 
'objective/new thoughts' (30%). However, there were also disadvantages 
mentioned by 65% of the respondents. The two factors were lack of expertise 
(40%) and self interest/conflict of interest (25%). 
Figure 5.18: How and why institutional investors can add value to 
supervisory board nomination - advantages and disadvantages. 
Advantages Disadvantages 
ClIho!. ,1< 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Table 5.4: Added value of institutional investors to supervisory board 
nomination - selected comments of respondents. 
Advantages 
Expertise Institutional investors have extensive knowledge of persons/personalities and 
are able to assess specialist and sector knowledge quite well. Institutional 
investors also have a clear grasp of what a candidate must offer to gain a 
seat on the supervisory board and they know whether the candidates 
understand the rules of the game. 
Institutional investors can boast a good and extensive network as they deal 
very intensively with the companies in question and are permanently 
reviewing them . This puts them in a position to identify and recognise 
competence gaps and weaknesses. They can offer the supervisory board 
genuine added value . They can also assume a 'mediator role ' by establishing 
contacts between various companies. 
Institutional investors should propose suitable candidates for the selection 
process. There are even cases of institutional investors ringing up the 
chairman and exerting influence on the criteria which the candidate should 
fulfil. Institutional investors exert indirect influence on the nomination of the 
supervisory board members via the criteria catalogue. They thus contribute 
towards professionalising the selection process and candidates . However, 
the influence is exerted less by specifically nominating their own candidates 
to the supervisory board . 
If institutional investors are represented on supervisory boards , they can 
defend the interest of the 'outside shareholders' far more effectively, 
particularly if the company has a strong single shareholder like a family. 
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New thoughts The main advantage of institutional investors is that they are able to think in 
a wider context. 
As a result of the investors' tasks and functions, an active and committed 
investor meets many other companies, organs and persons. This gives 
him/her a good overview of the qualification of individual persons and 
candidates. Thanks to this helicopter perspective, the institutional investor is 
in a good position to offer valuable proposals for the nomination of the 
supervisory board and/or propose specific candidates and also state, if 
applicable, who might be not suitable. 
Sparring If voting guidelines, including views on board nomination, exist, these are 
Partner helpful to determine a balanced board composition. As these guidelines are 
public, they might cause a debate and as a result a common understanding 
of a target composition in general will evolve over time. 
Disadvantages 
Lack of expertise In some cases, investors deal very schematically like box ticking with the 
selection criteria for supervisory board nominations. This does not 
correspond to the intensive work of a member of a supervisory board. 
The harmony of the organ could be jeopardised, possible lack of sector 
expertise. Institutional investors are more likely to offer financial knowledge. 
Foreign investors are less familiar with the German governance system 
Conflict of Institutional investors have a too strong dominance of own interests. 
interest One active investor like a hedge fund, emphatically pursing its own interest 
and possibly using the public to step pressure, is already enough to sharpen 
the influence on the composition of the supervisory board. 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Supervisory board nomination - summary of results 
The summarised results of the variable 'supervisory board nomination' in table 
5.5 show how the interviewees judged the level of shareholder responsibility 
regarding the various aspects of the variable 'supervisory board nomination' 
and what the means of the closed-ended question from the descriptive statistic 
tells us. The results indicate that the interviewees see the extent to which 
institutional investors focus on the composition of the supervisory board as 
weak to medium. Figure 5.18 shows that the majority of the interviewees see 
advantages. The most important advantage of institutional investors mentioned 
by the interviewees is that they can provide sector expertise. Fewer of the 
survey participants see disadvantages. The most important disadvantage or 
limitation regarding the added value of institutional investors with respect to 
nomination of supervisory board is lack of expertise. 
144 
Table 5.5: Supervisory board nomination - the role of institutional 
investors in German companies. 
Aspects of the question Results and meanings of the 
answers 
Focus on the composition of the supervisory board Mean = 2.5 = weak to 
medium 
Added value to supervisory board nomination Mean = 1.7 = agree 
Most important advantage for added value Sector expertise 
Most important disadvantage for added value Lack of expertise 
Source: Petra Nix. 
5.2.3 Identification of weaknesses/Improvement of company value 
The third variable within the monitoring section is the identification of 
weaknesses and refers to the ability of investors to improve the company value. 
Extent to which institutional investors add value to the process of value 
creation 
In a closed-ended question, the interviewees were asked about the extent to 
which various types of institutional investors like insurances, pension funds, 
hedge funds, etc., add value to the process of company value creation. The 
scale of this variable has good internal consistency. In this study, the Cronbach 
alpha coefficient was 0.89. 
In General. The majority of the interviewees (65%) are convinced that 
institutional investors are able to add value in the value creation process of the 
company. One respondent was not able to give a judgement on a general 
basis. He/she preferred to just answer the question on the particular types of 
investors. One third (30%) view the ability of investors to create value as weak. 
The mean is 3.16 (see Figure 5.19). 
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Figure 5.19: To what extent do institutional investors add value to the 
process of value creation? (general). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Banks. Half of the respondents (50%) feel that banks playa medium or strong 
role. One respondent who explicitly rated 'bank' as medium stated that he 
meant investment banks and not commercial banks. Two respondents had no 
opinion . A total of 44.5% see the bank's role as very weak or weak. One 
interviewee thinks that they do not playa role at all. The mean is 2.5 (see 
Figure 5.20) . 
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Figure 5.20: To what extent do institutional investors add value to the 
process of value creation? (banks). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
6 
• 
l 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Inst investor add value to value creation - Ban ks 
,.....--
~ 
r--
I I i ~ 
I.D 00 10 2.0 3 .0 .0 S.O 
Inst. investor add val ue to vAlue creat ion - 8anks 
Insurances . Slightly more than half (52.6%) of the respondents view the ability 
of insurances to add value to the process of value creation as medium or 
strong . One interviewee had no opinion and two respondents believe that they 
are not able to add value at all. A total of 36.8% perceive their role in the value 
creation process as weak or even very weak. The mean is 2.37 (see Figure 
5.21 ) 
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Figure 5.21: To what extent do institutional investors add value to the 
process of value creation? (insurances). 
o = none at all . 1 = very weak. 2 = weak. 3 = medium. 4 = strong. 5 = very strong. 6 = no 
opinion 
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Pension funds. A total of 68.4% of the participants believe that the money 
managers of pension funds can add value to improve the company's value on a 
medium or strong level. One interviewee had no opinion . Only 31 .6% view the 
role of money managers of pension funds as weak or very weak. The mean is 
2.89 (see Figure 5.22) 
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Figure 5.22: To what extent do institutional investors add value to the 
process of value creation? (pension funds). 
o = none at ali , = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Hedge funds . The results show a clear picture: The vast majority of corporate 
managers (80%) are convinced that hedge funds can add value to the process 
of value creation of a company. Only 20% view their role as weak. The mean is 
3.7 (see Figure 5.23) . 
Figure 5.23: To what extent do institutional investors add value to the 
process of value creation? (HF). 
o = none at ali , = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium , 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Endowments . Only 37.5% of the corporate managers feel that endowments 
playa medium or strong role in the value creation process. Four respondents 
had no opinion and 62.5% view their role as weak or very weak. The median is 
2.31 (see Figure 5.24) . 
Figure 5.24: To what extent do institutional investors add value to the 
process of value creation? (endowments) 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Sovereign wealth funds . A total of 47% of the respondents view the role of 
SWF in the process of value creation as medium or strong . Three interviewees 
had no opinion. Slightly more than half (53%) of the interviewees consider their 
role as weak or very weak. The mean is 2.59 (see Figure 5.25) . 
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Figure 5.25: To what extent do institutional investors add value to the 
process of value creation? (SWF). 
o = none at all . 1 = very weak. 2 = weak. 3 = medium. 4 = strong . 5 = very strong. 6 = no 
opin ion 
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Private Equity. The results show a clear tendency: The vast majori ty (85%) of 
the interviewees believe that private equity managers add value on a medium to 
very strong scale in the value creation process. Only 15% perceive the role of 
the private equity manager as weak. The mean is 3.9 (see Figure 5.26). 
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Figure 5.26: To what extent do institutional investors add value to the 
process of value creation? (PE). 
o = none at ali, 1 = very weak , 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Source: Petra Nix. 
German funds . The majority of the corporate managers (55%) think that 
German funds add value to the value creation process. They judge their impact 
as medium to strong . A total of 45% perceive their impact to the value creation 
process as weak or even very weak. The mean is 2.75 (see Figure 5.27) . 
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Figure 5.27: To what extent do institutional investors add value to the 
process of value creation? (German funds). 
o = none at ali, = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Foreign funds . A total of 75% of the respondents think that the impact of 
foreign funds in the value creation process of a company is medium or strong , 
whereas 25% view it as weak. The mean is 3.25 (see Figure 5.28) . 
Figure 5.28: To what extent do institutional investors add value to the 
process of value creation? (foreign funds) 
o = none at all , = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong , 6 = no 
opinion 
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Measures to identify potential to increase company value 
In this open-ended question the participants were asked to name up to five 
appropriate measures that have been or should be used by institutional 
investors to identify potential to increase company value. Figure 5.29 
summarises what percentage of the interviewees named each of the 
categorised measures. Table 5.6 summarises the answers and comments of 
the interviewees to the open-ended question regarding the measures used by 
institutional investors to identify potential to increase company value. The 
comments are sorted according to the categorised measures. Figure 5.29 and 
Table 5.6 are closely related. Together, they give an indication what the 
participants said about the various categorised measures and how often the 
measures were mentioned. 
Eight different measures were categorised (see Figure 5.29). The three most 
important measures were research and analysis (45%), communication (35%) 
and expertise (25%). Others measures included ownership/meaningful stake 
(15%), investment horizon (10%), use of voting rights (10%), lack of expertise 
(10%) and self-interest (10%). The latter two cannot be categorised as 
measures, but were mentioned by the respondents, therefore they are included 
in the findings. The category 'communication' can be broken down even further 
into personal, written, third-party communication and contact to supervisory 
board. Once more, personal communication (30%) was the most important 
measure for the respondents. The second most important measure (15%) was 
third-party communication. Third-party communication refers to institutional 
investors' contact to sell-side analysts and the media. 
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Figure 5.29: Measures to improve company value. 
Improvement of company value - important and typical measures I percentage of entnes 
Communications 
Research and analysis 
Communication 
Expertise 
_------ 45% 
_----35% 
_--- 25% 
Contacl to supervisory board _ 5% 
Written communIcation __ t 0% 
Ownershipl meaningful stake ~ 15% 
1 
Third Party communication 
Personal communication 
15% 
Investment horizon ,... 10% 
Lack of expertise ~ 10% 
Use of voting righ s ,.... 10% 
Self-Interest _ 5% 
Other .... 10% 
_------ 30% 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Table 5.6: Measures to identify potential to increase company value -
selected comments of respondents. 
Research & Institutional investors offer an objective view of the market - helicopter view. 
Analysis Financial and market analysis holds up a mirror to the company. 
Peer group comparisons : Institutional investors are in a very good position to 
make unprejudiced, low-brow and objective comparisons with other 
companies of the sector. This has a 'hygienic' function . Underperforming 
sectors are localised and frequently viewed more objectively than from an 
internal company perspective. In the latter case , 'good reasons ' are also 
frequently cited as to why the comparison cannot be made. 
Analyses prepared without being requested : This does indeed take place 
and the resources , which flow into these analyses on the part of the investor 
are considerable. Weak points are very frequently well-quantified and the 
models are mathematically sound. Analyses of this kind can indeed spark off 
discussions in the company. 
Strategic comparisons relating to what the company should do, will do and 
what it shouldn 't do. In recent years , strategy comparisons have grown in 
significance among investors. The assessment of the company in the overall 
context is more important today than in previous years. A difficult issue is, 
however, that investors are not always able to appreciate long-term company 
decisions on account of their generally shorter-term investment horizons. It is 
therefore not easy to assert and communicate long-term corporate decisions. 
Expertise Institutional investors disclose weak points in the business model. Managers 
tend to drag out decisions. In cases of this kind , institutional investors 
introduce objectivity and rationality into discussions on corporate decisions. 
Institutional investors offer an independent perspective of things . On the one 
hand they have good knowledge of the sector, on the other hand they have a 
perspective of society and are not biased by what is being conveyed by the 
management board to the supervisory board . 
Demands to eradicate weaknesses: Institutional investors are not compelled 
to give any justifications and do not have any 'dubious legacies'. They can 
also prevent any incorrect decisions from being made. 
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Communication Hold discussions with the management as a means of exercising greater 
pressure and ensuring more effective control. 
Results of the analyses should be presented to and discussed with the 
company. However, presenting these analysis results to the public without 
the company's knowledge would stir up a defence reaction and visibly 
deteriorate the discussion basis. 
Others Management receives incentive from hedge funds and private equity to 
realise measures to enhance corporate value - threat of sanction if the 
measures are not initiated. 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Institutional investors can identify potential to increase company value 
A total of 80% of the managers believe that institutional investors are in a 
position to identify potential to increase company value. Only 20% somewhat 
agree with this statement. The mean is 2.25 (see Figure 5.30) . 
Figure 5.30: Institutional investors can identify potential to increase 
company value. 
D = I strongly disagree, 1 = I somewhat agree, 2 = I agree, 3 = I strongly agree, 4 = I very 
strongly agree 
Histogram 
e-
t 
~ 
r 
I 
o l 2 
Identify potential to Increase company value 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Identify potential to increase value 
M.a" 2.25 
SId. 0'.'11. 0.85 1 
N .. ~o 
In that open-ended question , the respondents were asked how and why 
institutional investors could identify potential to increase company value. 
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Figure 5.31 summarises what percentage of the interviewees mentioned each 
of the categories. The results show that most of the respondents (65%) named 
positive criteria like research and analysis (25%), objective and new thoughts 
(15%) , sector expertise (15%) and sparring partner for management (10%) . Just 
15% of the respondents mentioned self-interest (15%) as a disadvantage. 
Figure 5.31: Identification of potential to increase value through 
institutional investors. 
Advantage Disadvantage 
At.1VAA'AGtSfl"" ______ •• _"" 
Source: Petra Nix. 
,." 
, ... 
Identification of weaknesses/identification of potential to increase value -
summary of results 
The summarised results in Table 5.7 show how the interviewees view the 
potential of institutional investors to improve company value. Furthermore, the 
table explains what the means used in the likert scale tells us with regard to the 
various aspects used in this variable . The interviewees see the extent to which 
institutional investors can add value to the process of value creation as medium. 
The most common measure used for this is research and analysis and the 
participants agree that institutional investors have the ability to identify potential 
to increase value. The ability of investors to provide comprehensive research 
and analysis is the advantage that was most mentioned by the interviewees. 
The conflict of self-interest is the most common disadvantage. 
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Table 5.7: Improvement of company value - the role of institutional 
investors in German companies. 
Aspects of the question Results and meanings of 
the answers 
Extent to which institutional investors add value to the process Mean = 3.15 = medium 
of value creation 
Top measure to identify potential to increase value Research and analysis 
Ability to identify potential to increase value Mean = 2.25 = agree 
Advantage of institutional investors identifying potential Research and analysis 
Disadvantage of institutional investors identifying potential Self-interest 
Source: Petra Nix. 
5.2.4 Recommendations to company 
The fourth variable 'recommendations to company' is part of the section on 
influence. It is one of the three variables - recommendations, inducing change, 
exercise of power - that have to do with influence. After identification of a 
weakness, the investor is in the position to initiate a discussion with the 
corporate managers. 
Extent to which institutional investors make recommendations to the 
company 
The interviewees were asked in a closed-ended question to what extent the 
various types of institutional investors, like insurances, pension funds, hedge 
funds, etc. make recommendations to the company. Of the 20 interviewees, one 
- an IRO of a DAX 30 company - was not able to answer the question at all. 
Therefore, only 19 participants responded to this question. 
The scale of this variable has good internal consistency. In this study, the 
Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.74. 
In General. The majority of the interviewees (58%) said that, in general, 
institutional investors do make recommendations to the company. A total of 
42% of the interviewees responded that they felt the extent to which 
recommendations are made by institutional investors was weak or very weak. 
The mean is 2.84 (see Figure 5.32). 
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Figure 5.32: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (general). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak , 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong , 6 = no 
opinion 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Banks. The majority of the interviewees (61 %) believe that banks do make 
recommendations to the company. The two respondents who explicitly 
responded with 'very strong' stated that they meant investment banks. A total of 
33.4% of the interviewees perceived the extent to which recommendations were 
made by banks as weak or very weak. One had no opinion. One respondent 
said that banks do not make recommendations at all . Here it seems that there is 
a significant difference of opinion regarding the extent to wh ich banks make 
recommendations . The type of a bank matters like commercial , private or 
investment bank. The mean is 2.78 (see Figure 5.33) . 
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Figure 5.33: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (banks). 
o = none at ali, 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong , 6 = no 
opinion 
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Insurances. One third of the interviewees (33.3%) believe that the extent to 
which insurances make recommendations to the company is just medium. One 
respondent had no opinion. More than half (55.5%) of the interviewees 
perceive the extent to which recommendations are made by insurances as 
weak or very weak. Two respondents said insurances do not make 
recommendations at all. The mean is 1.89 (see Figure 5.34). 
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Figure 5.34: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (insurances). 
o = none at all, 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Pension funds. The majority of the interviewees (55.5%) believe that the extent 
to which pension funds make recommendations to the company is medium or 
strong . One respondent had no opinion. A total of 44.4% of the interviewees 
perceive the extent to which recommendations are made by pension funds as 
weak or very weak. The mean is 2.44 (see Figure 5.35). 
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Figure 5.35: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (pension funds). 
o = non he at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak , 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong. 6 = no 
opinion 
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Hedge funds. The majority of the interviewees (84%) believe that the extent to 
which hedge funds make recommendations to the company is medium to very 
strong. Only 16% of the interviewees perceive the extent of recommendations 
made by hedge funds as weak. The mean is 3.68 (see Figure 5.36) . 
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Figure 5.36: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (hedge funds). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak , 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong , 6 = no 
opinion 
To what exten t do Insl investors make recommendations - Hedge Funds 
a-
6-
• 
~ 
Source : Petra Nix. 
I 
I I ' I 
I 
I 
To what extent do Inst. investors makt 
recomm~ndatjons - Hedge Funds 
~(lAn·164 
Std 0... \,003 
N " 1& 
Endowments . Only 28.6% of the interviewees feel that endowments make 
recommendations to a company to a medium extent. None of the interviewees 
gave an answer of strong or even very strong. More than half (57.1 %) of the 
interviewees perceive the extent to which endowments make recommendations 
to the company as weak or very weak. Two respondents gave an answer of 
none at all and six had no opinion. The mean is 1.79 (see Figure 5.37) . 
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Figure 5.37: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (endowments). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Sovereign wealth funds . Only 29.4% felt that the extent to which sovereign 
wealth funds make recommendations to a company is medium or strong. None 
of the interviewees gave a response of very strong . More than half (58.8%) of 
the interviewees perceive the extent to which recommendations are made by 
SWF as weak or very weak. Two respondents felt that SWF do not make 
recommendations at a" and one had no opinion. The mean is 2.12 (see Figure 
5.38). 
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Figure 5.38: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (SWF). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Private Equity. The majority of the inteNiewees (83.3%) perceive the extent to 
which private equity funds make recommendations to a company as medium to 
very strong . None of the inteNiewees gave an answer of very weak. Only 16% 
of the inteNiewees perceive the extent to which recommendations are made by 
private equity as weak. One respondent had no opinion . The mean is 3.84 (see 
Figure 5.39). 
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Figure 5.39: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (PE). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , S = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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German funds . A total of 42% of the inteNiewees experience the extent to 
which German funds make recommendations to the company as medium or 
strong . More than half (58%)viewed the extent of recommendations made by 
German funds as weak or very weak. The mean is 2.47 (see Figure 5.40) . 
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Figure 5.40: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (German funds). 
o = none at all . 1 = very weak . 2 = weak, 3 = medium. 4 = strong, 5 = very strong . 6 = no 
opinion 
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Foreign funds . The majority of the interviewees (79%) experience the extent to 
which foreign funds make recommendations to companies as medium to very 
strong . Only 21% viewed the extent to which recommendations are made by 
foreign funds as weak. The mean is 3.37 (see Figure 5.41) . 
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Figure 5.41: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (foreign funds). 
a = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Measures used to make recommendations 
In an open-ended question, the participants were asked to name up to five 
appropriate measures that have been or should be used by institutional 
investors to make recommendations to the company. Figure 5.42 summarises 
what percentage of the interviewees mentioned each of the categorised 
measures. Table 5.8 summarises the qualitative answers and comments of the 
interviewees to the open-ended question regarding the measures used by 
institutional investors to make recommendations to companies. The comments 
are sorted according to the categorised measures. Figure 5.42 and table 5.8 
are closely related . Together, they give an indication of what the participants 
said about the various categorised measures and how often they were 
mentioned. 
As the results show (see Figure 5.42) , the two most important measures for 
making recommendations mentioned by the interviewees were communication 
(70%) and the use of voting rights (40%). The second most important measures 
for making recommendations mentioned by the respondents were expertise 
(25%) and research and analysis (20%) . The respondents mentioned the 
following measures less frequently: a seat in the supervisory board (10%), 
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shareholder collaboration (10%), investment horizon (5%) and self-interest 
(5%). Within communication , personal communication (45%) was felt to be the 
most important measure, followed by third-party communication (25%), written 
communication (20%) and contact to the supervisory board (15%) . 
Figure 5.42: Measures used to make recommendations to companies. 
Recommendations to the companv · important and typical measures I percentage 0 entroes 
Communications 
Communication 
_______ 70% 
Use of voting rights 1 40% Personal communication .............. 45% 
Expertise _ 25% 
Research and analysis ..... 20% 
Seat In the supervisory board ,.. 10% 
Shareholder collaboration - 10% 
1 
Investment horizon • 5% 
Self-interest • 5% 
Other _ 10% 
Source : Petra Nix. 
Third perty communication 
Written communication 
___ 25% 
___ 20% 
Contact 10 supervisory boartl _ 15% 
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Table 5.8: Measures used to make recommendations - selected 
comments of respondents. 
Communication Intense dialogue with management board. Our company is not a target for 
critics since we meet our forecasts. 
One-on-ones are the most widespread. From an investor viewpoint, central 
themes are addressed time and again in various meetings. The 
recommendations are reinforced either by advising against a company 
decision or by pushing company decisions. 
Direct enquiries e.g., in form of letters to supervisory board, send out a 
strong signal and generally have a greater effect on the company's 
behaviour than if the theme were dealt with on the 'working level'. 
Detailed publication of the investment strategy and its conditions so that the 
company can better comprehend the way in which investors make their 
decisions. 
The media and the public is, however, an extremely bad way as it can spark 
off a response of defiance on the part of management. However, the case of 
Deutsche Borse highlights the fact that arrogance on the part of senior 
management is not an example worth following. A difficult issue is that 
recommendations are sometimes 'spontaneous ideas' which do not tally with 
management's perspective of things. 
Approaching the public by media campaigns is an effective tool. In some 
cases rumours can also be circulated. By doing so, public awareness of 
investors can be heightened and campaigns of this kind ca be used for own 
PR purposes. 
Expertise Companies can get good feedback on account of their market and can 
collect sector knowledge. 
Recommendations frequently make sense, even if they are not directly 
realised on a one-on-one basis. However, they do provide valuable ideas 
and suggestions. Institutional investors can develop into 'sparring partner' of 
the management or the supervisory board. 
The network of investors can be exploited to the benefit of the company 
Investors need to build up further specialist knowledge through further 
specialisation. A high degree of specialist knowledge exists, yet it is not 
possible to assess market opportunities and risks in certain sub-market in 
sufficient detail. 
AGM / Use of AGM is a good platform for public appearances - e.g., holding a speech-
voting rights and exerting influence on the AGM agenda. However, this is not the case 
with Anglo-Saxon investors who do not make use of this discussion forum. 
Proxy fight at the AGM is the 'ultima ratio'. The chairman of the supervisory 
board has the task of acting as a moderator and must display sufficient 
independence. The integrity of the management also plays a key role here, 
and decisions/actions should not be characterised by 'laziness' or suggest 
that management is pursuing its own interest. 
Research and Company does indeed pay attention to well-written sell-side studies. 
Analysis Competitive analysis and SWOT analysis, which are able to identify where 
potentials exist and which are based on a comparison between the goals and 
the current status. 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Value added by making recommendations 
A total of 74% of the respondents are convinced that institutional investors add 
value to the company when they make recommendations. Only 26% agreed 
somewhat. The mean is 2.11 (see Figure 5.43). 
Figure 5.43: Institutional investors add value to the company when they 
make recommendations. 
o = I strongly disagree, 1 = I somewhat agree, 2 = I agree, 3 = I strongly agree, 4 = I very 
strongly agree 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Handling of recommendations within the company 
The answers of the respondents indicate that there is not a common and 
structured way in which the recommendations of institutional investors are 
handled within the companies. The IRO stated that the recommendations are 
passed on to the responsible parties like CEO and CFO and flow into a 
constructive discussion in the company. The most important advantages of the 
recommendations are that they are impartial , are founded on a good knowledge 
base about the industry and that they shed new light on the circumstances. The 
latter could help to establish an objective, insightful discussion without prejudice 
or internal company politics. Furthermore, institutional investors frequently 
express 'uncomfortable truths' and their critical points help to sharpen the 
arguments of the management and supervisory boards. 
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Some respondents perceive disadvantages since it is not without problem to 
use the recommendations of institutional investors as a 'filter function'. But that 
seems to be a problem if companies do not deal openly with critical, difficult and 
negative remarks. My own experiences have proven that the discussion of 
critical issues within a company can quickly lead to problems because the 
parties may be too sensitive, which results in an emotional and less constructive 
discussion. Another aspect is that management can hide behind the arguments 
of the institutional investors and fail to observe its own responsibility. 
Furthermore, self-interest and the individual operations of institutional investors 
could have a negative impact because they could lead to unproductive 
discussions, which waste time and delay the decision making process. As a 
result they lead to inefficient processes. 
In order to pursue a more structured way to have a better and stronger impact 
on internal company discussions, independent and regular perception analyses 
are conducted. The opinions and views of the institutional investors are 
collected through a structured interview process with personal or telephone 
interviews conducted by an independent consultant. All of the comments and 
opinions are then analysed and clustered in a structured way. With such a 
process, the management board can get a better feeling about the most 
important and critical issues. Furthermore, the results of such a study can be 
circulated to the appropriate divisions and also be used to communicate the 
most important and relevant facts to the members of the supervisory board in 
order to give them an overview of the opinions that the institutional investors 
have about the company. 
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Recommendations to company - summary of results 
The summarised results in Table 5.9 show the view of the interviewees and how 
institutional investors make recommendations to the company. Furthermore, the 
table tells us what the means of the closed-ended question tells us with respect 
to the various aspects used in this variable. The interviewees see the extent to 
which institutional investors make recommendations to the company as 
medium. The most common measure used is communication and the 
participants agree that institutional investors have the ability to identify potential. 
Table 5.9: Recommendations to companies - the role of institutional 
investors in German companies. 
Aspects of the question Results and meanings of 
the answers 
Extent to which institutional investors make Mean = 2.84 = medium 
recommendations 
Top measure for making recommendations Communication 
Added value of the recommendations Mean = 2.11 = agree 
Source: Petra Nix. 
5.2.5 Inducing changes in corporate strategy 
The fifth variable 'inducing changes in corporate strategy' belongs to the 
influence section. It is argued that institutional investors play a certain role in 
prompting change (Gillian and Starks, 2003) and that they can force company 
executives to undertake strategic actions (Connelley et aI., 2010). 
Extent to which institutional investors prompt change 
A closed-ended question was used to ask the interviewees the extent to which 
they believed various types of institutional investors, like insurances, pension 
fund, hedge funds, etc., prompt change in corporate strategy. The scale of this 
variable has good internal consistency. In this study, the Cronbach alpha 
coefficient was 0.83. 
In General. The majority of the interviewees (55%) are convinced that 
institutional investors induce change in corporate strategy to a medium or 
strong extent. Less than half (45%) of the respondents view the extent to which 
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institutional investors induce changes in corporate strategy as weak or very 
weak. The mean is 2.55 (see Figure 5.44) . 
Figure 5.44: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (general). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Banks . A total of 42% think that banks induce change in corporate strategy to a 
medium or strong extent. One respondent who gave a response of 'strong ' 
explicitly stated that he meant investment banks and not commercial banks. 
Slightly more than half (52.6%) of the respondents view the extent to which 
banks induce changes in corporate strategy as weak or very weak. One 
respondent is convinced that banks do not prompt change at all . One 
interviewee had no opinion . The mean is 2.32 (see Figure 5.45) . 
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Figure 5.45: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (banks). 
o = none at ali , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong ,S = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Insurance. Only 20% think that insurances induce change in corporate strategy 
to a medium extent. A total of 70% of the respondents view the extent to which 
insurances induce changes in corporate strategy as weak or very weak. Only 
10% of the respondents are convinced that insurances do not prompt change at 
all . The mean is 1.8 (see Figure 5.46) . 
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Figure 5.46: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (insurance). 
o = none at all . 1 = very weak. 2 = weak . 3 = medium. 4 = strong . 5 = very strong. 6 = no 
opinion 
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Pension funds . A total of 63.2% think that pension funds induce change in 
corporate strategy to a medium or strong extent. A third (31.6%) of the 
respondents view the extent to which pension funds induce changes in 
corporate strategy as weak or very weak. Only 5% of the respondents are 
convinced that pension funds do not prompt change at all. One interviewee had 
no opinion on the behaviour of pension funds. The mean is 2.58 (see Figure 
5.47). 
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Figure 5.47: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (pension funds) . 
o = none at all . 1 = very weak. 2 = weak. 3 = medium. 4 = strong. 5 = very strong. 6 = no 
opinion 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Hedge funds. A total of 75% of the interviewees think that the extent to which 
hedge funds induce change in corporate strategy is medium to very strong. 
Only 25% of the respondents view the extent to which hedge funds prompt 
changes in corporate strategy as weak or very weak. The mean is 3.15 (see 
Figure 5.48). 
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Figure 5.48 To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (hedge funds). 
o = none at all, 1 = very weak, 2 = weak , 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Endowments. Just 18.8% of the respondents think that endowments induce 
change in corporate strategy to a medium extent. A total of 62.6% of the 
respondents view the extent to which endowments induce changes in corporate 
strategy as weak or very weak. Only 18.8% of the respondents view the extent 
to which endowments prompt changes as none at all and four respondents had 
no opinion. The mean is 1.5 (see Figure 5.49) . 
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Figure 5.49: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (endowments). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Sovereign wealth funds . Slightly more than a quarter (28%) of the 
interviewees think that the extent to which SWF induce changes in corporate 
strategy is medium to strong . More than half (61 %) of the respondents view the 
extent to which SWF induce changes in corporate strategy as weak or very 
weak. Only 10% of the respondents view the extent to which SWF prompt 
changes as none at all and two interviewees had no opinion. The mean is 2.0 
(see Figure 5.50). 
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Figure 5.50: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (SWF). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak , 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Private Equity. A total of 75% of the interviewees think that the extent to which 
private equity funds induce changes in corporate strategy is medium to very 
strong . Slightly over a third (35%) of the interviewees responded with weak or 
very weak. The mean is 3.3 (see Figure 5.51) 
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Figure 5.51: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (private equity). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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German funds. Only 35% of the interviewees think that the extent to which 
German funds induce change in corporate strategy is medium to strong. A total 
of 60% of the respondents view the extent of the influence of German funds in 
prompting changes in corporate strategy as weak or very weak. Only 5% think 
that they do not induce change at all. The mean is 2.05 (see Figure 5.52). 
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Figure 5.52: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (German funds). 
o = none at all , 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong , 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
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Foreign funds . A total of 60% of the interviewees think that the extent to wh ich 
foreign funds induce change in corporate strategy is medium to strong. A 
response of weak or very weak was given by 40% of the interviewees. The 
mean is 2.8 (see Figure 5.53) . 
Figure 5.53: To what extent do institutional investors make 
recommendations to the company? (foreign funds). 
o = none at all, = very weak, 2 = weak , 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong, 6 = no 
opinion 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Measures used to prompt change 
In an open-ended question , the participants were asked to name up to five of 
the most important and appropriate measures that have been or should be used 
by institutional investors to prompt changes in corporate strategy. Figure 5.54 
summarises what percentage of the interviewees mentioned each of the 
categorised measures. Table 5.10 summarises the qualitative answers and 
comments of the interviewees to the open-ended question about the measures 
used by institutional investors to prompt change. The comments are sorted 
according to the categorised measures. Figure 5.54 and Table 5.10 are closely 
related . Together, they give an indication of what the participants sa id about the 
various categorised measures and how often they were mentioned. 
Once again, the respondents mentioned communication (70%) and the use of 
voting rights (60%) most frequently as important measures to prompt change in 
corporate strategy. Other measures, which playa minor role are a seat in the 
supervisory board (25%), ownership (20%), stakeholder collaboration (15%), 
expertise (10%) and research and analysis (5%). 
Figure 5.54: Measures used to prompt change in corporate strategy. 
Inducing changes in corporate strategy - important and typical m easures I 
percentage of entries 
Communications 
Communication 
Use of voting rights 
______ 70% 
_____ 60% 
Personal communication ---___ 50% 
Seat in the supervisory board _ 25% 
Ownership _ 20% 
SharehOlder coliaboratJon _ 15% 
, 
Research and analysis • 5% 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Contact of supervisory board 
Written communication 
___ 30% 
___ 25'" 
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Table 5.10: Measures used to prompt change in corporate strategy -
selected comments by the respondents. 
Communication A change brought about. for example. as a result of much discussion. is the 
issue of a long-term dividend pledge. In response to many suggestions and 
discussions - along the lines of 'if you keep at it long enough you'll get there 
in the end'. Now the company has issued a long-term dividend pledge for the 
first time and reported on it also in the annual report 2010. 
Hold open discussions - also alongside the regular one-on-ones. 
The best and most effective tool is a direct. non-public dialogue with 
management. An open confrontation is most likely not helpful and creates 
only losers on both sides. 
Involvement of the media and the public, if the talks in the one-on-ones do 
not lead to any results. 
Participating in a public dialogue on key issues such as governance issues 
and corporate responsibility issues. 
AGM/Use of Influence the voting at the AGM. 
voting rights Threatening to disclose the stake and announce that this will be brought into 
the AGM. In the event of threats the AGM can be of great importance. 
Seat in the SB Nominate candidates to the supervisory boards to be represented. 
--
Meaningful Institutional investors diversify the risk and on account of their diversification 
stake strategy they generally have little influence - in other words they are not in 
the 'driver seat'. 
To prompt change institutional investors need to hold a long-term position in 
order to be successful. Furthermore, it may be necessary for them to 
increase their share holdings. 
To bring about changes, majorities among the institutional investors are 
needed - i.e., concerted action. However, it is not sufficient to just oppose 
decisions, an alternative strategy must also be developed. 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Value added by prompting change in strategy. Over half (58%) of the 
respondents are convinced that institutional investors add value to the company 
when they prompt change. Only 26% agreed somewhat and 16% strongly 
disagreed. One interviewee had no opinion. The mean is 1.74 (see Figure 
5.55). 
184 
Figure 5.55: Institutional investors add value to the company when they 
prompt change. 
0=1 strongly disagree, 1 =1 somewhat agree, 2=1 agree, 3=1 strongly agree, 4=1 very strongly 
agree 
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Common company situations and events for prompting change 
In this open-ended question, the interviewees were asked to name up to five 
common company situations and events in which institutional investors prompt 
change. In total , the 20 respondents named 65 events and situations. These 
were clustered into 10 categories (see Figure 5.56) . The respondents cited the 
underperformance (55%) of a company as the most important one, followed by 
a crisis situation , corporate finance and remuneration issues. Based on the 
statements of the interviewees, it can be assumed that management quality 
(25%), shareholder remuneration (25%), sustainability issues (10%) and the 
capital expenditure of a company (5%) are aspects that playa minor role in 
terms of the activities that prompt the institutional investor to induce change. 
The comments made by the participants are summarised in Table 5.11 . 
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Figure 5.56: Most common company situations for prompting change. 
Inducing changes in corporate strategy· most common company situations I 
percentage of entries 
Underperformance 
Special company situations/crises 45% 
Corporate finance 45% 
Management remuneration 45% 
M&A ,. _________ 40% 
Business portfolio 
Management quahty 
Shareholder remuneration 
~ 
.. _________ 40% 
_____ 25% 
_ _____ 25% 
, 
Sustainability issues _ 10% 
Capital expenditure J- 5% 
Source: Petra Nix. 
55% 
Table 5.11 Company situations in which institutional investors prompt 
change - selected comments of the interviewees. 
Crisis/ The likelihood is generally higher in difficult company situations and in 
Underperformance situations in which the company is underperforming 
Bad operating performance compared to peer group 
Bad press 
Fraud/corruption/mismanagement 
Corporate finance Measures to ra ise equity , borrowing capital , structured finance 
Business portfoliO Lack of acceptance of corporate strategy 
Business model end of life cycle 
Structure of the business portfolio 
Management Influence of shareholders regarding remuneration in Germany - as in 
remuneration many other EU states Germany now follows the EU recommendations 
to allow shareholders a non-binding (consultative) vote on the 
remuneration system (but not the individual compensation) . Although 
the law has only now come into effect, most large companies have 
already adopted such a vote in this year's AGMs (26 of 30 DAX 
companies; Heidelberger Cement: 55% of shareholders voted against 
remuneration structure ; Deutsche Bank: only 58% agreed and at 
Deutsche B6rse only 53% agreed due to voting recommendations of 
Risk Metrics) 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Inducing change - summary of results 
The summarised results of the variable 'inducing change' in Table 5.12 show 
how the interviewees viewed how institutional investors induce change. 
Furthermore, the table tells us what the means of the closed-end question from 
the descriptive statistic tells us. The results indicate that the interviewees see 
the extent to which institutional investors in German companies prompt change 
as weak to medium. The most common measure for prompting change is 
communication. The interviewees agree that institutional investors can add 
value by inducing change. The most common company situation that prompts 
institutional investors to induce change is a company's underperformance. 
Table 5.12: Inducing change - the role of institutional investors in German 
companies. 
Aspects of the question Results and meanings of the answers 
Extent to which institutional investors in Mean = 2.55 = medium/weak 
German companies prompt change 
Top measure for prompting change Communication 
Added value in inducing change Mean = 1.75 = agree 
Company situation that prompts institutional Underperformance 
investors to induce change 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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5.2.6 Execution of institutional power 
The sixth variable 'execution of institutional power' belongs to the influence 
section. This variable is the most powerful and consequently the one with the 
highest responsibility for institutional investors. If the executive management 
and/or the supervisory board of the company do not respond adequately to the 
concerns of institutional investors, they can use their voice and/or collaborate 
with other shareholders in order to prompt change. Therefore, the execution of 
institutional power is not in the mutual best interest of the institutional investors 
or the company's management since there may be different opinions and 
objectives with regard to particular issues. 
Execution of power 
In a closed-ended question, the participants where asked how they perceived 
the way that institutional investors exercise power. The various criteria for 
measuring the execution of power are no voice, sell the shares, loyalty, 
personal discussions, proposals to the AGM and a seat in the supervisory 
board. The scale of this variable has low internal consistency. In this study, the 
Cronbach alpha coefficient was 0.53, which may be common in scales with 
fewer than ten items. In this case, it may be more appropriate to report the 
mean inter-item correlation for the items. The recommended optimal range for 
the inter-item correlation is 0.2 to 0.4 (Pallant, 2007). This level was not reached 
in every case (see Table 5.13). 
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Table 5.13: Inter-item correlation matrix - how do institutional investors 
exercise their power. 
How do 
institutional 
investors No voice Sell Loyalty Discussion AGM Seat in SB 
exercise their 
power 
No voice 1,000 ,290 -,181 -,085 -,152 -,104 
Sell ,290 1,000 -,285 -,190 ,164 ,118 
Loyalty -,181 -,285 1,000 ,079 ,579 ,659 
Discussion -,085 -,190 .079 1,000 ,135 ,142 
AGM -,152 ,164 ,579 ,135 1,000 ,879 
Seat in SB -,104 ,118 ,659 ,142 ,879 1,000 
Source: Petra Nix. 
No voice. It was not easy for the respondents to make clear statements about 
this measure. Usually, companies hardly recognise if institutional investors 
exercise power through the no voice and no feedback measure. Nevertheless, 
the majority of the respondents (55%) perceived the measure of no voice in the 
exercise of institutional power as medium to very strong. Less than a quarter 
(20%) of the interviewees said that the extent to which this measure is 
exercised is weak or very weak. For 25% of the interviewees, it is non-existent. 
The mean is 2.25 (see Figure 5.57). 
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Figure 5.57: How do institutional investors exercise their power - no 
voice/no feedback. 
o = none at all, 1 = very weak, 2 = weak , 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong 
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Exit/Sell the shares. The vast majority of the respondents (85%) said that 
institutional investors exit the company by selling the stock. Just 25% said that 
the extent to which this measure is exercised is weak or very weak. For another 
25% of the interviewees, it is non-existent. The mean is 3.25 (see Figure 5.58) . 
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Figure 5.58: How do institutional investors exercise their power - exit/sell 
the shares. 
o = none at ali, 1 = very weak, 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong,S = very strong 
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Loyalty. One respondent did not answer this question . The majority of the 
respondents (63%) perceived that institutional investors exercise their power 
through loyal behaviour vis-a-vis the company on a medium to strong level. 
Here it seems that there is an inconsistency with regard to the sale of shares. 
An explanation for these results might be that the respondents experience 
different attitudes or positions from various institutional investors or that it is not 
easy for the corporate managers to exactly judge how institutional investors 
exercise their power in this regard. Slightly over a third (32%) of the 
interviewees responded with weak or very weak. For 5% of the interviewees it is 
non-existent. The mean is 2.56 (see Figure 5.59). 
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Figure 5.59: How do institutional investors exercise their power - loyalty. 
o = none at all . 1 = very weak, 2 = weak . 3 = medium. 4 = strong. 5 = very strong 
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Personal discussions. One respondent did not answer this question. Almost 
all of the respondents (90%) perceived that institutional investors exercise their 
power through personal discussions with the company on a medium to very 
strong level. Just 10% gave a response of weak. The mean is 3.68 (see Figure 
5.60) . 
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Figure 5.60: How do institutional investors exercise their power - personal 
discussions. 
o = none at all, 1 = very weak, 2 = weak , 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong 
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Proposals to the AGM. One respondent did not answer this question . Almost 
half of the respondents (47.4%) perceived that institutional investors exercise 
their power via proposals to the AGM on a medium to very strong level. A total 
of 47.4% perceived the engagement of institutional investors in the AGM as 
weak or very weak. Just 5.3% feel that institutional investors do not exercise 
their power via proposals to the AGM as none at all . The mean is 2.47 (see 
Figure 5.61) . 
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Figure 5.61: How do institutional investors exercise their power -
proposals to the AGM. 
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Seat in the supervisory board. One respondent did not answer this question. 
Almost half of the respondents (47 .3%) perceived that institutional investors 
exercise their power via seats in the supervisory board on a medium to very 
strong level. More than a quarter of the respondents (26.3%) perceived their 
ambition to be part of the supervisory board as weak or very weak. Another 
26.3% view their exercise of power via a seat in the supervisory board as none 
at all. The mean is 2.11 (see Figure 5.62) . 
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Figure 5.62: How do institutional investors exercise their power - seat in 
SB. 
o = none at ali, 1 = very weak , 2 = weak, 3 = medium, 4 = strong, 5 = very strong 
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Measures used to exercise institutional power 
In an open-ended question, the participants were asked to name up to five 
measures that have been or should be used by institutional investors to 
exercise their institutional power. The answers are categorised into five 
measures. Figure 5.63 summarises what percentage of the interviewees named 
each of the categorised measures. Table 5.14 summarises the qualitative 
answers and comments of the interviewees to the open-ended question about 
the measures used by the institutional investors to execute their institutional 
power. The comments are sorted according to the categorised measures . 
Figure 5.62 and Table 5.14 are closely related . Together, they give an 
indication of what the participants said about the various categorised measures 
and how often they are mentioned. 
The criteria most frequently mentioned by the respondents were communication 
(65%) and use of voting rights (60%). In contrast, the measures of supervisory 
board (30%) , collaboration (25%) and ownership (5%) were mentioned much 
less. Within communication , personal communication (50%) and third-party 
communication (40%) were brought up the most. 
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Figure 5.63: Measures used to exercise institutional power. 
Exercise of institutional power· measures to exercise the institutional power I 
percentage of entries 
Communications 
Communication 65% 
Use of voting nghts 
______ 60% 
Personal communication 50% 
Seat In the supervisory board ~ 30% Third pany communication 
Contact to supervisory board 
40% 
20% Shareholder collaboration _ 25% 
Ownership • 5% Written communicahon • 5% 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Tab le 5.14: Measures to execute institutional power - selected comments 
of res pondents. 
Communication Mainly Anglo Saxon investors such as HF, PE and mutual funds , less by 
German institutional investors, carry out the contact with the management. 
Generally, HF and PE have a clear strategy and position vis a vis the 
company and know how to enhance the value of a company and how to 
achieve shareholder value. 
By exerting their influence, foreign investors attempt to bring about a change 
in behaviour and in some cases to assert their interests. However, when it 
comes to accepting responsibility for their engagement, e.g., by accepting a 
seat on the supervisory board , this frequently meets with a show of 
reluctance on the part of the investors. However, a long-term commitment to 
the company would be necessary for this so that the influence cannot be 
geared merely to a short-term benefit. 
Compared to the UK, a member of the board of the directors - in particular 
that of the chairman - maintains greater contact with the investors. In my 
function as chairman of the compensation committee of a FTSE 100 
company, I am more frequently in contact with the 10 most important 
investors. For example, investors receive a letter explaining the remuneration 
system and there is also great feedback , more than in my position as a 
member of the supervisory board in a DAX 30 company. 
AGM Suggest themes at AGM for approval. However, if these have not been 
coordinated with management this masks conflict potential and can lead to 
confrontation. By stating this we do not mean the contribution of private! 
small shareholders who frequently address abstruse things in discussions. 
The headline in the German newspaper 'Handelsblatt' in 2000 announcing 
that an institutional investor was going to be expressing his interest at an 
AGM was at that time quite novel. 
Seat in SB Investors should strive for a position in the supervisory board . 
We'd like to have a number of institutional investors or their representatives 
in supervisory boards. We have already held such discussions with a 
German mutual fund. 
Institutional investors should be more strongly represented on the investor 
side of the supervisory board since they are the embodiment of the 
shareholders. The German system is somewhat inconsistent here . While 
workers ' representatives consistently represent the employee side, the same 
cannot be said of the investor side. Here, former managing directors for 
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example are also represented . 
Investors should ask for a seat in the supervisory board. 
Investors should propose their own candidates for supervisory board. 
Collaboration Instances in which various investors act in concert can raise the likelihood of 
a goal being reached and thus also increase the pressure on management. 
Meaningful The opinion of an investor with a high stake naturally carries more weight. 
stake Hence the disclosure of a shareholding plays an important role . The statutory 
disclosure obligation threshold thus acts as a signal for companies . The 
'society anonymous' is thus not the right way . The raising of stakes acts as a 
positive signal. 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Value added by exercising the power 
The participants were asked about their agreement in a closed-ended question 
to the statement 'Institutional investors increase the value of the company when 
they exercise their power'. A total of 75% of the respondents are convinced that 
institutional investors add value to the company when they exercise their 
institutional power. Just 25% somewhat agreed with the statement. The mean is 
2.1 (see Figure 5.64). 
Figure 5.64: Institutional investors increase the value of the company 
when they exercise power. 
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Exercise of power and company situation/events . In an open-ended 
question, the interviewees were asked to name up to five common company 
situations and events in which institutional investors exercise their power. The 
categories of the various situations (see Figure 5.65) are the same as the ones 
for the variable 'inducing changes'. However, the respondents mentioned them 
differently in terms of frequency. The two most important company situations 
mentioned were business portfolio (55%) and crisis (50%). 
Figure 5.65: Company situations in which institutional investors exercise 
their power. 
Exercise of institutional power - most common company situations I 
percentage of entries 
Business portfolio 
Cnsis 
______________ 50% 
Management quality 
Underperformance 
M&A 
Shareholder remunerations 
_______ 25% 
25°;' 
____ 15% 
Corporate finance 
Sustainabilily Issues 
Management remuneration - 5% 
10% 
, 
CapItal expenditure - 5% 
Source: Petra Nix. 
40% 
40% 
Exercise of institutional power - summary of results 
50% 
The summarised results in Table 5.15 show how interviewees view the potential 
of institutional investors to exercise their power. Furthermore , the table explains 
what the means of the closed-ended questions tells us according to the various 
aspects used in this variable . The interviewees perceive that the most common 
way institutional investors exercise their power is through personal discussions. 
A seat in the supervisory board is used much less frequently as a means of 
exercising power. Therefore, a consistent result is obtained with communication 
as the most frequently mentioned measure. The participants agree that 
institutional investors can add value when they exercise their power. Changes 
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in the business portfolio and a company's crisis are the most common 
situations, in which investors use their power. 
Table 5.15: Exercise of institutional power - the role of institutional 
investors in German companies. 
Aspects of the question Results and meanings of the answers 
No voice - no feedback Mean = 2.25 = weak/medium 
Exit/sell the share Mean = 3.25 = weak 
Loyalty Mean = 2.56 = weak/medium 
Personal discussions Mean = 3.68 = strong 
Proposals to the AGM Mean = 2.47 = weak/medium 
Seat in the supervisory board Mean = 2.11 = weak 
Top measure for exercising power Communication 
Added value by exercising power Mean = 2.1 = agree 
Company situation prompting institutional Business portfolio/crisis 
investors to exercise their power 
Source: Petra Nix. 
5.3 Future role of institutional investors 
In an open-ended question, the interviewees were asked to elaborate on the 
advantages and disadvantages, as well as the general issues, of how they think 
the role of institutional investors in corporate governance is developing. This 
question is a kind of wrap-up question and does not belong to the variables of 
the research model. The 48 entries are clustered into four different categories 
(see Figure 5.66). More than half (55%) of the respondents believe that the role 
of institutional investors in corporate governance will develop positively. A total 
of 25% of the respondents had a more neutral stance and just 10% expressed 
negative aspects. Most of the respondents expect a stronger development of 
the role of institutional investors in corporate governance in terms of more 
shareholder engagement (85%). The other aspects mentioned by the 
interviewees were dialogue (30%), expertise (20%) and regulation (20%). The 
comments made by the interviewees are presented in Table 5.16. 
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Figure 5.66: Future role of institutional investors in corporate governance. 
Development of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance I p rcontage of ntn s 
Shareholder engagement 
Dialogue 30% 
Expertise _ 20% 
RegulatIOn _ 20% 
Source: Petra Nix. 
85% Positive a peets e:- 55% Neutral 
NegaUve aspects ~ 10% 
Table 5.16: Measures of the execution of institutional power - selected 
comment. 
Engagement 
(positive) 
Stronger role of institutional investors - in particular Anglo Saxon investors -
can be advantageous for companies. Institutional investors' exertion of influence 
can result in more rational decisions being made. 
Institutional investors' exertion of influence will increase. This can already be 
seen in the growing share of SRI funds. At our company, the share of socially 
responsible investments currently lies at 2% to 3% . Thus , SRI investors have 
grown into an important client group. This is also evidenced by the fact that, for 
example, pension funds have taken up the issue of dealing with trade unions in 
USA. 
The trend towards more vociferously expressing dissatisfaction over strategy 
and performance will increase. Hence, constructive dialogue, openness to 
suggestions and mutual respect for investor's affairs is of great importance. 
Institutional investors will receive ever more capital. This will promote the trend 
towards greater shareholder engagement. In particular, the influence of foreign 
investors will increase. 
Institutional investors will increasingly pay attention to corporate governance. 
They will exert more influence as they are the owners . This can already be seen 
in institutions such as F&C, RCM and Hermes. They publish and document their 
engagement (e.g., voting behaviour at AGMs) . 
Tough challenges of performance and competition from other asset classes 
demand 'alpha' generation through active engagement in governance matters. 
This is due to: (1) growing transparency of investment results , (2) demand for 
absolute return strategies , (3) lower profitability due to increasing competition in 
the institutional field , (4) stronger role of consultants , (5) higher performance 
awareness, also by retail clients. 
We generally expect institutional investors to become more active and to also 
organise themselves better in future. They will increasingly use the media as 
'allies '. This will also raise the awareness of other shareholders. However, the 
interests of investors should be made public accompanied by the ability to 
evaluate these interests - it will no longer be possible to simply act in the back 
room. 
More engagement of institutional investors can lead to major changes in 
German nomination procedures. It can bring more transparency and more 
openness to the selection process. It can break up the 'closed door attitude '. 
Also, the institutional investors need to be a good role model. This means that 
they disclose their investment strategy and what investment opportunities they 
are looking for. They need to provide information about their engagement and 
how they execute their votinq riqhts. Last but not least, they need to disclose 
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their voting behaviour in the AGM. 
Institutional investors such as CalPERS and TIAA-CREF in the US, Hermes and 
Aviva in the UK, ABP and PGGM in the Netherlands and DWS Investments in 
Germany have been instrumental in setting international standards for good 
governance. 
Dialogue Talks with investors can be held as a 'strategic dialogue' in which not only the 
company's information is passed on in the form of a 'one way street' but in 
which the concerns are also voiced. 
Today, there are better technical possibilities of transferring information via 
various new media (e.g., em ails, SMS, social media). Nowadays, a company 
can no longer hide away in a fortified castle in difficult company situations. 
Discussions with well-informed and well-prepared investors are always 
rewarding. 
Proactive dialogue is in general helpful. 
In general, companies should openly and constructively approach this target 
group, derive an outside perspective and obtain feedback 
Engagement In general, no major changes are expected - the status quo remains. In our 
(neutral) company corporate governance is exemplary - there is no cause of criticism. In 
some cases, institutional investors have claimed that they were searching for 
the 'hair in the soup' as corporate management was so exemplary. As before, 
the central themes of regular dialogue will remain remuneration and corporate 
strategy are relevant themes. 
In future, companies will have to make special efforts to understand the financial 
community, in this case the buy-side, with regard to investment style or 
investment philosophy so as to further develop the shareholder base in 
accordance with the priorities of the company. 
The criterion of 'independence' and the material independence of investors is 
very important. This particularly applies to institutional investors, the owners/co-
owners of their own fund. 
Expertise Institutional investors can offer their industry knowledge to the supervisory 
board 
The key role of institutional investors is to demand state of the art and best 
practice governance. Influence can be exerted either through dialogue with the 
supervisory board and/or management and by voting at AGMs. By doing so, 
investors partially employ tools of the supervisory board and can eradicate 
weaknesses. 
Institutional investors can offer the company a committed and professional 
external perspective because they generally have a good view of things; 
specialist knowledge and sector expertise and can also throw an independent 
light on things. Owing to the large number of investments and as a result of the 
peer group comparison, they can form an objective and substantial opinion. 
Engagement Very often institutional investors have a lack of expertise and qualification 
negative 
'Predatory shareholders' can block a company 
Increase in bureaucracy, cost increases, efficiency losses 
Particular interests 
Break-up of the company for the sole purpose of generating liquidity revenues 
Regulation Corporate governance has been very strongly internalised in Germany in recent 
years. In the meantime, there is a very high regulatory density due also not least 
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to the declaration of compliance. The role of institutional investors has thus 
been accounted for in the development of the German corporate governance 
code owing to the fact that key institutional investors played a role in shaping 
the corporate governance area. The regulatory density is meanwhile so high 
that the limit has practically been reached. 
It is still difficult to explain the German two-tier board system to the Anglo Saxon 
region. Investors from characteristically Anglo-Saxon regions still lack a degree 
of understanding for the German board system. L-________ L-_____________________________________________________ ~ 
Source: Petra Nix. 
5.4 Relationship with institutional investors 
Apart from the six variables, the interviewees were asked about their general 
relationship with institutional investors. This section provides an overview of 
those results. 
Frequency of contacts 
In a closed-ended question, the corporate managers were asked about their 
frequency of contacts (e.g., meetings, road shows, telephone calls) with 
institutional investors per year and if they felt that it was sufficient. The 
frequency of contact tended to be either just a few meetings of between 1 and 
20 per year or over 100 meetings per year (see Table 5.17 and Figure 5.67). 
Some respondents from the DAX 30 companies who had contact with 
institutional investors more than 100 times per year mentioned that the 
frequency was more than 600 times. The vast majority (90%) of the 
respondents think that their level of contacts to institutional investors is 
sufficient, whereas 10% had no opinion. None of the respondents had the 
impression that their frequency of contacts to institutional investors was 
insufficient. 
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Table 5.17: Frequency of contacts per year. 
Frequency Percent rvalid Percent !cumulative Percent 
rvalid 1 - 20 contacts 8 40.0 40.0 40.0 
21 - 50 contacts 1 5.0 5.0 45.0 
51 - 100 contacts 3 15.0 15.0 60.0 
above 100 contacts 8 40.0 40.0 100.0 
Total 20 100.0 100.0 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Figure 5.67: Frequency of contacts per year. 
o = none; 1 = 1 - 20 contacts , 21 - 50 contacts, 51 - 100 contacts, above 100 contacts 
Histogram 
Frequency of contact 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Institutional investors ' understanding of the strategy and business model 
of the company 
In a closed-ended question, the corporate managers were asked whether the 
institutional investors have a good understanding of the strategy and business 
model of the company. A good level of knowledge is a sound and necessary 
prerequisite to assume a position of responsib il ity in corporate governance. The 
scale of th is variable has good internal consistency. In this study, the Cronbach 
alpha coefficient was 0.9. 
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In general . The vast majority (90%) of the participants responded with agree to 
very strongly agree that institutional investors have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company. Only 10% responded with 
somewhat agree and none of the respondents disagreed. The mean is 3.4 (see 
Figure 5.68) . 
Figure 5.68: Institutional investors have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company - in general. 
Q=no opinion , 1 =1 strongly disagree, 2=1 somewhat agree, 3=1 agree, 4=1 strongly agree, 5=1 
very strongly agree 
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Banks . More than half (55%) of the participants responded with agree to very 
strongly agree that banks have a good understanding of the strategy and 
business model of the company. A total of 30% responded with somewhat 
agree, none of them disagreed and 15% had no opinion . The mean is 2.75 (see 
Figure 5.69) . 
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Figure 5.69: Institutional investors have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company - banks. 
Q=no opinion , 1 =1 strongly disagree, 2=1 somewhat agree, 3=1 agree, 4=1 strongly agree, 5=1 
very strongly agree 
Understanding of strategy I business model - Banks 
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Insurances. More than half (55%) of the participants responded with agree to 
very strongly agree that banks have a good understanding of the strategy and 
business model of the company. A total of 40% responded with somewhat 
agree, 5% with strongly disagree and 10% had no opinion. The mean is 2.5 
(see Figure 5.70) . 
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Figure 5.70: Institutional investors have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company - insurances. 
o = no opinion , 1 = I strongly disagree, 2 = I somewhat agree, 3 = I agree, 4 = I strongly agree, 
S = I very strongly agree 
Understanding of strategy I business model - Insurances 
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Pension funds . A good portion (65%) of the participants responded with agree 
to very strongly agree that pension funds have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company. A total of 25% responded with 
somewhat agree, 5% with strongly disagree and 5% had no opinion. The mean 
is 2.8 (see Figure 5.71). 
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Figure 5.71: Institutional investors have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company - pension funds . 
o = no opinion, 1 = I strongly disagree, 2 = I somewhat agree, 3 = I agree, 4 = I strongly agree, 
S = I very strongly agree 
Understanding of strategy / business model - Pension Funds 
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Hedge funds . The vast majority (95%) of the participants responded with agree 
to very strongly agree that hedge funds have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company. Only 5% had no opinion. The 
mean is 3.8 (see Figure 5.72) . 
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Figure 5.72: Institutional investors have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company - hedge funds. 
o = no opinion , 1 = I strongly disagree, 2 = I somewhat agree, 3 = I agree, 4 = I strongly agree, 
S = I very strongly agree 
Understanding of strategy I business model - Hedge fu nds 
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Endowments. A total of 40% of the participants responded with agree or 
strongly agree that endowments have a good understanding of the strategy and 
business model of the company. A total of 20% responded with somewhat 
agree, 5% with strongly disagree and 35% had no opinion. The mean is 1.75 
(see Figure 5.73) . 
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Figure 5.73 Institutional investors have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company - endowments. 
o = no opinion, 1 = I strongly disagree, 2 = I somewhat agree, 3 = I agree, 4 = I strongly agree, 
S = I very strongly agree 
Understanding of strategy I business model - Endowments 
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Sovereign wealth funds . More than half (55%) of the participants responded 
with agree to very strongly agree that SWF have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company. A total of 25% responded with 
somewhat agree and 20% had no opinion. The mean is 2.3 (see Figure 5.74). 
Therefore, it can be stated that SWF, in general , only have some level of 
knowledge about their investee companies. 
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Figure 5.74: Institutional investors have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company - SWF. 
o = no opinion, 1 = I strongly disagree, 2 = I somewhat agree, 3 = I agree, 4 = I strongly agree , 
S = I very strongly agree 
Understanding of strategy / business model - SWF 
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Private equity. The vast majority (90%) of the participants responded with 
agree to very strongly agree that private equity institutions have a good 
understanding of the strategy and business model of the company. A total of 
10% had no opinion. The mean is 3.65 (see Figure 5.75) . 
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Figure 5.75: Institutional investors have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company - private equity 
o = no opinion, 1 = I strongly disagree, 2 = I somewhat agree, 3 = I agree, 4 = I strongly agree, 
S = I very strongly agree 
Understanding of strategy / business model - Private Equity 
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German funds . The vast majority (90%) of the participants responded with 
agree to very strongly agree that German funds have a good understanding of 
the strategy and business model of the company. A total of 5% responded with 
somewhat agree and 5% had no opinion. The mean is 3.25 (see Figure 5.76). 
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Figure 5.76: Institutional investors have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company - German funds. 
o = no opinion, 1 = I strongly disagree, 2 = I somewhat agree, 3 = I agree, 4 = I strong ly agree, 
5 = I very strongly agree 
Understanding of strategy / business model - German funds 
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Source: Petra Nix. 
Foreign funds . Most (85%) of the participants responded with agree to very 
strongly agree that foreign funds have a good understanding of the strategy and 
business model of the company. A small amount (5%) responded with 
somewhat agree and 10% had no opinion. The mean is 3.15 (see Figure 5.77) . 
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Figure 5.77: Institutional investors have a good understanding of the 
strategy and business model of the company - foreign funds. 
o = no opinion , 1 = I strongly disagree, 2 = I somewhat agree. 3 = I agree, 4 = I strongly agree. 
5 = I very strongly agree 
Understanding of strategy I business model - Fore.ign funds 
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In this open-ended question, the corporate managers were asked what the 
major differences between the different types of institutional investors are. They 
were asked to name up to five differences. In total , there were 48 entries. The 
answers of the respondents are clustered into four categories, which are 
investment style , investment horizon, expertise and engagement (see Figure 
5.78 and Table 5.18). The majority of the answers referred to investment style 
(60%) , followed by investment horizon (50%). 
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Figure 5.78: Major differences between institutional investors. 
Differences between the different types of institutional investors I 
percentage of entries 
Investment style 60% 
Investment horizon 50% 
Expertise 35% 
Engagement 
~ _____ .30% 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Table 5.18: Selected comments on the major differences between 
investors. 
Investment Reward and participation of the investor in upgrading the value of the 
style company. Hedge funds and private equity, for example, have a greater 
incentive here than mutual funds 
Business model of the investor matters. For example: Mutual funds are under 
extreme performance pressure of their own, they do not manage their own 
funds but manage funds under commissioning of a beneficial owner. Hedge 
funds, which are primarily invested in their own funds , have more intensive 
dealings with the respective companies and their business development. A 
trend can also currently be noted that hedge funds focussing on certain 
sectors , e.g., global transport and logistics sector. They thus generate a high 
level of specialist knowledge and are well informed on current developments. 
Different styles like GARP, growth , value, income, index funds 
Anglo-Saxon investors approach the themes far more aggressively 
Investment banks, hedge funds and private equity are active players 
aggressively defending their own interest - even if they do not always 
understand the facts . All other investor types pursue a more corrective and 
accompanying role. 
Investment Long-term vs . short-term investors 
horizon Hedge funds pursue a short-term investment horizon. This can be a 
disadvantage for a company if the measures asserted by the hedge funds 
cannot be strategically held out. For example: too high distributions in the 
form of dividends or share buy-backs and if financial resources are 
consequently lacking to finance necessary strategic points . 
Classic institutional investors follow a long-term investment horizon. These 
are more strongly associated with the company and also identify with it, 
which is a welcomed fact by the company 
Hedge funds: the short-term orientation is potentially negative , but there are 
also positive effects like market efficiency, liquidity and risk taking . 
Major differences depend on the strategic time horizon of the investors 
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Engagement Pension and mutual funds: the classic institutional investors with most active 
management 
Insurance companies are large investors but often too passive 
Strategic investors with supervisory board representation vs. general type of 
institutional investor 
Aggressiveness. not in the negative sense but in the sense of dealing with 
the company and the engagement 
Investors who represent their interests themselves 
Expertise Insurances frequently invest their own funds and also do not have such 
highly-qualified personnel such as hedge funds 
Investor's level of knowledge. Hedge funds have the shrewdest and cleverest 
minds. They are fully acquainted with the subjects. 
The knowledge of the companies in larger capital markets and home markets 
of the companies (e.g., Germany. UK, USA) is comparatively better than in 
smaller capital markets (e.g., Spain. Italy) and in more distantly located 
capital markets (e.g .. Japan). 
Due to good research. hedge funds are better informed. They have good 
people - better than pension funds. 
Generally the most talented money managers can be found at the hedge 
funds. Hedge funds are very pushy. Due to the attractive remuneration 
structure, good managers are wooed off by the hedge funds. 
Others Specific investment idea to realise hidden value. e.g .. merger. break-up. cost 
reductions. optimising the capital structure. 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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5.5 Various statistical tests to explore relationships, check reliability and 
compare groups 
5.5.1 Distribution of the results 
In the first step, the un-weighted averages of the scores given in each closed-
ended question of the specific variable were added up to obtain a more condensed 
variable. The condensed variable is exactly related to the research model. Table 
5.19 shows the summarised and aggregated results of the analysis and the 
strength of the impact of each variable to the overall role of institutional investors 
in corporate governance expressed by the mean. The participants of the 
interviews perceive the role of institutional investors as weak in the following two 
variables: inducing changes ( mean = 2.36) and board nomination (mean = 2.4). 
Board oversight (mean = 2.45) is perceived as weak to medium. Within board 
oversight, a differentiation is made between the oversight of the management 
board (Vorstand), which is perceived as medium and oversight of the supervisory 
board members (Aufsichtsrat), which is perceived as weak by the study 
participants. The participants considered the role of institutional investors as 
weak/medium in the variable recommendations to companies (mean = 2.54). The 
participants in that research study view the role of institutional investors as 
medium in the following two variables 'exercise of institutional power' (mean = 
2.67) and 'improvement of company value' reached the highest score (mean = 
2.9). All in all, the results indicate that the study participants view the role of 
institutional investors as weak to medium since the overall mean is 2.51. There are 
no major differences between the role of the institutional investors regarding 
monitoring (=2.50) and influence (mean = 2.52). Both can be considered as weak 
to medium. 
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Table 5.19: Aggregated descriptive statistics of the six variables. 
0= none at all. 1 = very weak. 2 = weak. 3 = medium. 4 = strong. 5 = very strong. 
Variable of research model Mean Median Std. dey Skewness 
Board oversight 2.45 2.0 0.80131 -0.097 
Board nomination 2.395 2.405 0.92210 -0.604 
Improvement of company value 2.912 3.0950 0.72387 -0.754 
Monitoring 2.5023 2.4350 0.70477 -0.110 
Recommendations 2.5405 2.625 0.84124 -1.378 
Inducing changes in corporate strategy 2.3545 2.4 0.84055 -0.589 
Exercise of institutional power 2.664 2.71 0.69867 -0.167 
Influence 2.5197 2.4717 0.5660 0.204 
Total 2.5110 2.3892 0.56817 0.220 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Kurtosis 
-1.217 
1.312 
0.062 
-1.101 
--
3.152 
-0.68 
-0.989 
-0.750 
-1.004 
Skewness and kurtosis tests. The distribution of the results was analysed. 
According to Pallant (2007), the skewness value provides an indication of the 
symmetry of the distribution. Positive skewness values indicate positive skew, 
which are clustered to the left at the low values. Negative skewness values 
indicate a clustering of scores at the top, right-hand side of a graph. All six 
variables have negative skewness values (see Table 5.19). Therefore, all the 
variables are clustered on the right-hand side of the values. Kurtosis provides 
information about the 'peakedness' of the distribution. In a perfectly normal 
distribution, the skewness and kurtosis value is O. The results show that none of 
the six variables are normally distributed (see Table 5.19). This is not surprising 
since it is rather uncommon to have a normal distribution in the social sciences, 
like in the case of this research study (Pallant, 2007) and when there are small 
samples. Furthermore, the kurtosis value of the three variables - board oversight, 
inducing changes and the exercise of institutional power - indicate that the 
distribution is relatively flat and that there are many cases in the extremes. It can 
be concluded that the results are not normally distributed and do not have a bell-
shaped curve, which has the greatest frequency of scores in the middle. 
Additionally the results show more frequencies towards the extremes. 
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5.5.2 Reliability of the research model 
The reliability of the research model is important to show that it can be used in 
management practice to define and develop the role of institutional investors in 
corporate governance. Assuming the research model (see Figure 3.3) is a 
superordinate model to the six variables, the reliability can be tested for each 
variable and sub-variable but also for the overall model. Therefore, a Cronbach's 
alpha test for the entire research model was done. The analysis has shown very 
reliable results. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient is 0.795, which suggests good 
internal consistency reliability (Palla nt, 2007) of the entire research model. 
Furthermore, a factor analysis was conducted. In conducting a factor analysis of 
the six main variables and all their sub-variables variable interference was not 
detected. This also supports the conclusion that the research model is accurately 
formulated. 
5.5.3 Correlation 
Correlation analysis is used to describe the strength and direction of the linear 
relationship between two variables (Pallant, 2007). Therefore, according to the 
research model, the six variables were aggregated even further (see Figure 3.3) 
into two variables - influencing and monitoring. A scatter plot was generated for 
the preliminary analysis (see Figure 5.79), which gives a good idea of the nature of 
the relationship between influencing and monitoring. 
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Figure 5.79: Correlation of monitoring and influencing variable. 
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The scatter plot shows a roughly linear upward trend. This indicates a positive 
relationship between the monitoring and influencing variable. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient is 0.594 and the non-parametric correlation coefficient, the 
Spearman 's rho , is 0.606. These values indicate the strength of the relationship 
between the variables monitoring and influencing . According to Pallant (2007) , a 
coefficient of 0.594 is considered to be large (small r = 0.10 to 0.29; medium r = 
0.30 to 0.49; large r = 0.50 to 1.0) . The coefficient of determination for the Pearson 
correlation coefficient is 35% and for the Spearman 's rho coefficient it is 37%. Th is 
indicates a 35% or 37% shared variance, respectively. The variable influencing 
helps explain the variance of 35% to 37% in the respondent's scores on the 
perceived monitoring scale. This is quite a respectable amount compared with a 
great deal of the research conducted in the social sciences (Pallant, 2007) . 
The significance level (Sig. 2-tailed) indicates the degree of confidence that we 
can have in the results obtained , which is strongly influenced by the size of the 
sample (Pallant, 2007) . In smaller samples like the ones used in this research 
study, moderate correlations may exist, which do not reach statistical significance 
at the traditional p < 0.05 level. Nevertheless, there is a high statistical significance 
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with a probability value of p = 0.006 on a 99% confidence interval. Therefore, it 
can be assumed that the results are not influenced or affected by any outliers. 
The scatter plot (Figure 5.79) shows an isolated dot on the higher end of the scale 
'monitoring' and the lower end of the scale 'influencing'. This case shows the result 
of a OAX 30 company. The respondent of this company did not give any answer 
for the variable 'recommendations' since the company is not accustomed to 
obtaining recommendations from institutional investors. Therefore, the respondent 
was not able to answer the question at all. If this case is defined as an outlier and 
is adjusted from the sample, the results are as follows: The adjusted Pearson 
correlation coefficient is 0.741, and the non-parametric correlation coefficient, the 
Spearman's rho of 0.714 is even stronger. 
5.5.4 Differences between members of the supervisory board and IROs 
In this research study, it is meaningful to see if there are differences between the 
members of the supervisory boards and the IROs. 
Mann-Witney U Test. According to Pallant (2007), the non-parametric Mann-
Whitney U Test is an alternative to the t-test for independent samples. This test 
compares medians. Since the scores are converted to ranks, the actual 
distribution of the scores does not matter. The Mann-Witney U test showed 
significance levels of p = 0.44 for monitoring and p = 0.85 for influencing. The 
probability value (p) is not less than or equal to 0.05, so the results are not 
significant. There is no statistically significant difference in the monitoring and 
influencing scores of the members of the supervisory boards and the IROs. 
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6 Study Findings and Analysis 
This section focuses on what the empirical study results of Section 5 tell us. The 
research question of this thesis is: 'What is the role of independent institutional 
investors in the corporate governance of German listed companies?' Based on the 
literature review, a research model (see Figure 3.3) was created to answer the 
research question. In order to give a general overview of the research model, the 
various aspects of each variable were aggregated. 
6.1 The role of institutional investors - summarised findings 
The next step after the descriptive analysis involves transforming the raw data into 
a form that can be used to conduct an analysis, which addresses the variables in a 
more comprehensive way and relates them more conSistently to the research 
model (Palla nt, 2007). The results of the means are provided in Figure 6.1. 
Overall, the participants of the study perceive the role and responsibilities of 
institutional investors in the German two-tier corporate governance structure as 
weak to medium. The results of the interviews of this empirical research study 
show an overall mean of 2.51 (see Figure 6.1). This is surprising since 85% of the 
participating companies represented by the interviewees in the research study 
have a shareholder base, in which the majority of the owners are institutional 
shareholders (see Table 4.4). Based on this, it can be stated that the sample used 
for this study has been reasonably selected in order to answer the research 
question. 
Figure 6.1: Role and responsibilities of institutional investors in corporate 
governance of German listed companies - an overview. 
2 = weak, 3 = medium 
Role and responsibility of institutional investor 
mean = 2.51 (weak to medium) 
r 
Monitoring Influencing 
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Source: Petra Nix. 
The key findings can be summarised as follows: 
1. Communication is the top measure for board oversight, recommendations , 
inducing changes and the exercise of institutional power. The dialogue in 
face-to-face meetings with well-informed · investors helps to develop a 
reciprocal understanding (Roberts et ai., 2006); it is one of the most used 
instruments (Kirchhoff and PricewaterhouseCoopers , 2005) and quite a 
powerful one in reaching agreements in private negotiations (Carleton et aI. , 
1998). Therefore, based on the results of the study, it can be concluded that 
the high level of communication signals that German companies want to 
pursue a non-confrontational style in their relationship with institutional 
investors. The results are particular and can be seen in the context of the 
German culture and supports previous empirical research that countries 
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matter in corporate governance (Chizema and Buck, 2006, Zingales, 2003, 
Rajan and Zingales, 2003, Light et aI., 2004; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). 
2. Furthermore, it seems that the IR activities of German corporations are well 
established. Therefore, continuous communication is a strong instrument 
among companies and their institutional investors in order to align the 
company's interest with those of the shareholders. This helps to reduce the 
conflict of interest between the shareholders and corporations, as well as 
asymmetric information. In addition, it also restores confidence and build 
trust, which are the most vital components in management practices and 
the necessary building blocks of corporate governance in order to keep the 
legitimacy effective (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 2005; Ghoshal and Moran, 2005; 
Roberts et aI., 2006; Bass, 1990; Hogan et aI., 1994). However, this is only 
effective if the investors voice their opinions and concerns (Craven and 
Marston, 1997) and if they are handled reasonably within the company. The 
results of the study did not reveal any patterns with regard to how the 
companies handle the investors' concerns and recommendations internally. 
This can lead to the conclusion that there is no established and structured 
way of reflecting the investors' opinions within the companies and how the 
management and supervisory board treat them. This might be an issue for 
further qualitative research in order to collect primary data on that subject. 
The handling of recommendations from institutional investors to companies 
is not structured or executed in a systematic way. Executing regular 
perception analyses on a regular basis could help to get a better overview 
of the perspectives and trends regarding the company in the capital market. 
The results can be used to communicate the issues in an objective and 
non-political way to the various internal organs, including the supervisory 
board, in order to keep them informed of what the institutional investors 
think. This can improve periormance, anticipate potential conflict at an early 
stage and help avoid confrontation. 
3. Research and analysis provided by the institutional investors to the 
management of a company is the top measure for the identification of 
weaknesses/improvement of company value. 
4. Measures with a higher level of engagement and commitment for the 
institutional investors like participating in the AGM and/or using the voting 
rights, shareholder cooperation and a seat in the supervisory board are not 
well established. This indicates a clear weakness in order to fulfil a 
responsible role in corporate governance. 
5. The majority of the various groups of investors pursue a weak or medium 
level of engagement in their different roles of responsibilities. Hedge funds 
and private equity funds are the only two groups that reached a strong level 
in some of the responsibility variables. A dilemma with respect to their 
engagement is that hedge funds are perceived as short-term oriented, self-
interested and not pursuing a stewardship approach. Their investment does 
not match with the investment horizons of the companies and therefore are 
not in the position to follow a responsible stewardship approach vis-a-vis a 
company. Hedge funds and private equity funds mostly have a clear 
positioning vis-a-vis the companies. The members of the supervisory 
boards and IROs perceive the endowments and sovereign wealth funds as 
the two groups with the weakest role in corporate governance and they 
have no clear position vis-a-vis the companies. Furthermore, it seems that 
the interviewees have little knowledge about their behaviour since these 
two groups had the highest responses with 'no opinion'. Therefore, it can be 
stated that the transparency of endowments and SWF vis-a-vis German 
companies is weak. 
6. The interviewees agree that institutional investors could play a role in 
corporate governance because they have expertise. 
7. It can be concluded from the results that the members of German 
supervisory boards have little contact to their institutional investors. Since it 
is just a small sample, these results cannot be generalised for other 
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German companies. Only one respondent explicitly said that they conduct a 
perception analysis once a year to get a structured feedback from the 
investors and that they organise meetings with the members of the 
supervisory board if they are requested. The results show that in individual 
cases, active institutional investors ask for meetings with members of the 
supervisory boards. This could be indicative of a trend that might strengthen 
in the future. Currently, however, there still no widespread established 
relationship between the members of the supervisory boards of German 
companies and their institutional shareholder. Therefore, it can be noted 
that the ownership of German listed companies is separated - at least from 
parts like supervisory boards - from its management (Tricker, 2009). Fama 
and Jensen (1983) argued that agency problems arise because contracts 
are not costless written and enforced. In a separated ownership structure 
the decision makers (members of the management board and/or members 
of the supervisory board) who initiate and implement important decisions 
are not the major residual claimants (institutional investors) and therefore 
do not bear a major share of the wealth effects of their decisions. One 
reason might be that institutional investors prefer firms with good 
governance (Ferreira and Matos, 2008), where an active ownership is not 
decisive since the firms achieve reasonable firm valuations and operating 
performance. Another reason could be that the institutional investors 
perceive the managers according to the stewardship theory (Donaldson, 
1991), i.e., as good stewards of corporate assets, and loyal managers that 
are trustworthy and collectivistic (Gabrielsson, 2003). 
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6.2 The role of institutional investors according to each variable 
The following section presents an analysis of the results and findings for each 
variable of the research model. 
Board oversight 
With a mean of 2.2, the extent of effective supervisory board oversight is weak, 
whereas the extent of effective management board oversight by institutional 
investors is medium (mean = 2.7) in German listed companies. Communication is 
the overriding and top measure named by the respondents in order to foster the 
relationship between the companies and their German and international 
shareholders. This is not staggering since 60% of the respondents have more than 
20 contacts to their institutional investors per year. A total of 40% of the 
respondents have even more than 100 contacts per year and some explicitly 
stated that they have more than 600 contacts per year. With so many contacts per 
year it appears that the companies communicate with their major investors on a 
regular basis. Regular communication is definitely a good starting point for 
establishing a good long-term relationship and is an excellent ongoing measure for 
the relationship between a listed corporation and its institutional investors to be 
nurtured. Through direct communication, institutional investors develop better 
understanding of the company, its strategy and the business model; and 
companies can more adequately explain their achievements and goals than by 
using impersonal communication instruments like annual and quarterly reports. 
From the results of this research project, it can be assumed that the investor 
relations function and their yearly programme of road shows, one-on-ones, etc., is 
well established in German companies. The programmes seem to be executed to 
a sufficient degree since none of the respondents see the necessity of increasing 
the level of contacts to institutional investors. Communication is definitely an 
appropriate measure for overseeing the management and supervisory board, but 
only as long as the company is doing well, no major investor concerns or 
asymmetric information exists, and the understanding between the company and 
its institutional investors needs to be improved or to be maintained. Since the 
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results show a lesser extent of effective supervisory board oversight than with the 
management board, it seems that the relationship is stronger between the 
company's management compared to the shareholder representatives in the 
supervisory boards of German companies. 
The results do not indicate how strong and/or how often investors express their 
concerns and disagreements in direct, written or personal communication. 
Communication that is well and fairly executed takes place on a regularly basis 
throughout the year. This includes regular company updates at the announcement 
of annual results, quarterly results, regular one-on-one-meetings and road shows, 
as well as ad-hoc telephone conversations when special questions and topics 
come up. The effectiveness of the communication can be measured in regularly 
conducted perception studies. The company can check if the intensity and 
frequency of the communication and the level of transparency of the information 
provided is sufficient and how institutional investors perceive the company's 
strategy. Additionally, such an analysis reveals existing concerns, which can lead 
to a stronger shareholder engagement if they are not adequately addressed and 
tackled by the management of the company. 
Apart from communication, there are other typical and presumably more powerful 
measures for board oversight, which can be used to execute the role of 
institutional investors in corporate governance in general and for board oversight 
in particular. These include the use of voting rights and engagement in the AGM, 
regular contact to the supervisory board or taking a seat and owning a meaningful 
stake in the company and collaboration with other shareholders to execute their 
utmost concerns. Only some respondents named these measures. One 
respondent stated that only German institutional investors make an appearance at 
the AGM. This is not very surprising since the AGMs of German corporations are 
very formal in a legal sense, last many hours and the language is German, which 
is already a natural barrier for foreign institutional investors to follow the 
discussions and participate in an active manner. It can be argued, that in a 
globalized world cultural differences - and amongst these also language 
differences - can act as barriers to the deployment of effective governance. 
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Supervisory board nomination 
A major role and responsibility of the shareholders is that they can nominate 
supeNisory board candidates for the elections at the AGM. As the results of the 
research show, the focus of institutional investors on the composition of the 
supeNisory boards of German companies is weak to medium (mean = 2.5). The 
aim of the principal agency theory is to reduce the agency costs. Therefore, taking 
a seat in the supeNisory board or an active involvement in the board nomination 
process can help to reduce the agency costs and can furthermore align the 
interests of the principal and the agent. However, the results of this study indicate 
that this role is not sufficiently executed by institutional investors in German listed 
companies. The results support the criticism of the stewardship theory, that in 
listed companies shareholders have become remote from the company and do not 
nominate the members of the supeNisory boards (Tricker, 2009). In order to 
increase the influence of shareholders and to reach a balanced voice with other 
shareholders (Noteboom, 1999) a more active engagement of institutional 
investors in the nomination process of the members of the supeNisory boards is 
needed. 
In that respect, one inteNiewee noted that 'Institutional investors are key when it 
comes to supeNisory board nomination. In Germany a "Shall-Recommendation" 
exists in the corporate governance code: a nomination committee shall be 
established that is composed solely of board members that are shareholder 
representatives. However, better investor participation in proposals for new 
supervisory board members is needed.' The inteNiewee referred to Sweden as a 
best practice, where the nomination committee consists of representatives of the 
four or five largest shareholders that are not part of the supeNisory board. This 
might also be an appropriate model for German corporate governance in order to 
improve the shareholder's influence and participation in the nomination of 
supeNisory board members. 
With an overall mean of 2.5, the value is not suffiCiently high to conclude that 
institutional investors execute their role with respect to the nomination of members 
to the supeNisory board. Only some types of investors (see Figure 6.2) like hedge 
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funds (mean = 3.3) and private equity funds (mean = 3.15) play an above average 
role in the nomination of supervisory boards. However, they are not willing to take 
part in the work of a supervisory board. Other groups of investors like insurances 
(mean = 1.95), endowments (mean = 1.83) and sovereign wealth funds (mean = 
1.89) only playa minor role. Therefore, it can be summarised that the institutional 
investors in German companies with respect to the nomination of members to the 
supervisory board is not relevant enough to monitor the principle agency problem 
and that they are not a dominant force (Solomon, 2000; McCahrey et a!. , 2009) . It 
is interesting that the corporate managers perceive that foreign funds play a 
stronger role in the supervisory board nomination than the German funds, even 
though one interviewee stated that 'foreign investors are less familiar with the 
German governance system', Nevertheless, it is necessary to be familiar with the 
German governance system in order to improve its engagement with the 
company. 
Figure 6.2: Supervisory board nomination: focus of institutional investors on 
composition. 
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The results indicate that only a limited number of investors or rather specific 
investor types are willing to execute their responsibility and role regarding the 
supervisory board nomination. One reason might be the time horizon of their 
investments. Taking a seat in a supervisory board is a longer-term commitment 
and requires a much stronger relationship to a specific company compared to a 
solely financial investment of just buying and selling the shares of a company. 
Such a strategy needs to be closely connected and integrated in the investment 
philosophies of the institutional investors. That approach goes beyond focusing 
exclusively on financial returns (Pendleton, 2005). On the one hand, having a seat 
means dedicating time and resources; on the other hand, it brings the institutional 
investor even closer to the internal decision making process of a company (e.g., 
like strategic and personal issues). This is a much stronger relationship with a 
company in order to minimise agency costs, but it requires sufficient resources of 
the institutional investor to be able to handle it. Furthermore, this approach can 
bring the institutional investor into a situation where conflicts of interest arise. This 
could be the case if an institutional investor has a seat in the supervisory board of 
a company and also owns shares in a competitor company. This can lead to 
limitations in the investment and diversification strategy of the asset allocation 
process. Through a seat in a supervisory board, the institutional investors become 
a primary insider of a company, which limits the investor in being able to trade 
shares freely. This results indicate that the behavior of the institutional investors is 
indeed linked to the principal agency theory to reduce the conflict of interest and to 
engage to perform on their behalf by delegating some decision making (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). But it does not goes beyond to satisfy the stewardship theory 
where the focus is on the motivation, collaboration and monitoring as well as an 
active role in the strategy formation and strategy implementation phase (Hillmann 
and Daziel, 2003; Shen, 2003; Donaldson, 1991). The results furthermore support 
the critics that remote shareholder like institutional investors do not nominate 
directors and/or member to the supervisory board. Another reason is that some of 
them - like pension funds - are just trustees whose accountability is not always 
apparent and seldom challenged (Tricker, 2009). 
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Nevertheless, the results show that the members of the supervisory boards and 
IROs of German listed companies believe that institutional investors can add value 
to the nomination of supervisory board members. Since institutional investors 
conduct many one-on-one meetings with various companies, they gain expertise 
and a good overview regarding the knowledge of possible candidates. Therefore, 
they are 'in a position to identify and recognise competence gaps and weakness' 
and they can 'contribute toward professionalising the selection process', as two 
interviewees put it. These results support Roberts et al. (2006) that well-informed 
investors gain a good understanding because they are experienced and 
knowledgeable about the particular company. 
A drawback is that some institutional investors are not experienced enough 
because they deal with governance issues 'very schematically like box ticking 
which does not correspond to the intensive work of a member of a supervisory 
board' and they can 'jeopardise the harmony of the organ'. Therefore, which 
institutional investors have the appropriate qualifications to play a role in the 
governance of a company or even take a seat in the supervisory board has to be 
well thought out. That means that not every institutional investor has the expertise 
and knowledge to playa role in the corporate governance of a company. There is 
no 'one size fits all' solution. However, this can also be a specific characteristic of 
an institutional investor to differentiate and distinguish its investment policy. In 
regard to conflict of interest, one interviewee commented that 'institutional 
investors have a too strong dominance of their own interests', which does not 
seem to be an appropriate answer. Regardless of which option the investor 
pursues, there are still enough other members in a supervisory board that can 
counterbalance the 'own interest' of an institutional investor. However, different 
opinions can prolong the decision-making process and bring up new thoughts. 
Furthermore, they can lead to a more open and controversial discussion culture in 
the boardrooms. 
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Improvement of company value 
The interviewees perceive the role of institutional investors in terms of their ability 
to add value to the process of value creation as medium (mean = 3.15). Since the 
value of a listed company is reflected in its share price, it is in the interest of an 
institutional investor that a company trade at its fair value, pursue a value 
enhancing strategy and that it is well run . Some institutional investors seem to 
have good expertise of an industry sector and are good at conducting profound 
research and analysis. Such types of investors should be in a position to identify 
weaknesses. Tackling the weaknesses appropriately can improve the company's 
value. In particular, private equity funds (mean = 3.9) , hedge funds (mean = 3.7) 
and foreign funds (mean = 3.25) are well positioned to identify weaknesses. Banks 
(mean = 2.5) , insurances (mean = 2.37) , endowments (mean = 2.31) and 
sovereign wealth funds (mean = 2.59) have only limited capabilities as far as 
taking part in the value creation process of a company (see Figure 6.3) . 
Figure 6.3: Improvement of company value: added value of institutional 
investors. 
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Sound research and analysis is a major prerequisite for institutional investors to 
get the attention of and start a dialogue with corporate managers. The first step is 
to conduct an in-depth, objective, sound and independent research study in order 
to identify the strengths and weaknesses of a company. This can also help 
overcome disadvantages, like the lack of expertise mentioned by some 
interviewees. However, having just one discussion with the corporate managers 
may not necessarily lead to a company initiating change to improve its value. In 
order to strengthen the position of the institutional investor vis-a-vis the company, 
it might be worthwhile to exchange views about a certain company with other 
institutional investors of the particular company in order to strengthen the position 
of the institutional investor to get more attention of the representation of the 
corporation. Research and analysis combined with a continuous management 
dialogue seems to be appropriate activities to solve the principal agency issue 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Recommendations to company 
The interviewees perceive the role of institutional investors with respect to making 
recommendations to companies as medium (mean = 2.84). After a thorough 
research and analysis, the institutional investor is in the position to discuss the 
results with the corporate managers. Appropriate platforms for this are one-on-one 
meetings where the institutional investor has the chance to discuss the corporate 
strategy 'behind the scenes'. As the study results show, the companies have 
frequent contacts with institutional investors. The majority has more than 20 
contacts per year. Some respondents from the DAX 30 companies stated that they 
have more than 100 contacts with institutional investors per year and some have 
even more than 600 contacts. Therefore, it is not a surprise that none of the 
interviewees have the impression that this level needs to be improved. 
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Figure 6.4: Recommendations to company - extent to which institutional 
investors make recommendations. 
1 = very weak , 2 = weak , 3 = medium; 4 = strong ; 5 = very strong 
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Again , the results of the research show that just three groups of investors - hedge 
funds (mean = 3.6), private equity funds (mean = 4) and foreign investors (mean = 
3.37) - are more active in making recommendations to German companies than 
the rest. Interesting is the above average mean of foreign funds. They are more 
actively engaged with German companies in making recommendations despi te the 
fact that they seem to be less familiar with the German corporate governance 
system. Endowments (mean = 1.79) , insurances (mean = 1.39) and sovereign 
wealth funds (mean = 2.12) are again below the average mean (see Figure 6.4) . 
Furthermore, the interviewees are convinced that institutional investors add value 
by making recommendations . The results show that hedge funds, private equity 
funds and foreign funds are most active to solve the principal agency problem rose 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) . But it cannot be excluded that these kinds of 
investors behave in opportunistic ways to serve their own interest at the expense 
of other stakeholders (Eisenhardt, 1989). Statements of the interviewees 
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supported that argument: "Institutional investors - above all hedge funds - also 
focus on purely financial aspects (e.g. distribution policy, high debt), causing the 
company to be 'bled out' as a result. They focus to greatly on their own interest. 
Usually, the first contact that an investor has with a corporate manager of a 
company is the IRO. Therefore, he/she would be the appropriate person to 
address the recommendations at the first stage. However, as one respondent 
stated 'direct enquiries in the form of letters to the supervisory board send out a 
stronger signal and generally have a greater eftect on the company's behaviour'. 
Therefore, the IRO seems to be a good 'entry point' to a company for an 
institutional investor. Still, addressing the recommendations through the 
supervisory board and, here in particular, the chairman and/or CEO and CFO of 
the companies have a greater impact. The advantage for the chairman is that 
he/she can get an independent and objective analysis of the company without the 
bias of internal politics. 
As the answers to the question about the handling of recommendations within the 
company show, there is no structured way to bring these recommendations into 
the companies. Some recommendations are passed on to the CEO and CFO and 
go into the company's internal discussion. None of the interviewees gave a 
particular example of how they have handled a certain issue raised by an 
institutional investor within the management board and supervisory board. Building 
a clear process within the company to channel this information in an appropriate 
manner to the supervisory board can help to improve the expertise and experience 
of the supervisory board and can strengthen the independent advice. One 
interviewee mentioned that the CEO became chairman of the supervisory board 
with the support of the institutional investors without having to comply with the 
'cooling-oft-period'. According to the German corporate governance code (5.4.4 as 
of 26 May 2010), 'management board members may not become members of the 
supervisory board of the company for two years after the end of the apPOintment 
unless they are appointed upon a motion presented by shareholders holding more 
than 25% of the voting rights in the company. Appointment to the chairmanship of 
the supervisory board shall be an exception to be justified to the AGM.' This 
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example documents that with the support of institutional investors, companies may 
even be able to manage successfully decisions, which are not in line with the 
German corporate governance code. Therefore, a good relationship is necessary; 
the company needs to know who the major shareholders are, what their opinions 
are about the specific company-related issues and how they will exercise their 
vote in the AGM or if they even need to mobilise their institutional shareholders to 
use their vote in the AGM. 
Sometimes it is not easy for the working level (IROs) to deal with critical issues 
within the company. One reason is that the recommendations reveal 
'uncomfortable truths'. Therefore, an appropriate way might be to conduct 
independent, objective analyses of the perceptions of the institutional investors. 
The independent results collected, analysed and summarised by independent 
outside consultants can be presented in the meetings of the management board 
and supervisory board. 
Inducing changes in corporate strategy 
In general, institutional investors playa weak to medium (mean = 2.55) role in 
prompting change and in forcing company executives to prompt change. The 
results of this research study support the findings of Gillian and Starks (2003) and 
Connelly (2010). As the results of Figure 6.6 show, the type of investors that own 
the company is important. As Figure 6.6 shows, private equity funds (mean = 3.3), 
hedge funds (3.1), pension funds (2.58) and the foreign funds (mean = 2.8) play 
an above average role. Insurances (mean = 1.8), endowments (mean = 1.5), 
sovereign wealth funds (mean = 2) and German funds (mean = 2.05) do not playa 
major role in forcing companies to undertake strategic action. Therefore. if a 
company faces changes in corporate strategy it depends on its ownership 
structure in general and their types of investors in particular. Companies with a 
strong bias towards owners like pension funds, hedge funds, private equity and 
foreign funds are more likely to be forced by its institutional investors to induce 
changes than companies with owners like German funds, insurances, sovereign 
wealth funds and endowments. 
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Figure 6.5: Inducing changes in corporate strategy - extent to which 
institutional investors make recommendations. 
1 = very weak , 2 = weak , 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong 
German funds Insurances 
Pension Funds 
-+4-Type of investor; average Endowments 
- Overall average=2.41 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Exercise of institutional power 
The most common strategy of institutional investors in exercising their institutional 
power is the personal discussion with the management. These resul ts are 
consistent with the findings of the high and satisfactory level of the frequency of 
contacts between the corporate managers and their institutional shareholders. It 
seems (see Figure 6.6) that if the institutional investors are not successful in the 
personal discussions with the management (mean = 3.68) , the majority of 
investors prefer to sell the shares (mean = 3.25) instead of making proposals to 
the AGM (mean = 2.47). These results support the argument that institutional 
investors try to negotiate 'behind the scene' and that they want to avoid the public. 
Figure 6.6: Strategies of institutional investors to exercise power. 
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The answers of the interviews indicate (mean = 2.47) just a weak to medium level 
of the extent to which institutional investors make proposals to the AGM. 
Therefore , it can be concluded that institutional investors want to avoid the more 
confrontational way of making proposals or even asking for a seat in the 
supervisory board. If they are not able to get their proposals through in the 
personal discussions, they will most likely sell the shares. Before they take actions 
like making proposals to the AGMs or asking for a seat in the supervisory board , 
they prefer to take a sympathetic role vis-a-vis the company. This supports the 
argument that institutional investors in the corporate governance of German 
companies are paper tigers (except for some individual cases). 
The interviewees are convinced that institutional investors add value if they 
exercise their power (mean = 2.1 = agree) . Therefore, it might be worthwhile for 
institutional investors to exercise their power. This would probably require some 
structural changes within the fund management company. Pursuing a strategy of 
higher company engagement in order to exercise institutional power requires other 
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personnel resources within the fund management companies like people 
(corporate governance specialists, lawyers etc.) who expedite the issues through 
the various authorities since this is not the core competence of the money 
manager. Their tasks are usually to analyse the companies, as well as to look for 
and pick the right shares. Such an engagement strategy vis-a-vis a company 
requires different skills within the fund management firm, such as a close 
cooperation and the exchange of expertise between corporate governance 
speCialists and the money manager who is the person with the highest level of 
knowledge of the industry and the particular company. 
6.3 Type of institutional investor matters 
In a further analysis, all the questions across the questionnaire related to 
institutional investors were aggregated. This analysis relates to the added value 
that institutional investors can make in executing their role in corporate 
governance and about their understanding of a company. 
Added value and understanding 
In the semi-structured questionnaire for each of the six variables, a closed-ended 
question was posed to the interviewees regarding the added value of institutional 
investors with respect to supervisory and management board oversight, 
supervisory board nomination, making recommendations, prompting changes and 
whether they increase the company's value when they exercise their power and 
are able to identify company value. These six questions were aggregated into a 
joint variable 'added value' across the questionnaire. The overall mean is 1.97 
(see Table 6.1), which means that the members of the supervisory boards and the 
IROs agreed that institutional investors add value. 
Table 6.1: Added value of institutional investors. 
0=1 strongly disagree; 1 =1 somewhat agree, 2=1 agree, 3=1 strongly agree, 4=1 very strongly agree 
Institutional investors Mean Median Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Added value 1.9686 1.90 0.70291 0.267 -1,125 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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Furthermore, they agreed that institutional investors have a good understanding of 
the strategy and business model of the company (mean = 3.3, see Table 6.2). This 
result shows that through effective and regular communication, the understanding 
of institutional investors regarding the strategy and business model of the 
company can be improved. Therefore, it can be concluded that institutional 
investors fulfil some of the prerequisites to playa role in corporate governance. 
The positive skewness in both cases show added value and understanding and 
indicate a clustering at the low values. The kurtosis values show that the variables 
are not normally distributed. 
Table 6.2: Understanding of institutional investors. 
1 =1 strongly agree, 2=1 somewhat agree, 3=1 agree, 4=1 strongly agree, 5=1 very strongly agree 
Institutional investors Mean Median Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis 
----------
Understanding 3.3 3.20 0.50576 0.176 -0.524 
Source: Petra Nix. 
Impact on corporate governance 
In the questionnaire, some questions also referred to various investor types. 
These questions were asked in the following four variables: supervisory board 
nomination, improvement of company value, recommendations to company and 
inducing changes in corporate strategy. The aggregation of this data showed 
some interesting results (see Table 6.3). The interviewees mentioned that the 
private equity funds play the strongest role, followed by the hedge funds. The 
private equity funds and hedge funds reached a mean of 3.5, which is considered 
as medium to strong. The weakest players are the endowments followed by the 
insurances. The interviewees viewed the role of the endowments (mean = 1.6) 
and the insurances (mean = 2.0) as weak. 
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Table 6.3: Strength of institutional investors in corporate governance. 
.-
Institutional investors Mean Median Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis 
- various types 
Banks 2.3125 2.6250 1.12489 -0.688 -0.207 
Insurances 1.9790 2.25 0.95387 -0.761 0.109 
Pension funds 2.4375 2.75 1.04464 -0.684 0.246 
Endowments 1.5915 1.29 1.9178 0.366 -0.747 
Sovereign wealth funds 2.004 2 1.05703 -0.156 -0.324 
Hedge funds 3.4625 3.5 0.93286 -0.524 0.435 
Private equity 3.4915 3.29 1.10090 -0.135 -0.1.203 
German funds 2.4625 2.25 0.73572 0.397 0.062 
Foreign funds 3.05 3 0.71451 -0.479 -0.738 
Source: Petra Nix. 
The results of the extent of institutional investors on various variables of the 
research model - board nomination, improvement of company value, 
recommendations to the company, inducing changes in corporate strategy - of the 
research model have shown good internal consistency, with a Cronbach alpha 
coefficient of 0.872. 
The research results indicate that the respondents assume that institutional 
investors can add value to corporate governance (mean = 1.97) regarding board 
oversight, making nominations to the supervisory board, identifying potential to 
increase value, making recommendations, prompting change and exercising their 
power. Furthermore, the respondents are convinced that institutional investors 
have a good understanding of the strategy and the business model of the 
company (mean = 3.3). The results indicate that institutional investors could be 
valuable partners in strengthening and improving corporate governance. 
Therefore, it would be worthwhile to consider strengthening the role of institutional 
investors and/or forcing them to execute it. Currently there are no plans in 
Germany to improve the role of institutional investors or force them to take a more 
active role in corporate governance. 
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As the research results show, only the hedge funds (mean = 3.46), private equity 
funds (mean = 3.49) and foreign funds (mean = 3.05) playa role in corporate 
governance, which is considered as medium by the interviewees. That is 
surpris ing since private equity funds are an asset class that typically does not 
invest in publ icly traded companies. There are just a few exceptions among 
German listed companies like Deutsche Telekom, where Blackstone is a 
shareholder and holds a seat in the supervisory board . Blackstone is one of the 
world 's leading Alternative Asset Management firms and independent Financia l 
Advisory firms , which includes private equity, real estate, credit businesses and 
hedge fund solutions. (http://www.blackstone.com/. accessed 14 August 2011 ). 
However, the role of the institutional investors is not well executed on a wider 
scale. As the ranking in Figure 6.7 shows, only private equity, hedge and foreig n 
funds playa role in the corporate governance of German companies. German and 
pension funds are considered to playa weak to medium role and all others like 
banks, SWF, insurances and endowments playa weak role . 
Figure 6.7: Role of institutional investors in corporate governance in German 
corporations - a ranking. 
Impact on corporate governance 
Pnvate equity _______________ 349 
Hedge funds _______________ 3.46 
Foreign funds 
German funds 
Pension funds 
Banks 
_____________ 3.05 
___________ 2.46 
___________ 2.44 
__________ 2.31 
'~----. Sovereign wealth funds _ 2.00 Insurances _________ 1.98 
Endowments ~~~~~~~_1_.59 ______ , ___ _ 
o 2 3 4 5 
1 = very weak 2 = weak 3 = medium 4 = strong 5 = v ry strong 
Source: Petra Nix. 
The research study found evidence that having a meaningful stake matters. The 
resu lts show that the higher the free float, the lower the role of institutional 
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investors in corporate governance. Therefore, it can be assumed that in broad and 
diverse ownership structures institutional investors do not improve the governance 
of the company. Therefore, their expertise in research and analysis, objectivity and 
independence is not properly used in the corporate governance of German 
companies. 
6.4 Shareholder engagement in German companies - some examples 
In the last couple of years, only a few German listed companies faced shareholder 
engagement, which made their way into the public. The following examples (see 
Table 6.4) are not part of the thesis, however they provide evidence and show that 
on rare occasions institutional investors have executed their oversight function in 
German companies recently. These examples are included in that thesis to 
support and underscore the findings of this study with real life cases in order to 
provide practical insight into shareholder engagement in German companies. 
These examples support the results of that thesis that in particular cases the 
company's management - management board and supervisory board - should be 
aware that institutional investors are willing to execute their role in corporate 
governance. 
These examples are still individual cases and mainly driven by foreign institutional 
investors. The examples are compiled from various sources like newspaper 
articles and shareholder meeting resolutions. These cases of shareholder 
engagement in German companies show that the institutional investors of German 
corporations adopt a 'hands-on' relationship approach without being represented 
on corporate boards (Salomon, 2000). 
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Table 6.4 Selected cases of shareholder engagement in Germany 2005 -
2011. 
Company Investor Issue 
Deutsche Bbrse TCIIAtticus M&Alshareholder remuneration 
Merck Various Anglo-Saxon mutual Compensation 
funds 
Demag Cranes Cevian Capital Seat in the supervisory board 
Heidelberger Cement Various Compensation 
Infineon Hermes Seat in the supervisory board 
Source: Petra NIX 
Deutsche Borse versus TCl/Atticus 
In 2005, the hedge funds The Children's Investment Fund (TCI) and Atticus 
prevented the announced merger between Deutsche Borse AG and The London 
Stock Exchange. In return, the funds forced the Deutsche Borse AG to provide 
better shareholder remuneration through share buy-backs and dividend increases. 
This was one of the most prominent cases, which attracted a great deal of 
attention in various newspapers. Based on the agency-theoretical background 
provided by Jensen (1986) and Shleifer and Vishny (1986), large and powerful 
institutional investors like the hedge funds TCI and Atticus often have the power to 
enhance value by reducing agency costs that might arise from the separation of 
ownership and control (Berle and Means, 1932; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Leverage can reduce agency costs as a higher leverage discourages managers 
from wasting corporate resources. In the case of Deutsche Borse the company 
disposes substantial amounts of cash and a high profit margin. This probably 
indicates that agency conflicts are present as they apparently show up as free 
cash flow problems. For that reason, increasing leverage as well as opposing the 
management's takeover intentions can also be regarded as short-term successful 
shareholder activism. 
In retrospect, however, the deal was questionable. In 2009, Atticus decided to 
close the fund after a rollercoaster ridehttp://www.marketfolly.com/2009/08/hedge-
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fund-atticus-capital-shutting.html, accessed 24 July 2011) and also TCI struggled 
with its activism approach 
(http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid =aPsCtUbl Ss, 
accessed 24 July 2011). This Deutsche Borse case of shareholder activism is not 
a good example of responsibility regarding the role of institutional investors. In 
fact, this case points to the disadvantages mentioned by the respondents, like 
'hedge funds have a high self-interest', and 'their behaviour is in their own 
interest'. These arguments become even more relevant by the fact that Deutsche 
Borse offered Chris Hohn, founder of the hedge fund TCI, a seat in the supervisory 
board, which he declined to take. One respondent mentioned this in the interview. 
The hedge funds missed the chance to take a stewardship approach and assume 
a longer-term, ownership role of responsibility in the corporate governance of that 
company. The behaviour of the hedge fund in that particular case served to 
confirm the reputation that hedge funds are self-interested. The motives of the two 
hedge funds did not prove a behaviour in accordance with the stewardship theory 
since the classical ideas that shareholders nominate and elect directors or 
supervisory board members who protect their interests (Tricker, 2009), to guide 
the management in achieving the missions and objectives (Goel and Erkovic, 
2005; Hillmann and Dalziel, 2003; Shen, 2003) and the involvement (Huse, 2007) 
are not fulfilled in that case. 
Merck versus various institutional investors 
Merck, a pharmaceutical, chemical and life science company, was the last DAX 30 
company not to disclose its management remuneration individually. Various 
foreign mutual funds, like Black Rock, Capital Group and Templeton voted against 
the discharge of its management board and the supervisory board at the AGM. 
They used these agenda topic 'discharge' of the AGM-agenda since the 
consultancy voting to the management compensation was not a separate agenda 
point. The share of votes to discharge the management board and supervisory 
board were just 56.2% and 56%, respectively, which are very bad results for a 
German AGM. These low voting results sent a strong signal to the corporate 
management. The consequence was that they introduced the compensation 
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consultancy voting one year later. As the Merck case shows, a low acceptance 
rate can be a strong signal to the management of a corporation to initiate change. 
Demag Cranes versus Cevian Capital 
In the case of Demag Cranes, the investor Cevian Capital acquired a stake of 
around 10% and therefore asked for a seat in the supervisory board. Cevian 
Capital is an investment firm acquiring significant ownership positions where long-
term value can be enhanced through active ownership. Compared to the Deutsche 
Borse, in this case the investor seems to be pursuing a more long-term oriented 
ownership strategy and is committed to assuming its responsibility as an owner of 
the company and actively participating in its corporate governance. 
Heidelberger Cement - failure of AGM approval 
At its AGM in 2010, Heidelberger Cement failed to get the shareholders' approval 
for the management compensation. Over half (54.2%) of the shareholders voted 
against the proposed compensation scheme. 
Intineon versus Hermes 
In 2010, Hermes, who helps institutional share owners around the world meet their 
fiduciary responsibilities and become active owners of public and private 
companies, lost the proxy fight to establish their own candidate as chairman of the 
supervisory board of Infineon in the election of the AGM. 
These few cases show that in some circumstances institutional investors are ready 
to execute their role in corporate governance. 
6.5 Comparison with the literature 
As the developments in the academic research show, a large body of corporate 
governance research is dominated by the US academic community, analysing the 
one-tier system and using publicly available data (Durisin and Puzone, 2009; 
Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Johnson et aI., 1996; Tricker, 2009). This research 
is one of the rare studies that go beyond the analysis of easily available external 
data since the major focus was on the collection of primary data. This study 
follows the shifting trend from a general analysis of the principal-agency theory to 
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the nature and role of owners (Pulgiese et aI., 2009) and thereby is able to weaken 
the black-box argument (Huse and Gabrielson, 2004). Furthermore, it explains the 
processes surrounding the information asymmetry of the principal agency theory 
(Huse and Eide, 1996) and offers solutions. 
Figure 6.8 shows how this research is positioned compared to most of the 
academic research: 
• The focus of this research is on Germany, a civil law country and not on 
common law countries as is done in most of the existing research. 
• This research takes an inductive and empirical exploration approach and 
uses primary data gathered through in-depth semi-structured interviews. 
Most of the other existing academic research has been built on archival 
data and a deductive research methodology. 
• The most popular subjects within academic research are board structure, 
compensation and firm performance. The subject of this research is the role 
of investors and analyses the role that they can play in corporate 
governance. 
Therefore, the study helps to close the gaps of prior research. 
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Figure 6.8: Positioning of academic research and research focus. 
Characteristics of most academic 
research 
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Source: Petra Nix. 
Focus of research 
Prior to conducting the in-depth semi-structured interviews, a research model and 
conceptual framework was created from the literature, The structure and content 
of the questionnaire was built upon the research model. As the Cronbach's alpha 
test has shown, the results and internal consistency of the entire research model 
are very reliable . The factor analysis of the six variables of the research model did 
not detect any variable interference. Therefore, it can be concluded that the 
questions asked in the semi-structured interviews and the well -defined scope of 
the variables should deliver appropriate answers to the research question . Table 
6.5 provides the answers to various questions and helps to gain a better 
understanding of the reality regarding the role that institutional investors play in the 
corporate governance of German listed companies. 
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Table 6.5: The role of institutional investors in German corporate 
governance - some selected answers. 
Questions raised from the literature review Findings and explanations from this research 
study 
How corporate managers of German listed In general their role is perceived as weak to 
companies perceive the role of institutional medium (mean=2.S1). However, the investment 
investors? style matters. In particular hedge funds, private 
equity funds and foreign funds playa stronger 
role compared to other types of investors. 
How corporate managers of German listed The interviewees think that institutional 
companies value the role of institutional investors can add value (mean=1.97) to 
investors? companies and that they have a good 
understanding of the strategy and the business 
model (mean=3.3). Furthermore, the 
advantages outweigh the disadvantages. 
How do corporate managers interact with their The interaction is primarily driven by 
shareholders? communication. Other measures - use of voting 
rights. consultative management. seat in the 
supervisory board, meaningful stake, 
collaboration - playa minor role. 
What actual role do institutional investors play in It seems that institutional investors and German 
corporate governance? corporate managers endeavour to have a good 
relationship that is mainly maintained by regular 
communication. However, measures to ensure 
a stronger and longer-term based engagement 
- like a seat in the supervisory board - are not 
very common. 
What role can or should institutional investors They can increase their engagement with 
play in German corporations? stronger participation in the AGM, taking a seat 
in the supervisory board, holding meaningful 
stakes. and increasing the collaboration with 
other institutional shareholders. 
Source: Petra Nix. 
According to Hockerts and Moir (2004). the issue of corporate responsibility is 
taken more seriously on the company side than on the investor side. Since the 
companies have sufficient contacts and relationships, at least on the operational 
business level, it can be concluded that the German companies take their 
corporate governance issues seriously in regard to their owners in general and the 
institutional investors in particular. My research thesis also supports the findings of 
Bassen (2005) that personal conversation and direct communication is the 
overriding measure to build and maintain the relationship and to implement good 
governance. However. it does not support Bassen's arguments that this also 
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includes the supervisory boards. In this regard, the findings have revealed some 
gaps. 
In terms of the level of control that suppliers of finance have over managers as 
raised by Shleifer and Visny in 1997, with their question, 'How do suppliers of 
finance control managers?' can be said to be 'weak' for German listed companies. 
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7 Conclusions and Implications 
7.1 Main findings 
In this research, the role and responsibilities of institutional investors were 
explored along the research model. The research model consists of six key 
variables explaining the influencing and monitoring role of institutional investors in 
the corporate governance of German listed companies. The monitoring role is 
defined by board oversight, board nomination and improvement of company value. 
The influencing role is defined by the variables recommendations to company, 
inducing changes in corporate strategy and execution of institutional power. The 
central research question of this thesis is: 'What is the role of institutional investors 
in corporate governance?' 
The results of this empirical research study reveal the following interesting 
findings: 
1) The results show that the participants of the study perceive the overall role 
of institutional investors in corporate governance in German companies as 
weak to medium. There were no major differences between the monitoring 
and influencing role. Some variables are perceived differently. The impact 
of the role of institutional investors in the improvement of company value 
and the exercise of institutional power was seen as medium. With regard to 
recommendations to the company and board oversight, the results were 
weak to medium. Board nomination and inducing changes were also weak. 
Improvement of company value got the highest mean (mean = 2.91), 
whereas inducing changes and board nomination received the lowest 
scores (mean = 2.4). 
2) There were no differences in the perceptions of the two groups, supervisory 
board and IROs. 
3) It seems that the handling of recommendations from institutional investors 
is not structured in a systematic way within the companies. 
4) Communication is the most important and typical measure used. 
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5) The respondents agree that institutional investors can add value. 
6) The respondents agree that the institutional investors have a good 
understanding of the companies business model 
7) The type of investor matters with regard to their role in corporate 
governance. Private equity funds were viewed as having a strong impact. 
Hedge funds were seen to playa medium to strong role. The role of foreign 
funds was perceived as medium. Endowments, insurances and sovereign 
wealth funds were perceived as having the weakest impact. 
8) The most common company situation in which institutional investors prompt 
change are underperformance, special company situation like a crisis, 
corporate finance issues and management remuneration. 
9) The most common company situation in which institutional investors 
exercise their power are issues regarding the business portfolio, a crisis, 
management quality and underperformance. 
10) The future role of institutional investors in corporate governance was 
perceived positively by most of the respondents. In particular, they expect 
an increase in shareholder engagement. 
7.2 Contributions of this study 
Although a great deal of existing and ongoing research can be found for corporate 
governance and institutional investors, only a small amount can be found which 
goes beyond the use of quantitative, archival, secondary or publicly available data 
from common law countries. This study focuses on Germany, which is a civil law 
country. 
Previous research and the existing literature show, however, that corporate 
governance needs more qualitative research on data that is not publicly available 
to provide more insights into the 'black-box' with regard to the role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance. That is exactly where this study fills the gap in 
academic research. In this study, primary data was collected in personal semi-
structured interviews. This is one of the few studies in the field of corporate 
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governance. This interpretativist research thesis has helped to close existing 
knowledge gap and gain a better understanding of the current role of institutional 
investors in corporate governance. 
The major contribution of this thesis is the presentation of the key findings on the 
role of institutional investors in corporate governance in German companies. The 
research gives insights into how company managers of German listed companies 
perceive the strength and involvement of institutional investors in German 
corporate governance. A large number of theoretical and empirical research 
studies on corporate governance in general already exist. Previous research 
focussing on various theories like the principal-agency theory, the stewardship 
theory and the stakeholder theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983; Donaldson, 1991; Freeman, 1984), has shown that investors voice opinions 
and concerns regarding the management of an enterprise (Craven and Marston, 
1997). Additionally, the research carried out in the past had already identified the 
need for further investigation of organisational processes in order to open the 
'black box' (Huse and Eide, 1996). 
Therefore the objective of this doctoral thesis was to go beyond the existing 
literature to create new knowledge of how corporate managers experience the 
corporate governance role of institutional investors. Furthermore, the contributions 
are of more relevance for other researchers. The research model, which focused 
on variables, such as board oversight, board nomination, improvement of 
company value, recommendations to companies, inducing changes and exercise 
of institutional power, has shown high internal consistency and can be used by 
other researchers. The model can also be applied to countries other than 
Germany in order to analyse the role that institutional investors carry out in other 
countries. 
The literature review (Section 2) helped to create a conceptual framework and the 
research model for this research. The methodology section provided an overview 
of how the research question was approached through semi-structured interviews 
and how the interview results were structured and analysed. Major parts of the 
semi-structured questionnaire can be applied and used to conduct similar research 
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in other countries. The questionnaire can also be used to conduct a broader 
research or longitudinal study in Germany. However, a longitudinal study would 
have been outside the scope of a doctoral thesis. The methodology section can be 
used as a basis for other researchers who want to replicate the findings. The 
collection of the primary data and analysis has been conducted with great care 
and the limitations have been discussed in detail. 
After completing the exploratory in-depth interviews, the conclusions were drawn 
from the context-rich data; therefore it can be assumed that the research model 
developed was accurately formulated. The result is a new research model for 
defining the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. 
7.3 Policy and managerial implication of this study 
This section discusses the implications of the findings for managerial practice. The 
conclusions from this research are used to draw lessons for (1) members of 
supervisory boards, members of the management board (in particular, CEOs and 
CFOs), as well as investor relations officers of listed companies, who want to 
improve governance and the relationships with their institutional shareholders; (2) 
institutional investors who want to enhance their engagement in their portfolio 
companies; and (3) standard setters like institutions and commissions that want to 
improve corporate governance. 
The research shows that certain measures and prerequiSites need to be fulfilled in 
order to playa role in the corporate governance of a company. However, such 
capabilities do develop by themselves. The members of the management and 
supervisory board and the institutional investors have to create an appropriate 
environment in order to strengthen the role of institutional investors in corporate 
governance. 
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Measures for institutional investors to engage in corporate governance 
Communication is definitely a good starting point for establishing a good long-term 
relationship and is an excellent ongoing measure for nurturing the relationship 
between a listed corporation and its institutional investors. With communication, 
institutional investors develop a better understanding of the company, its strategy 
and the business model; and companies can more adequately explain their 
achievements and goals than by using impersonal communication instruments like 
annual and quarterly reports. From the results of this research project, it can be 
assumed that the investor relations function and their yearly programme of road 
shows, one-on-ones, etc. is we" established in German companies. The 
programmes seem to be executed to a sufficient degree since none of the 
respondents see the necessity of increasing the level of contacts to institutional 
investors. Communication is definitely an appropriate measure for overseeing the 
management and supervisory board, but only as long as the company is doing 
we", no major investor concerns or asymmetric information exists, and the 
understanding between the company and its institutional investors needs to be 
improved or to be maintained. The results do not indicate how strong and/or how 
often investors express their concerns and disagreements in direct, written or 
personal communication. 
Apart from communication, there are other typical and presumably more powerful 
measures for board oversight, which can be used to execute the role of 
institutional investors in corporate governance in general and for board oversight 
in particular. These include the use of voting rights and engagement in the AGM, 
regular contact to the supervisory board or taking a seat and owning a meaningful 
stake in the company and collaboration with other shareholders to execute their 
utmost concerns. As Figure 5.3 shows, only some respondents named these 
measures. However, as long as institutional investors do not take their concerns to 
the next higher levels, like using the voting rights at AGMs, pursuing collaborations 
with other shareholders, acquiring a meaningful stake and/or asking for a seat in 
the supervisory board, they are dependent on the goodwill of the company 
management to take an action or are even a 'paper tiger' and may therefore be 
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considered weak or non-existent. To the responsibility of board oversight execute 
effectively, institutional investors have two choices: 
(1) They need to be prepared to increase their stake to a meaningful and 
powerful level or; 
(2) They need to collaborate effectively and systematically with other 
shareholders to increase their acceptance vis-a-vis the company's 
management. 
Surprisingly, none of the interviewees mentioned proxy voting agencies, which 
usually support institutional shareholders in corporate governance issues, execute 
their voting rights at the AGM and help them fulfil their stewardship responsibility. 
For international institutional investors, a practicable way of executing board 
oversight could also be to form dedicated partnerships or collaborations with 
German institutional investors to align their interests and improve their power in 
order to execute their responsibility. However, this needs an ongoing exchange of 
experiences and views about the respective companies. In addition, institutional 
investors can use open platforms like the clearing-house of the Principles for 
Responsible Investment. However, the collaborative engagements of PRI 
signatories are more driven by subjects like the CEO Water Mandate, 
Engagement on UN Global Compact reporting 
(http://www.unpri.org/collaborations/, accessed 23 July 2011) instead of particular 
companies. Therefore, it is questionable if such collaboration platforms are 
appropriate and specific enough to ensure effective board oversight for German 
corporations in general. These platforms might be helpful if certain issues like C02 
emissions matter for a particular company and have an impact on their business 
model and financial development, but not for board oversight in general. 
Therefore, other measures need to be improved. One suggestion is to establish an 
open platform where institutional investors can exchange their experiences, 
concerns and governance issues. 
In the first stage, an appropriate step might be to improve and establish a 
relationship between the members of the supervisory boards of the German 
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corporations and the institutional investors. As the results of the survey show, only 
25% of the respondents mentioned the contact to the supervisory board as a 
typical measure. There is potential for institutional investors to improve board 
oversight. Given the results regarding the added value of institutional investors to 
the supervisory and management board, the vast majority of the respondents are 
convinced that institutional investors can add value. Therefore, it is appropriate for 
them to improve their contact to the members of the supervisory boards. The 
advantages outweigh the advantages over the disadvantages. In particular, 
expertise, new perspectives and new ways of thinking are mentioned frequently. 
Expertise means that institutional investors can offer good sector expertise since 
they are familiar with the competitive developments. Additionally, they can offer an 
objective, well researched outside perspective, which is geared to value creation. 
However, such an approach also needs a strong long-term commitment from the 
institutional investor since they provide resources, like management time and 
'advisory and consultancy' work to the company for free. Furthermore, institutional 
investors with a high level of expertise can contribute to the widely discussed 
improvement of the competence and independence of company boards. It seems 
that German supervisory boards still do not perceive these advantages as positive. 
There are also some disadvantages, however, which need to be taken into 
account. They can be summarised as conflict of interest and lack of expertise. In 
that respect, mainly hedge funds were mentioned because of their short-term 
behaviour, selfishness and focus on purely financial interest. It seems that there is 
a dilemma. Investors that are active, committed to engagement and that have the 
necessary expertise, are the short-term oriented and self-interested hedge funds. 
Therefore, it seems that, in general, institutional investors are not willing to take 
their utmost concerns to the next higher level of interference to execute their role 
of oversight of the management and supervisory board. If the engagement were to 
take place with all or at least the majority of the institutional investors, the 
disadvantages that exist with hedge funds could be balanced and overcome. To 
do this, a higher engagement of other types of investors like pension funds and 
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sovereign wealth funds is necessary. They could actively use platforms like the UN 
principles for responsible investments or other associations. 
A company that wants to improve board oversight through institutional investors 
can invite well-selected institutional investors and bring them together with the 
chairman of the supervisory board. Using a selection criteria list with a likert scale 
could help in choosing the appropriate institutional investors. The selection criteria, 
which matter in this regard, are having a meaningful stake, expertise, research & 
analysis, and no conflict of interest. A conflict of interest could arise if the investor 
also has a significant stake in a competitor company. Nevertheless, this approach 
also has consequences for institutional investors in terms of executing their 
responsibilities as an owner of a listed company in Germany. Institutional investors 
need to provide plausible evidence and sufficient information that their 
engagement is not just for the short term and financially oriented, but that they are 
interested in the long-term value creation process of the company. This requires 
timeliness and transparent information about the shareholders' investment 
decisions, their goals and objectives with regard to the investments, as well as 
their shareholdings in a particular company. Furthermore, institutional investors 
must be willing and committed to maintain their stake in the company even during 
difficult phases of the company or at least be ready to increase their stake in order 
to enforce their objectives. The benefit of this is that they can strengthen their ties 
and relationship with the company, in which they own a significant stake. A closer 
relationship can reduce the agency cost by aligning the interest of the principal 
and the agent and it also reduces information asymmetry. Another benefit for the 
company is that it can gain a better knowledge base, improve the independent 
decision-making process and gain valuable information about the competitive and 
industry landscape. 
Criticisms and solutions regarding German corporate governance 
More participation of institutional shareholders would address the major criticisms 
levelled against German corporate governance (www.corporate-governance-
code.de, accessed 2 January 2010), which are as follows: 
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(1) Inadequate focus on shareholder interests; 
(2) Inadequate independence of German supervisory boards; 
(3) Closing the gap between the members of the supervisory boards and 
its major shareholders; 
(4) Anglo-Saxon cultures would gain a better understanding of the 
German system. 
The solutions are (see also Figure 7.1.) strengthening the relationship between the 
supervisory board members and the major shareholders of the company. The 
expertise of the institutional investors can be used to find optimal solutions. 
Supervisory board members would become aware of how institutional investors 
perceive the company and its strategy. Therefore, a regular monitoring and 
perception analysis is necessary. Finally, they can offer institutional investors a 
seat in the supervisory board . 
Figure 7.1: Criticisms and solutions regarding German corporate 
governance. 
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25 
The criticisms can be overcome with a higher engagement of institutional investors 
in corporate governance. That could be a major step towards modernisation of the 
characteristic two-tier board structure in Germany that dates back to the 1870s. In 
general, institutional investors can pursue various strategies to take part in the 
nomination process (see Table 7.1). 
(1) Institutional investors can propose criteria regarding the experience and 
competence of the candidates for the supervisory board. 
(2) Institutional investors can propose candidates, who represent their interests 
in the supervisory board, like Hermes did in the Infineon case. 
(3) Institutional investors can ask for a seat like in the Cevian case. 
The latter two would need a sufficient shareholding in the company. These three 
options are different with regard to the resources that an institutional investor has 
to provide and the prerequisites, which have to be fulfilled. 
Table 7.1: Strategies and roles for institutional investors to engage in the 
supervisory board nomination. 
No Activity Explanation Prerequisites Strength 
of role 
1 Influencing the Investors send a list of criteria to Contact to company Weak 
criteria setting the nomination committee, which via personal or written 
of the candidate's the candidate should fulfil or they communication; action 
profile drop some candidate names, takes place 'behind 
which can be added to the long or the scenes' 
short list 
2 Send a Investors can recommend the Certain stake in the Medium 
representative candidates, who will represent company is 
candidate to the their own interests in the necessary; long-term 
board supervisory boards investment horizon -~ 
Sweden model 
3 Take a seat in the A representative of the Certain stake, lon9- Strong 
supervisory board institutional investors (fund term investment 
manager, member of the horizon, personal and 
executive committee of the time resources need 
institutional investor) takes the to be committed 
seat in the supervisory board 
Source: Petra Nix. 
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The engagement of an institutional investor in the corporate governance of a 
company requires a certain level of knowledge about the German governance 
system. Two ways of dealing with this are as follows: 
(1) They can rely on the research and advice of third-party agencies like Risk 
Metrics. 
(2) They can build up their own in-house teams, which handle the corporate 
governance issues. Capital, which is a group of investment management 
companies, has already done that. 
However, having a higher engagement of institutional shareholders in German 
supervisory boards necessitates some prerequisites for the supervisory board as a 
whole, which are as follows: 
(1) The supervisory board needs to be willing to discuss important issues open 
and extensively. 
(2) The members of the supervisory boards need to be strong and experienced 
enough to enter into a debate in which there are opposing points of view. 
(3) The supervisory board must be willing to jeopardise the harmony of the 
board for a certain period of time in order to find the 'best solution' for the 
company. 
(4) The capabilities of the chairman of the supervisory board must be strong 
enough to moderate and supervise a debate in which there are different 
points of view and lead it to a reasonable decision-making process in favour 
of the company. 
Prerequisites for improving company value 
Institutional investors can utilise their expertise of a certain industry sector and 
their capabilities in conducting in-depth and profound research and analysis 
studies. Therefore, they are in a position to identify weaknesses, which, if properly 
addressed and handled, could improve the company's value. In order to get 
involved in the process of improving a company's value, institutional investors can 
pursue an escalation strategy. This can lead to a multi-level approach to 
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strengthen the arguments vis-a-vis the company as shown in Figure 7.2. It starts 
with a sound research and analysis of the company. Such an analysis enables an 
institutional investor to enter into a detailed strategic discussion with the company 
management. Institutional investors can share their results and concerns of the 
research with other institutional investors to create a common understanding . The 
next step is to agree on the specific objectives for the target company. Such 
collaborations strengthen the position of institutional investors vis-a-vis the 
company's management. Finally, the institutional investors can send a delegate to 
the supervisory board . 
Figure 7.2: Escalation strategies for institutional investors to improve 
company value and make recommendations. 
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This strategy needs an investor who is very committed to the company si nce the 
institutional investor provides time, resources and expertise in the process of 
conducting the research and analysis. This is just the first step. In order to improve 
the company's value , it is also necessary to make sure that the identified 
weaknesses and valuation gaps are closed by initiating and executing the 
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appropriate company measures. However. this is not in the hands of the 
institutional investors. Therefore. corporate managers need to take action and 
introduce the right measures in the company. The research results show that there 
are no structured or standard ways of dealing with these recommendations within 
a company. Therefore. the institutional investors run the risk of their research 
analysis not being adequately recognised and discussed within the company. 
Therefore. the way to escalate the recommendations and underscore them with a 
sufficient willingness to get the things done is similar to the way shown in Figure 
7.2. For a chairman, it is not possible and also not appropriate to have contacts to 
institutional investors to the same degree as the IROs or the managers of the 
management board. In order to avoid unnecessary duplication of the work in 
building the relationship with institutional investors. companies should have a good 
overview of the perception and its development and the magnitude of the concerns 
of the institutional investors. This is true for their strengths, as well as their 
weaknesses. 
Prerequisites for institutional investors to induce change and exercise 
power 
Based on the answers of the study participants. various measures and success 
factors for prompting change can be derived. These are as follows (see Figure 
7.3): 
(1) A long-term investment perspective; 
(2) The necessity of an open discussion alongside the regular one-on-ones in 
order to position themselves and their strategies vis-a-vis the company; 
(3) The use of voting rights in the AGM; and 
(4) The institutional investor needs to be prepared to increase its existing stake 
in order to exert more voting influence at the AGM. In such a case, 
collaboration with other institutional investors can also be helpful to initiate 
changes. 
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Figure 7.3: Prerequisites for institutional investors to induce change in 
corporations and exercise institutional power. 
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Management, who wants to avoid these situations are well advised to listen openly 
to the concerns of their institutional investors and to track the major issues and 
concerns related to their company. As already mentioned, conducting regular 
perception studies - also around strategically important special issues like 
compensation , corporate finance, composition of the business portfolio, M&A 
activities - can be very helpful to open up discussions and initiate change without 
any confrontation via the media or voting results in the AGM. A prerequisite is a 
certain level of objectivity and readiness within the management and supervisory 
board to discuss critical issues openly. 
Therefore, it is important for a company to have a good knowledge base about 
their shareholder structure and to monitor changes regularly. A shift towards 
another type of investor can change the engagement level of their shareholders. 
The positive thing here is that not just one type of investor is likely to induce 
changes. 
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In order to escalate the issues to the AGM or even to take a seat in the 
supervisory board of the particular company, some prerequisites need to be 
fulfilled. They are as follows: 
(1) Institutional investors need to pursue a clear and transparent strategy and 
position vis-a-vis the company and know how to increase the company's 
value; 
(2) Institutional Investors need a long-term commitment to the company; 
(3) Institutional investors need to be prepared to collaborate with other 
shareholders; 
(4) Institutional investors need to be ready to increase their stake to a 
meaningful level. Therefore, they need a sufficient proportion of the funds 
assets dedicated for these special situations. 
A broader scope of research and analysis is necessary which incorporates not 
only financial performance. Other factors, like evaluation of the strategy, the 
analysis of the governance structure, as well as social and environmental issues, 
are necessary. Furthermore, the money manager must be in a position to reflect 
on and make an accurate assessment of the trends that might have an impact on 
the business model and the financial performance of the company. If they are able 
to clearly identify and evaluate these value drivers, incorporate them into their 
model of research and analysis and if they have the necessary structures in place 
to struggle with corporate governance issues on a longer-term base, they have a 
good chance of being successful in their engagement activities and playing a 
strong role in executing their responsibilities of corporate governance as owners of 
their companies. Additionally, their findings and comments may be valuable for the 
company. They should also try to verify if their behaviour is in the interest of the 
company and their beneficial owners in order to create long-term value instead of 
going for short-term profit maximisation and self-interest. Taking a seat in the 
supervisory board is therefore a strong signal of the long-term commitment of an 
institutional investor to the company. 
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7.4 Limitations of the study and further research direction 
This study has some limitations. In the literature, primary data regarding the role of 
institutional investors in the corporate governance of German listed companies is 
almost non-existent. The existing research is broadly focused on common law 
countries and archival data. One limitation of this interpretativist study is that 
external validity might not be addressed broadly enough since the research 
findings are concluded from only twenty members of supervisory boards and 
investor relations officers from German listed companies. Nevertheless, various 
statistical tests have proven the reliability of the research model and that there is 
good internal consistency. It can be argued that this limitation also makes it difficult 
to generalise the findings statistically, even though the interviews were carefully 
researched. The aim of this study was not generalisation, but to develop an 
understanding of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance and 
how it can be exercised. An advantage of this research is that I was able to use 
my personal relationships and managed to get access to a very focused sample of 
companies and their interviewees at a very high level in the corporate hierarchy, 
which does not usually happen in such research studies. The author only talked to 
interviewees, who are active in this business and deal with these issues on a daily 
basis. To achieve more external validity, future research should also interview 
other members of the executive level from major German listed companies. The 
characteristics of the listed companies make it easy to identify the right target 
persons. Future research could be conducted by way of a larger scale 
investigation. Additional future research can be executed in other countries using 
the questionnaire and the research model. Furthermore, that would allow a cross-
country comparison. Therefore, the variables of the research model can be used 
for future research. 
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7.5 Reflective diary 
Writing my doctoral thesis was a long awaited aspiration. In the early nineties, 
after my studies in business administration, I considered writing a doctoral thesis 
for the first time. It was always my goal to do it part-time, parallel to my work, 
which is not easy to do in Germany. After an in-depth analysis, I decided to do my 
MBA. I graduated in 1996, however, writing the doctoral thesis was always a 
secret goal of mine. I was always aware of the fact that, if I would were to start 
such a long-term project, it needed to be on a really good, current and interesting 
subject, which could hold my attention for many years. In 2008, I conducted a 
research study on compensation committees. This study was closely related to my 
day-to-day work and dealt with the reporting behaviour of German and Swiss listed 
companies in relation to their disclosure policy regarding management 
remuneration. In the course of that project, I developed an interest in the subject of 
corporate governance and found the idea of writing a doctoral thesis about it quite 
attractive. Since I have lead the investor relations departments for large and 
medium-sized German companies for almost ten years, I was convinced that it 
would be a good idea to combine these two subjects. Therefore, I was in the 
position to combine my practical experience as an IRO with exploring the new 
subject of corporate governance. The University of Surrey was an appropriate 
place to write my doctoral thesis for the following two reasons: 
(1) The UK was the leading corporate governance development with the 
initiation of various codes, which many countries used as a blueprint. 
(2) One specialist area at the Management School of the University of Surrey is 
corporate governance from finance, economics and accounting 
perspectives. 
The research journey was a very unique and interesting experience in my life. 
During this journey, I was able to collect significant and valuable knowledge and 
competence in professional research methodology. I can also transfer this 
knowledge quite well in my day-to-day projects as a consultant advising listed 
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companies in Germany and Switzerland according to their corporate and financial 
communications activities. 
It was very useful to take part in research workshops in the first year to gain an 
appropriate knowledge base on how to conduct a scientific research project. 
The first workshop helped me to set up a sound basis of the philosophical 
underpinnings of research methods. Furthermore, I developed a good 
understanding of the differences between a DBA and a PhD thesis and 
qualification. It was also very interesting to learn more about the differences 
between the inductive and deductive approach to research design. After the 
assignment, I was able to adopt the epistemological and ontological underpinnings 
of research. 
The second workshop helped me to gain a good understanding of quantitative 
research methods. I learned how to deal with statistical software programmes like 
SPSS. Furthermore, in the quantitative research module, I learned more about 
significance tests like regressions, parametric and non-parametric tests, reliability 
and how to draw a sample. The lessons of the quantitative research module were 
very useful in the analysis of my own research project. I not only learned the 
methods, but also how to apply them accurately and to judge their robustness. I 
also developed an understanding of the differences in research design 
approaches and how to apply and interpret an appropriate significance test to 
data. 
In the third workshop, I was provided with the understanding and application of 
qualitative research methodology, design and methods to research undertaken in 
a workplace context. I learned to adopt my research subject within the context of a 
qualitative research designand to take a critical and defendable perspective. 
Furthermore, I learned how to develop a research question, and set out an 
appropriate and logical methodological approach to resolve the research question. 
I gained a deeper knowledge of case study research design, qualitative and semi-
structured interviews, focus group interviews, cognitive mapping, template coding, 
analysing qualitative data and their strength and weaknesses. During writing the 
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assignment on the subject of 'Topics and criteria that matter in corporate 
governance', I was able to relate my research topic to the research process for the 
first time. This assignment was very helpful in the writing of my research proposal 
later on. Additionally, I was able to align my practical experience of conducting 
perception studies for large blue-chip companies with the qualitative research 
approach. 
In the workshop 'critical evaluation', I learned how to evaluate other research. 
During the course of that lecture, I gained the experience to carry out a critical 
assessment of a research paper and how to engage critically as a reader of 
management texts, research reports and proposals. The workshop introduced the 
components of a structured approach for reviewing literature that focuses on in-
depth critical analysis of individual texts. It was very valuable to develop the ability 
of making informed independent judgements on complex management issues. 
After the workshop and writing of the assignment, I was able to develop a logical 
structure and discussion of an academic paper. While browsing and searching 
through different literature databases, I learned about the different quality of 
journals and other publications available. I gained experience in identifying the 
strengths and weaknesses of research methodologies, contribution and overall 
style of various published research papers. In addition, I developed skills, which 
allowed me to comment on the limitations and transferability of the reported 
research findings to both research and workplace settings. I learned how to 
develop and apply a checklist for a critical literature review and gained more 
insights into academic writing at the doctoral level. This learning gave me a good 
foundation and was very helpful in writing my own literature review. 
One of the most intriguing and interesting assignments was the writing of my own 
proposal and planning my own research project. I acquired a good understanding 
of the requirements of a suitable research design and how to apply it to my own 
research project. I learned how to use the online library and how to carry out an 
effective literature search. During the literature review, I gained the first insights 
into the existing literature and the conceptual and theoretical approaches, which 
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are related to my research topic. During the writing of my own proposal, I learned 
how to distil and logically structure my own ideas into an acceptable proposal. 
A positive side effect of the first year was to become acquainted with other DBA 
students, compare their experiences, and learn about their goals and motivations 
for writing a DBA thesis. Having set up these relationships was also helpful for the 
duration of the research project. 
Writing the literature review gave me good understanding of the actual status of 
corporate governance, its fundamentals, development and scope. It was very 
interesting to learn more about the developments in the academic research, the 
theoretical frameworks of corporate governance, the various guidelines and the 
role of institutional investors. The latter had a significant impact in the development 
of the research model and the design of the questionnaire. Formulating the 
research question was one of the most challenging parts of the project. However, 
after the research question was clearly formulated, it was much easier to develop 
the research model and the semi-structured questionnaire. It was very interesting 
to discuss the questionnaire with various academics and practitioners. That was 
the first check to see if it was an actual subject and if it could attract the interest of 
the respondents. It was quite easy to get a few people to do the pilot test. Their 
comments and remarks improved the quality and logic of the questionnaire and in 
the end the questionnaire was more consistent. 
Conducting the interviews was an impressive experience. The contacts to 
supervisory board members, former bosses and IRO colleagues were very helpful 
in getting their attention and setting up the meetings. It was a new situation since 
they viewed me as a researcher and not as a former colleague or a business 
partner. The interview partners talked very openly and each interview took longer 
than expected. Furthermore, I also recognised that they showed a high level of 
trust in me because I could potentially use the knowledge gained about them in 
future business situations. Therefore, I had to follow high ethical standards and 
show professionalism in order to distinguish between the business-to-business 
and the business-to-researcher relationship. 
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I prepared the transcript of each interview immediately after it had taken place. 
Right after the interviews, I combined all the open questions into one document. 
This helped me to structure the comments and answers of the interviewees. By 
using this approach, it was not that difficult to define the codes and categorise the 
qualitative statements. Nevertheless, it constituted a large amount of information 
and qualitative comments. 
For the analysis of the closed-ended questions, I used the software SPSS and 
wrote a comprehensive codebook. However, it was not easy to get started. After 
talking to my supervisors, I realised that I needed to keep it as Simple as possible. 
Writing the codebook was very helpful in structuring my thoughts and setting up 
the SPSS database. However, the software set-up of SPSS was quite frustrating 
at the beginning since the Windows software version was not compatible with my 
Apple computer. It took me more than three weeks to solve this IT problem. It was 
very interesting to realise from the Significance tests that I had developed a very 
robust research model. In the study findings, I elaborated on the categorised and 
coded findings, as well as on the descriptive statistics. Afterwards, I explained the 
research findings and linked them to the research model and the literature 
reviews. 
In conclusion, the work on my research project helped me to progress in terms of 
academic rigour by adapting my intuitive and experiential thinking processes, 
sharpening my knowledge about different research paradigms and associated 
methodologies, and increasing my experience with qualitative research methods. I 
learned to read literature critically, to create a research proposal that can stand up 
to a peer review and to conduct a research project that delivers valuable data for 
analysis. 
Critical thinking also began to become a part of my life, such as while reading the 
newspaper or in discussions with my family and friends. I actually find it especially 
valuable in my business life, where I am able to use it to create solid chains of 
evidence in discussions and negotiations. The work on my DBA thesis showed me 
how to approach management problems at the doctoral level scientifically by using 
highly sophisticated research methods. The experience I acquired during that 
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research journey was very helpful and also improved my day-to-day business 
practice. Therefore, the learning and experiences that enriched my life in this 
journey is something I would not have missed for the world. 
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9 Appendix 
9.1 An empirical review of academic research 2005 - 2009 
In order to observe a pattern in the previous research, a review of a selection of academic journals has been carried out. The journals 
included in the analysis are the Journal of Finance (4 articles), the Journal of Financial Economics (1 article), the Journal of Business 
Research (4 articles), Corporate Governance: An International Review (29 articles), and the Strategic Management Journal (6 
articles). Total: 44 articles 
Corporate Common Country Research Article Topicl Issue Date Findings! 
governan lawvs. Methodl Research Remarks 
ce theory civil law Source of question 
- Articles countries Data 
referring 
toCG 
theory 
Journal 
of 
Finance 
Agency Common USA Archival Entrepreneurial Activism 02!2009 Entrepreneurial activists experience great 
Data (130) Shareholder campaigns success in getting existing management to 
2003- Activism: Hedge acquiesce to their demands. Hedge funds enjoy 
2005 Funds and a success rate of 60%, and other entrepreneurial 
Other Private activists accomplish their objectives 65% of the 
Equity Investors time. 
Hedge funds appear to address the free cash 
-----
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I 
I 
I 
! 
flow problem, as articulated by Jensen (1986). 
Under this theory, firms can reduce agency 
conflicts between managers and shareholders by 
reducing excess cash on hand, and by obligating 
managers to make continuous payouts in the 
form of increased dividends and interest 
payments to creditors. 
In contrast, other entrepreneurial activists appear 
to redirect the investment strategies of their 
targeted firms. In their initial Schedule 13Ds, they 
most frequently demand changes in the targets' 
operating strategies. 
Agency Common USA Archival Agency Managerial 08/2009 Using a sample of U.S. dual-class companies, 
Data Problems at extraction we examine how divergence between insider 
Dual-Class voting and cash flow rights affects managerial 
Companies. extraction of private benefits of control. We find that as this divergence widens, corporate cash 
holdings are worthless to outside shareholders, 
CEOs receive higher compensation, managers 
make shareholder value-destroying acquisitions 
more often, and capital expenditures contribute 
less to shareholder value. These findings support 
the agency hypothesis that managers with 
greater excess control rights over cash flow 
rights are more prone to pursue private benefits 
at shareholders' expense, and help explain why 
firm value is decreasing in insider excess control 
rights. 
Agency Common USA Archival Attracting Informal 6/2008 The analysis shows that the presence of strong 
Data Attention: communicat agency conflicts that require the use of high-
Cheap ion between powered incentive compensation should be 
Managerial Talk I firms and accompanied by more intense disclosure of 
XXVI 
and Costly capital information by managers. 
Market markets Managerial disclosure of information, even Monitoring though hampered by agency conflicts, plays a 
role in attracting attention and directing market 
research. This trade-off suggests a theory of 
discretionary disclosure whereby firms may want 
to regulate the disclosure of information to attract 
speculation in certain cases but discourage it in 
others. 
New regulations may produce, contrary to their 
intended objective, higher rather than lower 
information asymmetries among different market 
participants. 
Agency Common USA Archival Board Seat Number of 08/2005 When fewer agency concerns exist, additional 
Data Accumulation by directorship directorships relate to increased firm value. 
Executives: A s Announcement returns are also higher when 1994- Shareholder's executives accept an outside directorship in a 1996 Perspective financial, high-growth, or related industry firm. 
Our results suggest that outside directorships for 
executives can enhance firm value. 
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Corporate Common Country Research Article Subject! Issue Date Findingsl 
governance lawvs. Methodl Topic Remarks 
theory - civil law Source of 
Articles countries Data 
referring to 
CG theory 
Journal of 
Financial 
Economics 
Agency Civil Germany Archival Does good Employee Journal of The authors found that labour 
Bloomberg governance representation Financial representation provides a powerful include Economics means of monitoring and reduces 
Worldscope employee 12/2006 agency costs within the firm. Moreover, 
representation? they show that the greater the need for 
Evidence from coordination within the firm, the greater 
German the potential improvement there is in 
corporate governance effectiveness through the 
boards judicious use of labour representation. 
~~.--- ~--
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Corporate Common Country Research Article Subjectl Issue Findingsl 
governance lawvs. Method/Source Topic Date Remarks 
theory - civil law of Data 
Articles countries 
referring to 
CG theory 
Journal of 
Business 
Research 
Agency n/a nla Archival Institutional Institutional 08/2005 The largest owner's concentration is 
Thomson Ownership and ownership associated with lower levels of 
Financial's CEO and its affects compensation, as well as with higher 
shareworld Compensation: of CEO ratios of salary to total compensation 
database S&P a longitudinal compensation and lower ratios of options to total 
Executive examination compensation, but that the number of 
Comp database blockholders does not predict any 
aspects of CEO compensation. In 
addition, institutional ownership 
dispersion is associated with increased 
levels of compensation and greater use 
of incentive compensation. Finally, 
higher levels of CEO ownership lead to 
a significant reduction in the level of 
options compensation, as well as higher 
ratios of salary to total compensation 
and lower ratios of options to total 
compensation. 
Agency Common USA Archival Data Stock options Compensation 05/2006 The analysis lends partial support to 
expensing: An disclosure agency theory explanations for stock 
examination of option expensing; these results depend 
XXIX 
agency and on the costs associated with expensing. 
institutional Stronger support was found for the 
theory institutional theory perspective that 
explanations mimetic pressures significantly increase 
the likelihood that firms will expense 
stock options, independent of the cost. 
The findings suggesting a more 
complex model of compensation 
disclosure in which social pressures 
dominate voluntary compensation 
disclosure decisions. 
Agency and Archival The impact of Goal 10/2007 The results show that goal alignment 
stewardship goal alignment alignment in leads to different board composition 
on board non-quoted and significantly smaller board size. 
composition firms The analysis extends current 
and board size knowledge about board structures and 
in family board sizes in family businesses. In 
businesses addition, the paper contributes to 
theories of governance studies by 
providing an integrative and 
complementary use of agency and 
stewardship theory. 
Agency Common USA Publicly Stock options Stock option 2009 Option backdating firms have much higher agency costs compared to size-
available backdating and backdating and industry- matched control firms. financial agency cost This finding provides evidence that 
accounting stock option backdating is an indication information 
of a more wide-spread firm agency 
problem occurring within the firms. 
---- -----
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Corporate Common Country Research Article SubjecU Issue Findingsl 
governance lawvs. Method/Source Topic Date Remarks 
theory - civil law of Data 
Articles countries 
referring to 
CG theory 
Corporate 
Governance 
Agency Common USA 100 domestic Investors' Managerial 09/2006 First, this study provides strong support for the assertion that environmental 
acquisitions by perceptions of opportunism/ 
conditions influence the explanatory publicly-listed managerial Management 
firms SDC- opportunism behaviour power of agency theory in the context of investors' reaction to acquisition database in corporate 
announcements. Specifically, complex 
acquisitions 
and/or dynamic environments appear to 
exacerbate perceived agency problems 
and hence increase the importance of 
monitors when assessing the value of 
an acquisition. 
Second, the results also suggest that 
investors may perceive affiliate directors 
in a firm as effective monitors of top 
executives if these directors have an 
equity stake in the firm. 
Third, the findings highlight an 
interesting aberration when compared 
with prior research. Although investors 
may increase their reliance on effective 
boards to reduce information asymmetry 
between investors and top executives in 
a complex environment, the same 
XXXI 
\ environment may increase information 
asymmetry between directors and top 
executives resulting in less effective 
board monitoring 
Agency Civil Flemish 3400 firms from Board roles in Board roles 09/2006 Boards in Belgian small and medium-
part of a family- SME family sized family businesses perform two 
Belgium business businesses: aggregated board roles: control and 
database performance service. The control role is mainly based 
and on agency theory, whereas the service 
importance role embraces several theoretical perspectives. This study provides 
a static picture of the tasks and roles 
that boards perform. 
Stakeholder n.m. Europe nla The New Analysis and 03/2007 It is argued that the emergence of the 
Corporate consequenses SE will lay an effective ground for a 
Vehicle for European market for corporate control in all 
Societas corporate member states of the European Union. 
Europaea governance of The possibility to organise the 
(SE): the newly management of a SE as a one-tier or 
consequence created SE alternatively a two-tier system provides 
s for flexibility, and there is no reason to 
European expect that one system will prevail in 
corporate equilibrium. Furthermore, it seems 
governance plausible that the emergence of the SE 
company will, to some extent, put some 
pressure on the countries that have 
mandatory employee involvement in the 
decision process. For instance, 
employee involvement could be reduced 
to situations where the decision of the 
firm explicitly affects the well-being or 
utility of the employees or where the 
XXXII 
interests of other stakeholders are 
seriously at stake. 
Stakeholder Common Australia Longitudinal Corporate This paper 09/2007 The volume of environmental disclosure 
content study, Governance reports on the has increased. These findings indicate 
analysing the and quantity and that, should the identified trend continue, 
annual reports Environmenta categories of the amount of environmental information 
of 41 publicly I Reporting: environmental provided in corporate annual reports will 
traded an Australian information increase. This increase may be 
companies for study disclosed. sustained by initiatives such as 
the 21-year Environmental Reporting Awards, now 
period 1983 - well established in Australia, Europe and 
2003 Japan, and by "best practice" 
recommendations for corporate 
governance, which include the provision 
of environmental information to 
legitimate stakeholders. 
Agency I Common Australia Multi-method: The evolution Evolving 09/2007 Positioning of the board shifts toward 
stewardship , Survey with of Corporate perspectives and 
becoming a strategic partner to 
Canada, 658 corporate Governance: behaviour of 
management. The role of institutional 
New directors in four power directors and 
investors also shifted in ways that are 
Zealand, 
countries and redistribution institutional 
complementary to this new role of 
USA 34 institutional brings board investors 
directors (e.g. toward increased 
investors in to life 
monitoring). Research suggests that the 
board is evolving towards a more 
Canada collaborative role with management, 
Semi-structured consistent with the stewardship theory. 
face-ta-face 
interviews 
Agency I Common UK Exploratory Onwards and Reasons for the 09/2007 Reasons for changes: 
Expectancy study, adopting upwards: why continued Increase due to being below-market 
a multiple case companies increase in Changing performance-related schemes 
XXXlII 
approach. The change their executive that did not payout or paid less than 
study focuses executive directors' expected 
on the views of remuneration remuneration in 
the individuals, schemes, and large UK 
by means of why this leads companies. The 
semi-structured to increase in study focuses on 
face-to-face pay the underlying 
interviews with explanations. 
protagonists in 
the 
remuneration-
setting process 
in FTSE 350 
companies. 
Agency Common USA Archival data Moderators of Efficacy of stock- 11/2007 Use of director stock options and grants 
S&P 500 firms the based 
ratio was more strongly associated with 
from the period Relationship compensation 
positive performance in firms with (a) 
of 1995 - 97 Between for outside 
higher investment opportunities, and (b) 
Director directors weaker external monitoring. 
Stock-based 
Compen 
sation and 
Firm 
Performance 
Agency Common USA Primary and Investigating 07/2007 Increases in the proportion of outside 
secondary data the directors were associated with increases 
from 149 public Relationship in boards' information quality and 
US firms between proactive information seeking. Similarly, 
Survey Board 
increases in outsider tenure were 
Characteristic associated with increases in boards' 
s and Board frequency of interaction. The findings provide support for agency theory's 
XXXIV 
Information predictions that information asymmetry 
plays a central role in corporate 
governance 
Agency Civil Switzerl Archival data: Estimating Equity linked 09/2007 The equilibrium level of executive 
and 235 companies the Cost of compensation 
compensation is explained by economic 
Executive plans determinant variables such as firm size 
of the Swiss Stock and growth opportunities, whereas the Performance Options: pay-for-performance sensitivity remains Index, Annual 
reports, Evidence 
largely unexplained. Firms with larger 
from boards of directors pay higher wages, Datastream Switzerland indicating potentially unresolved agency database conflicts. 
Agency I Civil Egyptian Archival data: Does CEO CEO duality and 11/2007 CEO duality has no impact on corporate 
Stewardship listed Records of the duality really firm performance 
performance. However, when an 
firms affect interaction term between industry type Egyptian 
corporate and CEO duality is included in the Capital Market 
Agency performance 
model, the impact of CEO duality is on 
corporate governance. A result, that is 
(ECMA) over supportive of both agency theory and 
the time period stewardship theory. Additionally, when 
2000 - 2004. firms are categorised according to their 
financial performance, CEO duality 
attracts a positive and significant 
coefficient only when corporate 
performance is low. 
Agency I Common Australia Case-based Can Directors Firm 07/2007 The study found that while each theory 
Stewardship 1 methodology Impact performance can explain a particular case, no single 
Resource Performance? theory explains the general pattern of 
Dependence A case-based results. We conclude by endorSing 
test of three recent calls for a more process-
theories of orientated approach to both theory and 
corporate empirical analysis if we are to 
xxxv 
governance understand how boards add value. 
Agency 1 Commonl Europe, Empirical Are Socially Connection 05/2008 The study found a positive impact of 
Stakeholder Civil North Responsible between earnings management practices on Archival data earnings CSR. Also, it demonstrates that the America, Sample is Managers management combination of earnings management Australia Really 
composed of Ethical? and corporate and CSR has a negative impact on 593 industrial Exploring the social financial performance. This study offers firms from 26 Relationship responsibility insights for policy makers and managers 
countries between (CSR). interested in enhancing CSR. For included in the Earnings managers, the findings suggest that 2002 - 2004 projecting a socially-friendly image in 
SiRiPro Management order to disguise earnings management 
and database. Corporate cannot be sustained over time due to the detrimental effect on financial Social performance. Responsibility 
Agency Common UK Empirical The How 05/2008 The study found, that concerns with 
Remuneration remuneration legitimacy push remuneration 22 semi- Committee committees committees towards an institutional 
structured 
and Strategic design executive isomorphism in process and practice. interviews with Human pay 
members of the Resource arrangements 
remuneration Management 
committee 
Agency Common Canadia Empirical Dual-Class Association 03/2008 The study found that dual-class firms between non- pay a larger amount of non-audit fees to 
n Equity 
audit service the auditors, relative to single-class Structure, 
Non-audit purchases from firms, both in the absolute dollar amount 
Fees and the external auditors and as a ratio of total audit fees. In 
Information and the addition, the returns-earnings 
Content of corporate association is significantly lower for dual-
Earnings ownership class firms than for their counterparts. 
and there is a further valuation discount 
.. 
XXXVI 
structure. as dual-class firms increase non-audit 
service purchases 
Agency Civil Italy Archival Data Does Relationship 07/2008 The study supports the agency theory between and the managerial entrenchment 
Empirical Ownership ownership argument. Structure 
Sample Affect structure and The study found that the ownership 
includes all Performance? firm performance concentration of the five largest 
publicly traded Evidence shareholders is beneficial to firm 
Italian from the valuation. On the contrary, managerial 
companies over Italian Market ownership is beneficial only in non-
the period 2000 concentrated firms, suggesting that the 
- 2003: it controlling owner may use his/her 
consists of 297 position in the firm to extract private 
companies for benefits at the expense of the other 
932 firm-year shareholders by appointing managers 
observations that represent its own interest. 
Source: 
Consob 
Database and 
Datastream 
Agency Civil! Cross- Archival Disclosure on Determinants of 03/2008 The level of disclosure: (1) is lower for the level of companies with higher ownership Common country Empirical Corporate disclosure on concentration; (2) is higher for Governance 
Worldscope, in the EU corporate companies from common-law countries; 
Deminor Rating governance and (3) increases with the level of practices among working capital accruals. 
European listed 
I companies in the 
I time period 
I preceding the 
I adoption of the I 
----
~ 
-
European Union 
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recommendation 
s and Action 
Plan. 
Agency Commonl Cross- Empirical The Contest Influence of 05/2008 The study found that increased 
Civil country Archival data to the Control 
large contestability of the control of the largest 
in European shareholders on shareholder increases the value of 
Financial Family Firms: firm value using family-owned firms. Results also show 
statements and How other a sample of that in firms in which the largest 
Compustat Shareholders firms from shareholder is a family, a second family 
database Affect Firm 11 European shareholder reduces firm value. 
Sample Value countries, 
Conversely, an institutional investor as 
second shareholder increases firm 
includes 1208 specifically value. Likewise, better legal protection 
companies considering how 
from 11 the existence of 
of shareholders not members of the 
countries in the a controlling 
controlling coalition increases the value 
EU between coalition in 
of family firms. 
1996 - 2000. family-owned firms and the 
Civil law and contestability of 
common law control of the 
countries largest 
account for shareholder 
approx.55% affect the value 
and 45% of the family-
owned firms. 
Stewardship n/a nla Conceptual I Toward a Our study 07/2008 The study takes steps toward a theory of I Social Capital evaluates the director selection, explaining how social 
Theory of role of social capital at the individual-level influences 
Director capital in new director selection and at the group level 
Selection director influences board effectiveness. At the l selection, board individual level, social capital is defined composition, and as the interpersonal linkages that 
XXXVIII 
board director candidates have to others, both 
effectiveness. inside and outside the firm. At the group 
level, board social capital is an asset 
that includes both relations of directors 
and potential resources arising from the 
relations. 
Agency Common USA Empirical Corporate Impact of 09/2008 The study shows that CEO ownership 
Governance corporate and board independence affect the cash 1,500 S&P 
and Cash governance on holdings in listed new economy and old 
companies Holdings: the cash-holding economy firms differently. 
Regression Listed New policies of firms Specifically, higher managerial cash 
Analysis Economy and with different holdings tend to reduce cash holdings in investment Old Economy 
opportunities. old economy firms and higher board Firms independence tend to increase cash 
holdings in listed new economy firms. 
Agency Common Canada Empirical Audit The role of audit 11/2008 The study shows that the creation of an 
Committee, committees (AC) AC at the time of the IPO has no effect Securities Underpricing in the initial on under-pricing unless its members are Commission 
of IPOs, and public offering independent and have expertise in 
Accuracy of (lPO) process in financial matters, in which case it 
Management a governance decreases significantly the level of 
Earnings environment under-pricing of the IPO. However, no 
Forecasts where AC best significant association between these practices are two governance attributes and the 
well established accuracy of forecasts included in 
but their prospectuses were found. 
adoption is 
voluntary. 
Agency Common USA Empirical The Effect of This study 01/2008 The results indicate that earnings-return 
Audit examines associations for foreign registrants Form 20-F from Committees whether foreign without audit committees are 1998 - 2001 on registrants that __ significantly lower compared with those 
XXXIX 
the EDGAR on Earnings- choose not to of their US-matched firms, which are 
database, Return establish audit required to establish audit committees. 
Compustat Association: committees in This result is even more pronounced 
Evidence the US have after the introduction of new audit 
from Foreign generally lower committee rules in 1999 aimed at 
Registrants in earnings-return increasing the responsibilities of audit 
the US associations. committees. In addition, earnings-return 
associations of foreign registrants are 
found to increase following the 
establishment of audit committees. 
Overall, our results are consistent with 
the idea that the establishment of audit 
committees may be related to higher 
earnings-return associations. 
Agency Common Canada Empirical Board of This study 01/2009 The results provide evidence that the 
examines the use of non-financial performance 
184 public Directors, associations measures in the CEO bonus plan varies CEO 
companies Ownership, between the predictably. Growth opportunities are listed on the 
and the Use board of positively associated with the firm's Toronto Stock 
of Non- director's choice choice to integrate non-financial Exchange at Financial to integrate non- information into the CEO bonus plan. the end of 2000 Performance financial The results are also sensitive to our 
System for Measures in performance proxy for board independence and CEO 
Electronic the CEO measures into ownership in firms with high growth 
Document Bonus Plan the CEO bonus opportunities. 
Analysis and plan and two 
Retrieval other 
Database and governance 
Compustat mechanisms -board database independence 
Multiple logistic and 
regression 
XL 
model CEO ownership 
Stakeholder Commonl Anglo- Conceptual Corporate This paper 01/2009 The morality underlying different models 
Civil Saxon Governance frames the of corporate governance has largely 
vs Convergence debate on been ignored in the corporate 
Continen and Moral corporate governance convergence literature. A 
tal Relativism governance range of moral philosophies and 
Europe/J convergence in principles that underlie the dominant 
apan terms of the corporate governance models are 
morality identified. This leads to a consideration 
underlying of the claims and arguments of moral 
corporate relativism relating to corporate 
governance governance. A research agenda around 
models. The the claims of descriptive and meta-
claims and ethical moral relativism, and which 
arguments of ultimately informs the associated 
moral relativism normative argument, is then suggested. 
are presented to 
provide 
theoretical 
structure to the 
moral aspects of 
corporate 
governance 
convergence, 
and ultimately 
the normative 
question of 
whether 
convergence 
should occur. 
Agency Common US Empirical Determinants The study 11/2009 The study found that firms with a larger, 
and examines the more independent. and more active Sample of S&P determinants of board, higher aQency costs (as indicated 
XLI 
1,500 firms Accounting forming a by lower managerial ownership and 
over the period Consequence governance lower takeover vulnerability), and past 
of 1996 to 2002 s of Forming committee and occurrence of class-action lawsuits are 
a Governance whether such a more likely to voluntarily form a 
Committee: committee governance committee. This study also 
Evidence constrains provides evidence that having a 
from the US managerial governance committee brings real 
opportunism consequences in that it constrains 
managerial opportunism by reducing 
aggressive financial reporting. 
Agency I Common Anglo- Conceptual Governance This paper 09/2009 We introduce firm performance as a 
Stewardship Saxon Research Bundles, Firm extends the critical contingency that heightens 
Performance, theory of shareholders' concerns over 
and the bundles of governance issues as they seek to 
Substitutabilit corporate retain control over adverse selection and 
yand governance moral hazard problems. We propose 
Complementa mechanisms to that when firms are performing poorly, 
rityof address agency outside monitoring by institutional 
Governance issues within the investors can complement internal 
Mechanisms Anglo-Saxon monitoring by boards of directors. 
system of 
corporate 
governance. The 
focus of the 
study is to detail 
the role of firm 
performance as 
a key 
determinant of 
how the 
governance 
mechanisms of 
monitoring and 
XLII 
incentive 
alignment serve 
as complements 
or substitutes in 
addressing 
agency issues. 
Agency Common Australia Empirical Governance This study 11/2009 The study finds that ownership 
Mechanisms examines concentration has a negative impact on 
and Firm whether board independence, but no impact on 
Sample of Value: The ownership audit committee independence. Results 
Australian Impact of concentration also suggest that board independence 
publicly listed Ownership affects board enhances firm value and that 
firms over the Concentration and audit performance impact of board 
period 2000- and committee independence is stronger in closely-held 
2005 Dividends independence, firms and!or firms having low dividend 
and whether the payouts. A marginally positive impact of 
impact of board audit committee independence, 
and audit especially among closely-held firms, is 
committee also found. 
independence 
on firm value is 
moderated by 
ownership 
concentration 
and dividend 
payouts. 
Agency Common! 27 Empirical Legal The study 01!2009 The study found that independent of 
Civil countrie Institutions, examines managerial risk-aversion, CEO pay is 
s 
Remuneration Board whether anti- always less generous under stricter anti-data provided Diligence, director laws and director rules and a stronger rule of law. by Towers legal director 
Perrin and Top liability rules Director liability rules are associated with Executive 
affect the more generous pay schemes. The 
XLIII 
Pay diligence of results persist once we control for the 
directors in presence of institutional investors and 
setting the cross-listing in the US. 
compensation of 
CEOs. 
Agency! n.m. n.m. Review of a Private Equity Assessment of 05!2009 Private equity firms are heterogeneous 
Stewardship! comprehensive and the role of in their characteristics and activities. 
Institutional! selection of Corporate Corporate Nevertheless, a corporate governance 
Stakeholder theoretical and Governance: Governance and structure with private equity involvement 
empirical Retrospect the impact of provides incentives to reduce agency 
papers and Prospect Private Equity and free cash flow problems. Additionally, private equity enhances the 
efficacy of the market for corporate 
control. Private equity investment is 
associated with performance gains, with 
such gains not simply being a result of 
transfers from other stakeholders. In the 
short term, the benefits appear clear to 
outgoing owners and to the new owners 
and management while in the longer 
term the benefrts are less clear. While 
non-financial stakeholders argue that 
other stakeholders suffer in the short 
and long term, the evidence to support 
this view is at best mixed. 
Agency! n.m. n.m. Editorial Taking Stock The article 05/2009 This includes taking a more holistic 
Behavioural! of Corporate identifies some approach to corporate governance 
I nstitutionall Governance key issues for issues and developing an inter-
Resource- Research the analysis of disciplinary perspective 
based While Looking corporate by building on agency theory while governance to the Future based on the considering the rich new insights offered 
articles within by complementary theories, such as 
XLIV 
this special behavioural theory, institutional theory 
review issue and the resource-based views of the 
coupled with our firm. In particular, future corporate 
own governance research needs to be 
perspectives. conducted in multiple countries 
Our aim in this Our analysis suggests that analytic and issue is to distil 
some research regulatory approaches to corporate 
streams in the governance issues should move from a 
field and identify "one-size-fits-alJ" template to taking into 
account organizational, institutional and 
opportunities for 
national contexts. future research. 
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Corporate Common law Country Research Article Subject! Issue Findingsl 
governance vs. civil law Method/Source Topic Date Remarks 
theory - countries of Data 
Articles 
referring to 
CG theory 
Strategic 
Management 
Journal 
Agency Common USA 206 US publicly CEO Relationship 04/2006 These results provide 
traded firms incentives between CEO substantial support for our 
provided by , pay, innovation, contention that 
CHI Research innovation and firm technology intensive firms 
Inc. The , and performance perform better when their 
sample performan CEOs' incentives are 
represented a cein linked to a holistic set of 
variety of technolog financial results and 
industries. y-intense innovation quality 
firms: a indicators, while the same 
reconciliat is not true for less 
ion of technology-intensive 
outcome firms. This again 
and suggests that for agency 
behaviour predictions to be 
-based meaningful in terms of the 
incentive determinants and 
schemes consequences of CEO pay design, it is critical to 
take context into account. 
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Agency Common USA US Agency Relationship 2006 The main implication of 
manufacturing hazards between the this study is that firms' 
firms and firm's inside decisions regarding 
Period 1993-97 alliance 
ownership and investments in alliances 
portfolios its subsequent are sensitive to the investment in presence or absence of 
IJVs, agency hazards that arise 
from the separation of 
ownership and control. 
Agency 100 randomly Board Effect on 2008 We have advanced the 
selected vigilance, acquisition case that traditional 
acquisitions of director outcomes of the agency theory 
publicly traded experienc interaction of considerations may not 
firms made by e, and board vigilance be sufficient for 
other publicly corporate and director describing the range of 
traded firms of outcomes experiential potential contributions an 
each of the learning effective board can 
years 1997 provide when 
through 2001 management pursues a 
(totalling 500 corporate acquisition. 
acquiisitions) 
Hierarchical 
regression 
models 
Agency Common USA Longitudinal The Based on the We find that a longer sample of 293 prospect theory 2008 CEO career horizon is 
public U.S. firms accentuat 
over a five-year ed CEO 
and agency associated with a higher 
period (1995- career theory, we likelihood of international 
1999). , horizon emphasize the acquisitions. We also find 
I problem: legacy that CEOs nearing I evidence conservation retirement with high levels and wealth of in-the-money 
XLVII 
from preservation unexercised options and 
internatio concerns of equity holdings are less 
nal CEOs and likely to engage in 
acquisitio investigate how international acquisitions 
ns their holdings of than CEOs with low levels 
in-the-money of in-the-money options 
unexercised and equity holdings. 
options and firm 
equity 
accentuate or 
mitigate the 
career horizon 
problem. 
Agency Canada The Implementation 2009 Our findings reveal that 
implement of special when agency problems 
ation of attributes of are higher, manifested by 
special CEO larger control premiums 
attributes compensation and poor firm 
of CEO contracts is performance, boards of determined directors tend to 
compensa implement stronger tion 
contracts mechanisms of incentive 
around alignment around M&A 
M&A transactions. Boards are 
transactio reactive rather than 
ns. 
proactive in dealing with 
agency problems. 
Stakeholder Common/Civil Cross- Archival National We examine the 09/2009 The study found support 
national Corporate characteristics for the predictions that Cross-national Governan of national stronger legal protection dataset of systems of of shareholder rights in 
corporate ce corporate the acquirer country 
acquisitions institution governance to compared to the target 
XLVIII 
and post- s and theorize about country increases the 
acquisition post- the nature of the acquirer's ability to 
reorganization acquisitio shareholders' restructure the target's 
n target and employees' assets and leverage the 
reorganiz interests when it target's resources, while 
ation comes to the protection of 
reorganization, employee rights in the 
under the target country restricts the 
assumption that acquirer's ability to 
the firm is restructure the target's 
coalitional in assets and redeploy 
nature. We resources to and from the 
argue that target. 
corporate 
governance 
institutions 
prevalent in 
both the host 
and the target 
country of the 
merging firms 
enable or 
constrain the 
ability of the 
acquirer to 
reorganize the 
target. 
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UNIVERSITY OF 
SURREY 
9.2 Questionnairelinterview guideline 
TECHNISCHE 
UNIVERS IT.h. T 
DARMSTADT 
Questionnaire - The Role of Institutional Investors 14 in Corporate 
Governance: Evidence from German Corporations 
Role of institutional investors in corporate governance 
1. Board Overs ight 
1.1 To what extent do institutional investors ensure effective supervisory and management 
board oversight? 
0= none at 1 = very 2 = weak 3= 4 = strong 5 = very 
all weak medium strong 
Supervisory board 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Management board 0 0 0 0 0 0 
14 Institutional investors are organisations that pool large sums of money and invest those sums in companies. 
They include banks, insurance companies, penSion funds, hedge funds, endowments, sovereign wealth funds 
and private equ ity . 
L 
UNIVE ITy or 
SURREY 
TCCI-I ISCHE 
UNIVERSITAT 
DARMSTADT 
1.2 What are the most important and typical measures that have been or should be used by 
institutional investors to oversee and control the supervisory and management 
boards? Please name up to five and comment. 
o None at all. Please explain why. 
1. ____________________________________________________ __ 
2. ______________________________________________________ __ 
3. ________________________________________________________ __ 
4. ____________________________________________________ __ 
5. ______________________________________________________ __ 
1.3 Institutional investors add value to supervisory and management board oversight. 
o = I strongly 1 = I somewhat 2 = I 3 = I strongly 4 = I very 
disagree agree agree agree strongly agree 
Supervisory board 0 0 0 0 0 
Management board 0 0 0 0 0 
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1.4 How and why can institutional investors add value to supervisory and management 
board oversight? Please elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages. 
o None at all. Please explain why. 
Advantages: __________________________________________________________ ___ 
Disadvantages: _______________________________________________________ ___ 
In general: ___________________________________________________________ _ 
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2.1 To what extent do institutional investors focus on the composition of the 
supervisory board? 
0= 1 = very 2= 3= 4 = 5 = very 6 = no 
none at weak weak medium strong strong opinion 
all 
In general 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
In particular 
Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Insurances 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pension funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hedge funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Endowments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SWF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Private Equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
German institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others, please specify 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2.2 Institutional investors add value to the supervisory board nomination. 
o = I strongly 1 = I somewhat 2 = I agree 3 = I strongly 4 = I very strongly 
disagree agree agree agree 
0 0 0 0 0 
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2.3 How and why can institutional investors add value to the supervisory board 
nomination? Please elaborate on the advantages and disadvantages. 
o None at all. Please explain why. 
Advantages : ________________________________________________________ __ 
Disadvantages: ______________________________________________________ ___ 
In general: __________________________________________________________ __ 
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3. Improvement of company value 
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3.1 To what extent do institutional investors add value to the process of value creation? 
0= None 1 = very 2= 3 = medium 4 = 5 = very 
at all weak weak strong strong 
In general 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I n particular 
Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Insurances 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pension funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hedge funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Endowments 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SWF 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Private Equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 
German institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others, please specify 0 0 0 0 0 0 
6 = no 
opinion 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
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3.2 What are the most common measures that have been or should be used by institutional 
investors to identify potential to increase company value? Please name up to five 
measures and comment. 
o None at all . Please explain why. 
1. __________________________________________________ ___ 
2. ____________________________________________________ ___ 
3. ____________________________________________________ ___ 
4. ____________________________________________________ ___ 
5. ________________________________________________ _ 
3.3 Institutional investors can identify potential to increase company value. 
0=1 strongly disagree 1 =1 somewhat agree 2=1 agree 3 = I strongly agree 4 = I very strongly agree 
0 0 0 0 0 
3.4 How and why can institutional investors identify potential to increase company 
value? Please explain . 
o None at all. Please explain why. 
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4. Recommendations to the company 
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4.1 To what extent do institutional investors make recommendations to the company? 
0= None 1 = very 2= 3 = medium 4 = 5 = very 6 = no 
at all weak weak strong strong opinion 
In general 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
In particular 
Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Insurances 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pension funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hedge funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Endowments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SWF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Private Equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
German institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others, please specify 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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4.2 What are the most important measures that have been or should be used by 
institutional investors in making recommendations? Please name up to five and 
comment. 
o None at all. Please explain why. 
1. __________________________________________________ ___ 
2. __________________________________________________ ___ 
3. __________________________________________________ ___ 
4. ______________________________________________________ _ 
5. ________________________________________________ __ 
4.3 Institutional investors add value to the company when they make recommendations. 
o = I strongly 1 = I somewhat 2 = I agree 3 = I strongly 4 = I very strongly 
disagree agree agree agree 
0 0 0 0 0 
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4.4 How are the recommendations of institutional investors generally handled or how 
should they be handled within the company? Please elaborate on the advantages and 
disadvantages. 
o None at all. Please explain why. 
Advantages : _____________________________ _ 
Disadvantages: _____________________________ _ 
Ingeneral : __________________________________ ___ 
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5. Inducing changes in corporate strategy 
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5.1 To what extent do institutional investors prompt changes in corporate strategy? 
0= None 1 = very 2= 3 = 4 = 5 = very 6 = no 
at all weak weak medium strong strong opinion 
In general 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
In particular 
Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Insurances 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pension funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hedge funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Endowments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SWF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Private Equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
German institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others, please specify 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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5.2 What are the most common measures that have been or should be used by institutional 
investors to prompt change in corporate strategy? 
Please name up to five and comment. 
o None at all . Please explain why. 
1. __________________________________________________ ___ 
2. __________________________________________________ ___ 
3. ________________________________________________ ___ 
4, ________________________________________________ ___ 
5. ________________________________________________ ___ 
5.3 Institutional investors add value to the company when they prompt change in strategy. 
o ::: I strongly 1 ::: I 2::: I agree 3 ::: I strongly 4 ::: I very strongly agree 
disagree somewhat agree 
agree 
0 0 0 0 0 
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5.4 What are the most common company situations/events in which institutional investors 
prompt change? Please name up to five and comment. 
o None at all. Please explain why. 
1. ________________________________________________________ __ 
2. __________________________________________________________ _ 
3. ____________________________________________________ ___ 
4. ______________________________________________________ __ 
5. ______________________________________________________ __ 
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6. Exercise of institutional power 
6.1 How do institutional investors exercise their power? 
0= 1 = 2= 
none at all very weak weak 
No voice/no feedback 0 0 0 
Exit/sell the shares 0 0 0 
Loyalty 0 0 0 
Personal discussions 0 0 0 
Proposals to AGM 0 0 0 
Seat in the supervisory board 0 0 0 
Others, please specify 0 0 0 
3= 
medium 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
4 = 
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5= 
strong very strong 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
LXIII 
U IVERSJTY OF SURREY TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITli.T DARMSTADT 
6.2 What measures have been or should be used by institutional investors to exercise their 
institutional power? Please name up to five and comment. 
o None at all. Please explain why. 
1. ______________________________________________________ _ 
2. ________________________________________________ __ 
3. ____________________________________________________ __ 
4. ________________________________________________________ __ 
5. ________________________________________________ __ 
6.3 Institutional investors increase the value of the company when they exercise 
their power. 
o = I strongly 1 = I somewhat 2 = I agree 3 = I strongly 4 = I very strongly agree 
disagree agree agree 
0 0 0 0 0 
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7.4 What are the most common company situations and events in which institutional 
investors exercise their power? Please name up to five and comment. 
o None at all. Please explain why 
1. __________________________________________________ _ 
2. __ -----------------------------------------------
3. ________________________________________________ _ 
4. __________________________________________________ ___ 
5. ____ -------------------------------------------
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7. How do you think the role of institutional investors in corporate governance 
is developing? Where do you see the advantages and disadvantages? 
Advantages ____________________________________________________________ __ 
Disadvantages: _______________________________________________________ _ 
Ingeneral __________________________________________________________ ___ 
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II. General information about the relationship with institutional investors 
1 What is the frequency of contact (e.g. , meetings, road shows, telephone calls) 
with institutional investors per year? 
None 1 - 20 contacts 21 - 50 contacts 51 - 100 contacts > 1 00 contacts 
0 0 0 0 0 
2 Is that frequency sufficient? Please comment. 
Yes No No opinion 
0 0 0 
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3 Institutional investors have a good understanding of the strategy and business model 
ofthe company. 
1 = I strongly 2 = I 3 = I 4 = I 5 = I very 6 = no 
disagree somewhat agree strongly strong ly opinion 
agree agree agree 
In general 0 0 0 0 0 0 
In particular 
Banks 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Insurances 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pension funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Hedge funds 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Endowments 0 0 0 0 0 0 
SWF 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Private Equity 0 0 0 0 0 0 
German institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Foreign institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Others, please specify 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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4 What are the major differences between the different types of institutional investors? 
Please name up to five and explain. 
o None at all. 
1. __________________________________________________ ___ 
2. ________________________________________________ _ 
3. __________________________________________________ _ 
4. __________________________________________________ _ 
5. __________________________________________________ ___ 
Many thanks for your time and commentsl 
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III General information about the participating company 
(will be filled out by the researcher) 
1. Membership of stock market index 
He,,! ISCHC 
UNIVERSITAT 
DARMSTADT 
Members of supervisory boards in company/ies belonging to the following indices 15 
2. Category of the interviewee 
Member of supervisory board CEO CFO IRO 
0 0 0 0 
3. Key figures 2010 
(Source: Annual Report 201 O/Company website) 
Sales: in EUR million 
Number of Employees: (end of 2010) 
EBIT: in EUR million 
15 Supervisory board members can represent and speak for more than one company. 
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4. Shareholder structure 
(Source: Annual Report 201 a/Company website) : 
by type of investor by region 
5. Market capitalisation 31.12.2010 
(Source: Annual Report 201 O/Company website , Deutsche Borse AG) : 
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Overall : _____ in EUR billion Free float _____ in EUR billion 
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9.3 Information sheet and consent form 
TECHNISCHC 
UNIVERSITAT 
DARMSTADT 
The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance: 
Evidence from German Corporations 
How Corporate Managers in German Listed Companies Experience 
the Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance 
An Empirical Study 
Researcher: Petra Nix, URN 609 46 36 
Purpose of the survey 
Petra Nix is a DBA student at the University of Surrey. The first supervisor is Dr. Jean Chen. The 
second supervisor is Prof. Dr. Dirk Schiereck, Technische Universitat Darmstadt. Furthermore, the 
study is supported by SIRN, the Scientific Investor Relations Network of the DIRK, the German 
Investor Relations Association . In the context of the dissertation Petra Nix is conducting semi-
structured personal interviews. The qualitative research study is conducted among members of the 
Supervisory Boards , CEOs, CFOs and IROs of German listed companies. 
Abstract and scope of the research project 
An important factor in global capital markets is the fast growing importance of institutional investors . 
This is also true for Germany where total equity assets have grown by 33 % annually between 2000 
and 2005. In the same time span , the number of institutions has grown from 53 to 164 (Ferreira and 
Matos, 2008). Additionally, the shareholder structure of German listed companies is more international 
and diversified . 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the role of international institutional investors as owners of 
public companies in Germany. The research question is: 'What is the role of independent institutional 
investors in the corporate governance of German listed companies? ' On the basis of an empirical 
study, the thesis aims to provide information regarding the influence of institutional investors in listed 
companies . Moreover, this paper examines how institutional investors exercise their role in corporate 
governance apart from official voice execution in the AGM and unfriendly shareholder acitivism . 
Ethics and rights of the respondents 
Research undertaken in the name of the University of Surrey must be conducted in an ethical manner. 
The research project will follow the guidelines of good practice for ethically conducted research . 
Participation in the survey will be without any risk . Participants can voluntarily decide about their 
participation and will be asked in advance if they are willing to participate. The interviews will avoid 
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offensive, distressing or deeply personal questions . The interviewees may refuse to answer any 
question for any reason . 
All the information provided will be treated as strictly confidential. The analysed results will be present d 
anonymously and only in a summarised form. 
Consent form 16 
Interviewee: Mr. XXX YYY, Company: ZZZ, CITY 
Date: xx January 2011 
Project title: The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance: 
Evidence from German Corporations 
Researcher: Petra Nix, URN 609 46 36 
Please 
1. I confirm that I have read and understood the information sheet dated 
January 2011 for the above project and have had the opportunity to ask questions. 
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw 
at any time. I understand that I can ask for any sensitive remarks to be 
removed from the record and that I am free to withhold information which 
16 Will be f illed out by the researcher and signed at the beginning of the interview. 
initial box 
D 
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I regard to be of a sensitive nature. 
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3. I understand that interview tapes and transcripts will be anonymised and stored 
within a locked filing cabinet within the research establishment and under the care 
of a designated custodian for five years. This will be in accordance with the Data 
Protection Act , 1998. 
4. I confirm that I have/have not* agreed for the interview to be tape-recorded 
as part of the study referred to above. 
* Please delete as appropriate. 
Name of interviewee Date Signature 
Petra Nix 
Name of researcher Date Signature 
D 
D 
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9.4 Feedback sheet - pilot test 
TECHNISCHE 
UNIVERSITAT 
DARMSTADT 
The Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance: 
Evidence from German Corporations 
How Corporate Managers in German Listed Companies Experience 
the Role of Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance 
An Empirical Study 
Researcher: Petra Nix, URN 609 46 36, September/October 2010 
Purpose of the Pilot Test 
The purpose of the pilot test is to refine the questionnaire so that respondents do not have any 
problems in answering the questions and so that there is no problem in recording the data. In addition , 
it will enable the researcher to obtain some assessment of the questions' validity and the likely 
reliability of the data that will be collected . 
The pilot test data ensures that the data collected will enable the investigative questions to be 
answered. The research question is: 'What is the role of independent institutional investors in the 
corporate governance of German listed companies?' A group of experts will be asked to comment on 
the representativeness and suitability of the questions. Suggestions on the structure are allowed. This 
will help to establish content validity and enables the researcher to make any necessary amendments. 
Please fill out the short questionnaire. This helps the researcher to determine if there are any 
problems with the questionnaire. 
1. Were the instructions clear? 
o Yes 
o No. What should be changed and why? Please comment. 
LXXV 
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5. 
6. 
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Which , if any, questions were unclear or ambiguous? Please comment and explain why. 
Which , if any, questions did you feel uneasy answering. Please comment and explain why. 
Were there any major topic errors? 
o No 
o Yes. What should be changed and why? Please comment and explain why. 
Was the layout clear and attractive? 
o Yes 
o No. What should be changed and why? Please comment and explain why. 
Any other comments? 
How long did the questionnaire take to complete? 
--
Minutes 
All the information provided will be treated as strictly confidential. The analysed results will be 
presented in a summarised form and anonymously in the thesis. 
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9.5 Code book 
As of 8 May 2011 
Question Type: closed-ended = 1; open-ended = 2; des = descriptive. 
SB = supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) ; MB = management board (Vorstand) 
T Cl-iNISCHE 
UNIVERSITAT 
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The method of measurement of the closed-ended questions is the multiple regression and for the 
open-ended question is grounded theory. The answers of the open questions were categorised and 
coded according to the given answers of the interviewees. The open-ended questions are not 
analysed via the SPSS software. 
- -
yy17 Sec 18 Yariable SPSS-Yariable Quest. Coding instructions 
Type 
-
._- -
--- - - --
--
---
III General Information 
1 Identification Number ID Des Interviewee 
---- -
---- -'--- ----
2 1 Member of the stock Index Des DAX = 1; MDAX = 2; 
index TechDAX = 3 
3 2 Category of the Function Des Supervisory board = 1; 
interviewee IRO = 2 
-
4 3 Sales 2010 Sales Des In Mio EUR 
--- --
---
5 3 Number of employees Employee Des Total number 
2010 
-
6 3 EBIT 2010 EBIT Des In Mio EUR 
I 
---. M _____ +------- ---------
7 4 Shareholder Structure ShareholdeUnst Des Share of institutional investors 
o - 25% = 1; > 25 - 50% 
= 2; I 
> 50 - 75 % = 3; > 75 -
17 Number of variable view_ 
18 Section of questionnaire. 
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r-'- f-. 
8 4 Shareholder Structure Shareholder_Germany 
__ . __ ~.w_ f-. -
9 5 Market capitalisation Marketcap (30.12.2010) 
10 6 Free float Freefloat 
Des 
Des 
Des 
TtCHNISCHt 
UNIVER ITAT 
DARM TADT 
100 % = 4 
n.a. = 5 
Germany 
0 - 25% = 1; > 25 - 50% 
= 2; 
> 50 - 75 % = 3; > 75 -
100 % = 4 
n.a. = 99 
'-
In Mrd EUR 
0 - 25% = 1; > 25 - 50% 
= 2; 
> 50 - 75 % = 3; > 75 -
100 % = 4 
n.a. = 99 
.. 
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W Sec Variable SPSS-
Variable 
I Role of institutional 
investor 
1 Board Oversight (BO) 
.---
--_ .•. -
11 1.1 Extent to ensure BOSB 
effective oversight 
Supervisory Board (5B) 
12 Extent to ensure BO MB 
effective oversight 
Manageme.nt Board 
(MB) 
1.2 Important and typical BO 
-
measures Measures 
-
---
._. 
13 1.3 Add value to oversight BOAV 5B (SB) 
14 Add va lue to oversight BO AV MB (MB) 
_ .. _---_ .. _-_., ,. __ .. - - --
--'--'--
-_.-. _._--' 
HowM/hy can inst. jnv. BOAV 
-
1.4 
Add value 
Type 
----
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
._---
2 
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Coding instructions 
----
-- - -
Supervisory Board 
o = none; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = medium; 4 
= strong; 5 = very strong 
Management Board 
o = none; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = medium; 4 
= strong; 5 = very strong 
0= none at all 
1 = Use of voting rights 
2 = Direct communication (personal , written , 
contact to supervisory board) 
3 = Third-party communication (sell-side analysts, 
media) 
4 = Shareholder cooperation 
5 = Seat in the supervisory board 
6 = Expertise/active consultative relationship 
7 = Self-interesUconflict of interest 
8 = Ownership/Meaningful stake 
9 = Research and Analysis - identification of 
weaknesses 
10 = Investment horizon 
11 = Objective and new thoughts (Denkanst6sse) 
12 = Sparring partner for management 
99 = others 
-'-
Supervisory Board 
0= I strongly disagree; 1 = I somewhat agree; 2 = I 
agree; 3 = I strongly agree; 4 = I very strongly 
agree 
Management Board 
o = I strongly disagree; 1 = I somewhat agree; 2 = I 
agree; 3 = I strongly agree; 4 = I very strongly 
agree 
- ---
0= none at all 
1 = Use of voting rights 
2 = Direct communication (personal , written , 
contact to supervisory board ) 
3 = Third-party communication (sell-side analysts, 
media) 
4 = Shareholder cooperation 
5 = Seat in the supervisory board 
6 = Expertise/active consultative relationship 
7 = Self-interesUconflict of interest 
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8 - Ownership/Meaningful stake 
9 = Research and Analysis - identification of 
weaknesses 
10 = Investment horizon 
11 = Objective and new thoughts (DenkanstOsse) 
12 = Sparrings-Partner for management 
99 = others 
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W Sec Variable 
2 Supervisory Board Nomination (BN) 
15 2,1 Inst. Investor focus on composition 
16 
SPSS- Type 
Variable 
BN 1 
General 
TECHNISCHE 
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Coding instructions 
o = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong ; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
BN Banks 1 0 = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
~l--"-- ---------'----------'---t-B-N--'----- -;---" t-~ = none at all; 1 = '~~ry ~e~'k ; 2 = ~e~~; 3 = 
Insurance medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
18 
19 
I 
20 
I 
BN 
Pension 
BN Hedge 
BN 
Endowm 
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
-;'~"--- --'---l--'-----'--------------~ SWF-- ~----- -o- ='-n-o-n-e- at- a- I-I; -1-=-V-~~ ~;~;: W~~;-3-=-
i--22-----II---ll----------------'-'- ____ " ______ +-6_m_:_dn_i~_~_~_~_~_0~_t_ro_n_g_~:._=_ve~_st_ro_ng_;_ _ _ 
23 
BN PE 1 0 = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
I I 6 = no opinion 
II 
I 
I 
I 
BN 
German 
o = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
! I 24 I BN Foreign 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
I medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
I ; 6 = no opinion 
I . ______________________________ -------,-.--.- .---. --- -- .---. 
;'~-"-I'''--- -r BN Others 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
.. ___ L--L----- ;:d~~~~~~~trong ; 5 = very strong ; 
26 'I 2.2 II Add value to board nomination BN AV SB 1--·----fO = I stron~;~--;;isa~~; -~-: I som~~ha-t-'-
agree ; 2 = I agree; 3 = I strongly agree; 4 = I I I I very strongly agree 
-----!.-----'1-------- t: ----- -.. -----.----.-- ._- ._- ---'--' -. 
.. I 2.3 I' HowfWhy can inst. inv add value BN AV 2 Name up to five 
0= none at ali 
'
I 1 = Use of voting rights 
__ .________________ _ _____________ ._ 2 = Dir~fL~g_Q1.r::rly.Qi.9<!!i 9n (perso_nal, ~i!!~.!1 
'--__ . ...-l __ ~ __ _ 
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contact to supervisory board) 
3 = Third-party communication (sell-side 
analysts, media) 
4 = Shareholder cooperation 
5 = Seat in the supervisory board 
6 = Expertise/active consultative relationship 
7 = Self-interest/conflict of interest 
8 = Ownership/Meaningful stake 
9 = Research and Analysis - identification of 
weaknesses 
10 = Investment horizon 
11 = Objective and new thoughts 
(DenkanstOsse) 
12 = Sparring partner for management 
99 = others 
-
LXXXI I 
UNIVERSITY OF 
SURREY 
TECHNISCHE 
UNIVERSITAT 
DARMSTADT 
W Sec Variable SPSS-
Variable 
Type Coding instructions 
3 Improvement company value 
(CV) 
r-;J--;~~Tnst. Inv add value to value C~~~~~~-I 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very-~~ak; 2 = ----
creation weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very 
strong; 
___ t _____________ -1---- ____________ 6 = n~Pinion 
28 CV Banks 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = 
weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very 
strong; 
29 CV Insurance 1 
6 = no opinion 
o = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = 
weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very 
strong; 
6 = no opinion 1-_____________________ -! ________ +-__ t-_________ _ 
_ 
30 __________ 1 ________________ -t-c_v __ p __ e_n_s_io_n_1-1 __ --+_o_=_ n __ on_e_a_t_a_II;_1 __ = _very_weak; 2 = weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong ; 
6 = no opinion 
-
31 I CV Hedge 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = 
weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very 
I 
strong; 
6 = no opinion 
32 
weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very 
strong; J- CV Endowm 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = ~ __ -+--- __________________ I-____ -! ____ 1-_6_=_n_o __ o ___ Pi~~~ ____________ . ___________ 0_ 
I-
33 CVSWF 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very 
strong; 
6 = no opinion 
L--+--~--------------_r------1_--1_--------------------
I 
1 0 = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = 
weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very 
strong; 
34 CVPE 
I I 
6 = no opinion 
I ! CV Genman 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = 
35 I ,I weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very 
strong; 
I 'i! 6 = no opinion 
___ L---1- _______________ --t _______ I-_____ ~--_------------ ---- ----------- ------
36 
I ! CV Foreign 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = 
- weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very 
I ,I I strong; 
i ! 6 = no opinion 
I I 
37 I CV Others 
I 
o = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = 
weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very 
strong ; 
LXXX[IJ 
U IVERSfTY OF 
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6 = no opinion 
TECHNISCHE 
UNIVERS I T~T 
DARMSTADT 
~_--~3-.-2--~M-e-a-s-ur-e-s----------------i-c-V--Me--a-s-u-re-s-i-2----~-O =--n-o-ne--a-ta- '-' - ---------------~, 
1 = Use of voting rights 
2 = Direct communication (personal , 
written , contact to supervisory board) 
3 = Third-party communication (sell-
side analysts, media) 
4 = Shareholder cooperation 
5 = Seat in the supervisory board 
6 = Expertise/active consultative 
relationship 
7 = Self-interest/conflict of interest 
8 = Ownership/Meaningful stake 
9 = Research and Analysis -
identification of weaknesses 
10 = Investment horizon 
11 = Objective and new thoughts 
(DenkanstOsse) 
12 = Sparring partner for management 
99 = others 
l.--+---+-------t-----r--,-.---. - - ---
38 33 Identify potential to increase CV CV Potential 1 0 = I strongly disagree; 1 = I somewhat j . agree; 2 = I agree; 3 = I strongly agree : 4 = I very strongly agree ~- -;;--+-H-O-W-Ml--h--y inst. inv. identify-----+-C- V--p-o-te-n-t-ia-, -+-2----+-0-=-~· ;~-e-at-a-lI- .----- --------,-
I potential 2 1 = Use of voting rights 
I 
2 = Direct communication (personal, 
written, contact to supervisory board) 
3 = Th ird-party communication (sell-
side analysts, med ia) 
4 = Shareholder cooperation 
5 = Seat in the supervisory board 
6 = Expertise/active consultative 
relationship 
7 = Self-interest/conflict of interest 
8 = Ownership/Meaningful stake 
9 = Research and Analysis -
identification of weaknesses 
10 = Investment horizon 
11 = Objective and new thoughts 
(DenkanstOsse) 
12 = Sparring partner for management 
99 = others 
LXXXJV 
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w I Sec Variable spss-Variable Type Coding Instruction 
4 Recommendations to company 
(REC) 
__ -+----.. ____ · _______________ +-____ --1· _____ 1 ___________ --
39 4 .1 To what extent do inst investors make 
recommendations to company 
REC Gen 1 o = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
40 REC Banks 1 
r----1----rl ____ .----.-------I-------j ...... . 6 = no opinion 
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong ; 
6 = no opinion 
f--.- . __ I ----.--------.-
41 REC 1 Insurance 
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
~ __ +--+-----------------------~-------r·---t--------------
42 REC Pension 
o = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
~ __ -;---.---.--------------------t------f---+----.--------
43 REC Hedge o = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 :: very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
_._. __ L--- '---_. _______ . __ . ______________ -t--____ ..__ --- --
46 
! REC EndOW 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
44 I medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
I t-___________________ . __ . ___ -+-____ -+_6._=_n_o_ op_i_ni_o_n ___ . __ _ 
l I REC SWF 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 45 medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; r-' J _________________ f_-----+---+-6. __ ~ no opinion .. _ __ 
I /1 REC PE 1 0 = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
I
I medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
i 6 = no opinion 
_.......-r--.. -l-------·-------------t-------+--------------
47 i REC 1 0 = none at all; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
I German medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 6 = no opinion 
....---1-----------------------+------ 1-----. -'- -- ... -
--, I 1 0 = none at all,' 1 = very weak', 2 = weak', 3 = 48 II II REC Foreign 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 :: very strong ; 
6 = no opinion 
--:;~-~--i-------------------+I-R-E-C-O-th--e;;: -~---.- --;-:~one at all ; 1 = very w~ak; 2= :-eak; 3 =' 
I I .11 medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
i I 6 = no opinion 
--+'2 ! Most important measures I REC -; ----l-o--=-n-o-n-e-a-t-a-II---- - --- .. ---
.. I ' I I Measures I 1 = Use of voting rights 
I I 2 = Direct communication (personal, written, I contact to supervisory board) 
I I III 3 = Th ird-party communication (sell-side I I I analysts, media) 
I I J 4 = Shareholder cooperation 
_..--L __ ....L __ ._. ______________ L----__ .. __ ---------- .-...... -.-- - .. - - -... -. - -
LXXXV 
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50 4.3 Ins!. inv. add value when they make 
recommendatons 
RECAV 1 
~ ___ ~~l~= the recommendations handled REC 2 Handled 
-----
TECH ISCH 
UNIVERSITAT 
DARMSTADT 
5 - Seat in the supervisory board 
6 = Expertise/active consultative relationship 
7 :::; Self-interesVconflict of interest 
8 = Ownership/Meaningful stake 
9 :::; Research and Analysis - identification of 
weaknesses 
10 :::; Investment horizon 
11 = Objective and new thoughts 
(DenkanstOsse) 
12 :::; Sparring- partner for management 
99 :::; others 
---- --
o = I strongly disagree; 1 = I somewhat agree; 
2 :::; 1 agree; 3 :::; I strongly agree; 4 :::; I strongly 
agree 
No codes or cateogories 
--
- -
LXXXVI 
UNIVERSITY OF 
SURREY 
W Sec Variable SpSS-
Variable 
5 Inducing changes in 
corporate strategy (IC) 
r.---r-'-- --------
51 5.1 To what extent do inst. inv. ICGen 
induce change 
---
~---.- -_._._----------I-------.. --
52 IC Banks 
r.--.- ----
53 IC Insurance 
1----------_. 
54 IC Pension 
._k'_ 
55 IC Hedge 
----
--
---_. -----_. 
56 IC Endow 
-_.- --_. ~-
57 ICSWF 
-' 
-----
58 IC PE 
--
f----.- 1---
59 IC German 
--
--_.-1----
60 IC Foreign 
---f---
61 
IC Others 
I 
I 
I 
I---- .. ---- "'---- I 
5.2 Measures to prompt change IC Measures I 
- I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
-_._- -_.-'--- -
Type 
1 
----
1 
1 
1 
-
1 
TECHNIS(HE 
UNIV(RSIT~T 
DARMSTADT 
Coding instructions 
.. _----
._. __ .-
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 
3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong ; 
6 = no opinion 
f---._--
-
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak: 
3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong ; 
6 = no opinion 
.. - .. _--...... 
.. -
R_._ 
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 
3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
---_ .. -
-
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 
3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong ; 
6 = no opinion 
. __ ... _._-_ ... --- --
-
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 
3 = medium; 4 = strong ; 5 = very strong ; 
6 = no opinion 
-----
---_. 
1 o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak: 
3 = medium: 4 = strong ; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
-"-- ------- .--. -
1 o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 
3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
-----------
1 o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 
3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong ; 
6 = no opinion 
--_._._. __ .. _--_.- ._. -- .-
1 o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 
3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong; 
6 = no opinion 
----.. -- .--~ .... . ... -
1 o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 
3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong ; 
6 = no opinion 
--_._-------- -- - ---
1 o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 
3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong ; 
6 = no opinion 
_ __ M _ .. ___________ .. 
--
2 0= none at all 
11 = Use of voting rights 
I 2 = Direct communication (personal , 
I written , contact to supervisory board) 
I ! 3 = Third-party communication (sell-side 
i analysts, media) 
I 4 = Share~~I.~=~:??~~.~a.t~on_ 
- .... ~. ,." .... _, .... -
LXXXVII 
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62 5.3 Inst. inv add value when they ICAV 1 
prompt change 
5.4 Common situations/events in IC Events 2 
-
which institutional investors 
prompt change 
TECHN ISCHE 
UNIVERS ITM 
DARMSTADT 
5 - Seat in the supervisory board 
6 = Expertise/active consultative 
relationship 
7 = Self-interest/conflict of interest 
8 = Ownership/Meaningful stake 
9 = Research and Analysis -
identification of weaknesses 
10 = Investment horizon 
11 = Objective and new thoughts 
(DenkanstOsse) 
12 = Sparring partner for management 
99 = others 
o = I strongly disagree; 1 = I somewhat 
agree; 2 = I agree; 3 = I strongly agree; 
4 = I very strongly agree 
0 = none at all 
1 = M&A 
2 = Shareholder remunerations 
(dividend policy, share buy-backs) 
3 = Underperformance 
4 = Capital Expenditure 
5 = Sustainability issues (i.e ., Co2 
emissions) 
6 = Management remuneration 
7 = Corporate finance 
8 = Special company situations (crisis, 
scandals) 
9 = Business portfolio 
10 = Management quality 
99 = others 
LXXXVIII 
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w I Sec I Variable 
I 6 Exercise of institutional power (EX) 
63 1 6.1 How do inst. Inv. exercise their power 
spss-
Variable 
TECHN ISCHE 
UNIVERSITiU 
DAR MSTADT 
Type Coding instructions 
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong 
--4--.- ... -. _. 
6~'--~1 -._"-_--./.. ______________ + _____ +_ 0 = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong ; 5 = very strong 
--- --- --
-;-
665 . __ II----~-------------I-----f.-- .. --. __ O_=. __ .n .. o_n __ e._at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = _ medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong 
---'. .-. 
o = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong 
67 I 0 = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong 
EX Seat 1 0 = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
-
1---68'---'--, I 
I medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong ~~---r -----------.--------+---------1---_ ... '-'- - - -
69 II I EX Other 1 0 = none at all ; 1 = very weak; 2 = weak; 3 = 
medium; 4 = strong; 5 = very strong 
I 6.2 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I Mea,u'e' to exe'c;se ;os'- powe' 
I 
EX 
Measures 
2 0 = none at all 
1 = Use of voting rights 
2 = Direct communication (personal, written , 
contact to supervisory board ) 
3 = Third-party communication (sell-side 
analysts, media) 
4 = Shareholder cooperation 
5 = Seat in the supervisory board 
6 = Expertise/active consultative relationship 
7 = Self-interest/conflict of interest 
8 = Ownership/Meaningful stake 
9 = Research and Analysis - identification of 
weaknesses 
10 = Investment horizon 
11 = Objective and new thoughts 
(Denkanstosse) 
12 = Sparring partner for management 
99 = others 
70 I 6.3 I Ins!. investors increase company value EX Comp 1 0 = I strongly disagree; 1 = I somewhat agree; 2 
I I when they exercise power value .. r I = I agree; 3 = I strongly agree; 4 = I very strongly 
1 ~ agree 
L-__ l--J.------------'---- ---_ .... ---_._ ... _------_._._ ... _ ...... _. . .... _.- ...... - - -
Lxxxrx 
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- 1 6.4 Events in which inst. investors exercise 
EX Events 2 
their power 
I 
I 
I 
-
7 Development of role of inst. investors FUTURE 2 
I 
0 = none at all 
1 = M&A 
TECHNISCHE 
UNIVERSITAT 
DARMSTADT 
2 = Shareholder remunerations (dividend policy 
share buy-backs) . 
3 = Underperformance 
4 = Capital Expenditure 
5 = Sustainability issues (i.e .. Co2 emissions) 
6 = Management remuneration 
7 = Corporate finance 
8 = Special company situations (crisis . scandals) 
9 = Business portfolio 
10 = Management quality 
1 
99 = others 
----J 
1 = Shareholder engagement 
2 = Regulation I 
3 = Dialogue 
4 = Expertise I 
99 = others 
x 
UNIVE ITYOF 
SURREY 
W Sec Variable I SpSS-Variable 
II General information about 
the relationship with 
institutional investors 
71 1 Frequency of contact I Contact 
1 
----
._---
--
72 12 Is frequency sufficient Frequ suff 
--r-
73 
1
3 Understanding of strategyl UNDERST 
business model- Gen 
I UNDERST 
74 I UNDERST Banks 
I 
75 I UNDERST Insurance 
I 
76 I UNDERST Pension 
77 UNDERST 
I 
Hedge 
j 
i I 
I UNDERST 
78 Endow 
I UNDERST 79 I SWF 
I ! I 
80 I I UNDERST I PE 
--r4---- I I I UNDERST 
81 I I German 
i 
I I UNDERST 
82 I 1 I Foreign I I I 
I I UNDERST 
-
I 
I Others 
I 
Type 
1 
1 
_. 
1 
I 1 
1 
1 
1 
I 
1 
I 
I 
1 
I 
I 1 
I 
I 1 
I 
;.-~ 
1 
I 
I 
1 
2 
I 
Coding instructions 
T(CHNISCHE 
UNIVERSITAT 
DARMSTADT 
-
None = 0; 1 - 20 contacts = 1; 21 - 50 
contacts = 2; 51 -100 contacts = 3; 
above 100 = 4 
-
Yes = 1; No = 2; No option = 0 
-
-----
0= no opinion; 1 = I strongly disagree; 2 
= 1 somewhat agree; 3 = I agree; 4= I 
strongly agree; 5 = very strongly agree 
0= no opinion; 1 = I strongly disagree; 2 
= 1 somewhat agree; 3 = I agree; 4= I 
strongly agree; 5 = very strongly agree 
o = no opinion; 1 = I strongly disagree; 2 
= 1 somewhat agree; 3 = I agree; 4= I 
strongly agree; 5 = very strongly agree 
o = no opinion; 1 = I strongly disagree; 2 
= 1 somewhat agree ; 3 = I agree; 4= I 
strongly agree; 5 = very strongly agree 
- -
o = no opinion; 1 = I strongly disagree; 2 
= 1 somewhat agree; 3 = I agree; 4= I 
strongly agree; 5 = very strongly agree 
----
0= no opinion ; 1 = I strongly disagree; 2 
= 1 somewhat agree; 3 = I agree; 4= I 
strongly agree; 5 = very strongly agree 
0= no opinion ; 1 = I strongly disagree; 2 
= 1 somewhat agree; 3 = I agree; 4= I 
strongly agree; 5 = very strongly agree 
o = no opinion; 1 = I strongly disagree; 2 
= 1 somewhat agree; 3 = I agree; 4= I 
strongly agree; 5 = very strongly agree 
~ 
o = no opinion; 1 = I strongly disagree; 2 
= 1 somewhat agree; 3 = I agree; 4= I 
strongly agree; 5 = very strongly agree 
o = no opinion; 1 = I strongly di~~~e~;'-'-l 
= 1 somewhat agree; 3 = I agree; 4= I 
strongly agree; 5 = very strongly agree 
--- -- l 0= no opinion ; 1 = I strongly disagree; 2 
= 1 somewhat agree; 3 = I agree; 4= I 
strongly agree; 5 = v=_~~tro~gIY a~e:_ _ 
X I 
UNIVERSITY OF 
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14 I Major differences between 
-
I .investors - DIFF 
I I I 
I I I 
DIFF 2 0= none at all 
1 = Investment style 
TECHNISCHE 
UNIVERSITAT 
DARMSTADT 
2 = Investment horizon 
3 = Engagement 
4 = Expertise 
99 = others 
x n 
U IVE ITYOF 
SURREY 
Categorised key criteria of the open questions and their answers 
I. Measures, add value and identification of weaknesses 
Questions 1.2; 1.4; 2.3; 3.2; 3.4; 4.2; 5.2; 6.2 - section I of the questionnaire 
1. Use of voting rights 
2. Direct Communication (personal, written, contact to supervisory board) 
3. Third~party communication (sell-side analysts, media) 
4. Shareholder cooperation 
5. Seat in the supervisory board 
6. Expertise/active consultative relationship and recommendations 
7. Self-interesVconflict of interest 
8. Ownership/Meaningful stake 
9. Research and Analysis - identification of weaknesses 
10. Investment horizon 
11 . Objective and new thoughts (DenkanstOsse) 
12. Sparring partner for management 
II. Handling of recommendations 
Question 4.4 - section I of questionnaire 
categories and codes not meaningful 
III. Company situations (CS) 
Questions 5.4, 6.4 - section I of questionnaire 
1. M&A 
2. Shareholder remunerations (dividend policy, share buy-backs) 
3. Underperformance 
4. Capital Expenditure 
5. Sustainability issues (Le., Co2 emissions) 
6. Management remuneration 
7. Corporate finance 
8. Special company situations (crisis, scandals) 
9. Business portfolio 
10. Management quality 
IV. Development of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance (D) 
Question 7 - section I of questionnaire 
1. Shareholder engagement 
2. Regulation 
3. Dialogue 
4. Expertise 
v. Differences between the different types of institutional investors? (OIFF) 
Question 4 - section II of questionnaire 
1. Investment style 
2. Investment horizon 
3. Engagement 
4. Expertise 
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UNIVERSITAT 
DARMSTADT 
X 111 
